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 Abstract 
 
This doctoral dissertation follows an economic analysis to study the fertility decisions 
of the couples, an important research field within the Family Economics, by developing 
three different lines of research. First, we analyze the effect of divorce law reforms in 
Europe on fertility decisions, for which we exploit the legislative history of divorce 
liberalization across Europe, finding that divorce law reforms have a negative and 
permanent effect on fertility. Second, we use data on second-and-higher generation 
immigrants living in the United States to study the impact of culture on the fertility 
decisions of adolescent women, exploiting the variations in fertility rates of teen women 
by ancestor’s home country. Our results show that culture has quantitatively important 
impacts on the fertility decisions of adolescent women. Finally, we study the effect of 
the number of children conceived during first marriage on the risk of marital dissolution 
using an instrumental variable approach. Our findings confirm the deterrent effect of 
children on the probability of divorce of the couple. By developing this thesis integrated 
within Family Economics, we try to shed light on the causes and consequences of 
fertility decisions made by the couples, complementing and contributing to the existing 
literature on fertility. 
 
 
Resumen 
 
Esta tesis doctoral sigue un análisis económico para estudiar las decisiones de la pareja 
relativas a la fertilidad, un importante campo de estudio dentro de la Economía de la 
Familia, mediante el desarrollo de tres líneas de investigación. En primer lugar, 
analizamos el efecto de las reformas en las leyes de divorcio que se produjeron en 
Europa sobre las decisiones de fertilidad, para lo que explotamos la historia legislativa 
de la liberalización del divorcio en Europa, encontrando que las reformas de las leyes de 
divorcio tienen un efecto negativo y permanente sobre la fertilidad. En segundo lugar, 
usamos datos de inmigrantes de segunda y superior generación que viven en los Estados 
Unidos para estudiar el impacto de la cultura en las decisiones de fertilidad de las 
mujeres adolescentes, para lo que explotamos las variaciones en las tasas de fertilidad 
de las mujeres adolescentes por país de origen de sus antepasados. Los resultados 
muestran que la cultura tiene un impacto cuantitativamente significativo sobre las 
decisiones de fertilidad de las mujeres adolescentes. Finalmente, estudiamos el efecto 
del número de hijos concebidos durante el primer matrimonio sobre el riesgo de ruptura 
matrimonial usando un enfoque de variables instrumentales. Los resultados confirman 
el efecto disuasorio de los hijos en la probabilidad de divorcio de la pareja. Mediante 
esta tesis integrada dentro de la Economía de la Familia, pretendemos mejorar el 
conocimiento de las causas y las consecuencias de las decisiones de fertilidad de las 
parejas, complementando y contribuyendo a la literatura existente sobre fertilidad. 
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Introduction 
 
The Economy of the Family became part of the field of study of the economy as a result 
of the researches conducted by Professor Gary Becker, whose influence on subsequent 
studies is clearly perceptible even today. This thesis employs an economic analysis to 
study fertility decisions of couples, an important field of research within the Economics 
of the Family.  
Throughout the following chapters, we show empirical evidence on the decision-
making process associated with fertility. Specifically, we analyze the effect of changes 
in divorce laws on fertility decisions, the influence of culture on fertility decisions of 
adolescent women and the relationship between the number of children and the 
probability of marriage disruption. 
The low levels of fertility rates, below the replacement rate of 2.1, are an ongoing 
concern for policy-makers and researchers in Europe. Previous studies have analyzed 
the role of different variables on the decline of the fertility rate in Europe (the 
incorporation of women to the labor market, the decline in infant mortality, the family 
policies implemented by each European country, the increase in earnings that increased 
the opportunity cost of women’s time...). In chapter one, we analyze the effect that the 
liberalization of divorce laws that occurred in Europe since the early seventies has had 
on the decline of fertility rates. Results suggest that divorce law reforms have a negative 
and permanent effect on fertility. These findings are robust to alternative specifications 
and controls for observed (such as the liberalization of abortion and the availability of 
the birth-control pill, among others) and unobserved country-specific factors, and time-
varying factors at the country level. Supplemental analysis, developed to understand the 
mechanisms through which divorce law reforms affect fertility, shows that both marital 
and out-of-wedlock fertility decline, but that the impact on marital fertility varies, 
depending on whether couples are married prior to or after divorce law reforms. 
The problem of the low fertility rate, which even puts at risk the necessary 
generational shift, is not the only concern that exists related to fertility. In the next 
chapter we analyze another major problem associated with fertility, the high fertility 
rates that exist among adolescent women in some countries. 
In chapter 2, we analyze whether there is a cultural component that increases the 
probability of being a teen mother, by exploiting the variations in fertility rates of 
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adolescent women by ancestor’s home country. For this purpose, we use data from 
women who were born and have lived in the United States, so that all of them have been 
exposed to the same institutions, legal constraints, markets and social stimuli. Thus, 
differences in fertility rates of adolescent women by national origin can be considered 
as supporting evidence of the impact of culture. Our results show that culture has 
quantitatively important impacts on the fertility decisions of adolescent women. This 
finding is robust to alternative specifications and to the introduction of several home 
country variables and individual characteristics measured when young women take the 
decision to have a child.  
In the last chapter of this thesis, we analyze the effect that the number of children 
conceived during the first marriage has on the probability of marital disruption of the 
couple. Previous researches show conflicting evidence on this issue, so we examine the 
impact of children on marital stability. Our results show that children conceived during 
first marriage have a deterrent effect on the probability of marriage dissolution. In 
addition, we consider the potential endogeneity between children and marital status, 
because while children can be considered as marital specific investments and affect the 
marital stability, those couples with more marital problems are less likely to have 
children. Using an instrumental variable approach, our results still show the deterrent 
effect of children conceived during the first marriage on the risk of marital disruption. 
These results are robust to changes in the definition of our variable of interest, to 
changes in our sample and to the inclusion of new controls previously excluded due to 
endogeneity concerns. 
Moreover, in this chapter we also explore whether all children have the same 
deterrent effect on the probability of marital disruption. Specifically, we analyze its 
impact on marital stability depending on the educational level of their parents. We find 
that the higher the educational level of the parents, the greater the negative impact of 
their offspring on the likelihood of marriage dissolution. This finding suggests that more 
educated parents make higher investments in the quality of their children, which 
increases more the value of their marriage, making it more difficult to break. 
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Chapter 1: Divorce laws and fertility  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Over the past fifty years, European countries have experienced a considerable decrease 
in their Total Fertility Rates (TFR).1 This rate declined from 2.84 on average in 1960, to 
below 1.9 in almost all European countries in 2006, with the lowest TFRs being for 
Greece (1.4), Spain (1.38), Portugal (1.36) and Italy (1.34), according to Eurostat.. 
These levels, below the replacement rate of 2.1, are an ongoing concern for policy-
makers and researchers alike. The search for explanations of this decline in fertility has 
covered much ground (see for a review Feyrer et al. 2008): the dramatic increase in 
female labour force participation (Ahn and Mira 2002; Michael 1985), the rise in 
earnings that increased the opportunity cost of women’s time (Becker 1981), 
technological progress (Galor and Weil 1996; Greenwood and Seshadri 2002), the 
decline in infant mortality (Sah 1991), the law reforms that made abortion more 
accessible, and the availability of the birth control pill (Ananat et al. 2007; Goldin and 
Katz 2000, 2002), among other factors. In this chapter, we present evidence suggesting 
that divorce law reforms have also played an important role. 
We are not the first to study empirically the effect of divorce law reforms on 
fertility but, to our knowledge, there is no existing literature that has examined reform’s 
impact on European fertility rates. The majority of papers have focused on the effect of 
public policies that regulate the aftermath of divorce in the US, finding a positive 
correlation between these laws and the fertility rate (Halla 2013). Less work has been 
done on the analysis of the fertility effects of divorce law reforms that regulate how 
spouses obtain a divorce. Alesina and Giuliano (2007) and Drewianka (2008), both 
using US data, found that the implementation of divorce law reform has a negative 
effect on the fertility rate. 
The introduction of more liberal divorce laws generates a permanent reduction in 
the costs of divorce, and so marriage become less attractive relative to divorce 
(Matouscheck and Rasul 2008). From a theoretical point of view, the decline in the 
                                                          
1 The TFR is defined as the mean number of children that would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime if she 
were to pass through her childbearing years conforming to the fertility rates by age of a given year. 
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value of marriage is expected to negatively affect marital fertility, to the extent that 
children are considered as marriage-specific capital (Becker et al. 1977; Stevenson 
2007). This is not the only expected impact of divorce laws on fertility. An opposite 
effect is also suggested if couples who are already married utilize investment in 
marriage-specific capital strategically over-investing in children to increase the value of 
their marriage (Stevenson 2007). Additionally, divorce law reforms can have an effect 
on the costs of entering into a bad marriage, which after the reforms are also reduced. In 
this setting, the decision to marry may be easier to take, especially if there are 
individuals who want to have children in a marital setting, which negatively affects out-
of-wedlock fertility and positively affects marital fertility (Alesina and Giuliano 2007; 
Drewianka 2008). All these contrary forces, operating through marital and non-marital 
fertility, make the effect of divorce laws on fertility unclear. Thus, whether divorce law 
reforms have an impact on fertility appears to be an empirical issue. 
In our analysis, we construct a panel of 18 European countries spanning the period 
from 1960 to 2006, using data from Eurostat, to analyze the effect of changes in divorce 
laws on fertility rates. We identify the relationship by exploiting the legislative history 
of divorce liberalization across European countries. Our results suggest that the 
introduction of divorce law reforms decreases fertility rates, and that the effect appears 
to be permanent. These results are consistent with the use of different measures of 
fertility rates and with the use of fertility rates by age of the mother. We find that 
fertility falls in all age groups, with the decline being greater for women between 20 and 
34 years old. 
These findings contribute to the growing literature on the impact of changes in 
divorce laws on socio-economic outcomes. Using methodologies very similar to ours, 
much of the recent literature has focused on the impact of divorce law reforms on 
divorce rates, generally finding a positive relationship between the permissiveness of 
the laws and the probability of divorce (Friedberg 1998; González-Val and Marcén 
2012b; Gray 1998; Peters 1986, 1992; Wolfers 2006, for the US; and González and 
Viitanen 2009; González-Val and Marcén 2012a, for Europe). Other researchers have 
studied the effect of changes in divorce laws on suicide, domestic violence and spousal 
homicides (Stevenson and Wolfers 2006), marriage rates (Drewianka 2008), marriage-
specific investments (Stevenson 2007), labour supply (Gray 1998; Peters 1986), and 
child outcomes (Gruber 2004). Not only do we add to this literature by examining the 
effect of divorce law reforms on fertility, but we provide additional evidence suggesting 
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that our results are not driven by unobserved country-specific factors, time-varying 
factors at the country level, the liberalization of abortion, reforms of cohabitation laws, 
or the availability of the birth-control pill. 
We introduce controls for fixed and trending unobserved factors at the country level 
that may be correlated with fertility. In addition, we include in our main specification a 
host of country level variables that appear to be related to fertility rates. For instance, 
given that fertility rates are lower among women who participate in the labour market 
(Kalwij 2000) and among those who are more educated (Bloemen and Kalwij 2001; 
Breierova and Duflo 2004; Leon 2004), the large rise in labour force participation since 
the 1970s may be driving our results. After including all these controls, the coefficients 
that capture the effect of divorce law reforms change very little. Another potential 
concern with our analysis is that it omits reforms that introduced changes in the abortion 
and cohabitation laws, the introduction of the oral contraceptive pill, and other family 
policies that may also be driving the evolution of the TFR. To examine this issue, we 
add to our main specification controls for legislative variations across countries in the 
timing of these reforms. Results are robust to the introduction of these controls.  
In the final section, we examine how divorce law reforms operate by analysing the 
effect on out-of-wedlock fertility and on marital fertility, separately. We find that the 
marital fertility rate decreases as a consequence of the liberalization of divorce laws, but 
that the effect is transitory; after a decade, no effect can be discerned. On the contrary, 
the impact on out-of-wedlock fertility is negative and permanent. Thus, our results 
suggest that the decrease in the TFR might be driven by two forces: first, after the 
adoption of reforms, the TFR may fall due to the reaction of both marital and non-
marital fertility, and after 7 to 8 years it may be driven by the reaction of out-of-
wedlock fertility. We also explore whether the timing of marital births is influenced by 
divorce law reforms. Results suggest that divorce law reforms have a selection effect on 
the composition of marriages, since we observe that those reforms may have different 
effects on fertility, depending on whether couples were married before, or after, the 
divorce law reforms. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the 
empirical strategy. Section 1.3 describes the data. Baseline results and robustness 
checks are discussed in Section 1.4. In Section 1.5, we analyse the mechanisms through 
which divorce law reforms operate, and Section 1.6 sets out our main conclusions. 
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1.2 Empirical strategy 
 
Our empirical approach makes use of the variations in the timing of divorce law 
liberalization across European countries, in order to identify the effects of these reforms 
on fertility rates. The reforms, known as no-fault unilateral divorce reforms, consist of 
any change in divorce laws that liberalizes divorce and of those changes that introduce 
unilateral divorce either implicitly (at least after a required separation period) or 
explicitly (divorce can be granted at the request of either spouse). As shown in 
González-Val and Marcén (2013a,b), the date of the no-fault unilateral reforms 
coincides with the timing of structural breaks located in the divorce rates series of 
European countries and of the US. These authors explain that those policy shocks had a 
permanent impact on the divorce rate, suggesting that the reforms of divorce laws 
permanently reduce the value of marriage relative to divorce. These permanent shocks 
should also affect the fertility decisions of those individuals who are already married, or 
those expecting to get married, since children are considered as marriage-specific 
capital (Becker et al. 1977; Stevenson 2007). For this reason, and following the 
economic literature that has found an important role of divorce law reforms in 
explaining changes in divorce rates (see, for example, Friedberg 1998; González and 
Viitanen 2009;  Wolfers 2006), we study the impact of these reforms on fertility. 
Initially, to capture the effect of divorce law reforms, we estimate the following 
expression: 
 
                     Fertility ratect = βNoFaultct +uct                                 (1.1) 
 
where NoFaultct is a dummy variable that takes a value of “1” when country c has a no-
fault unilateral divorce law regime in year t, and “0” otherwise. The parameter β is 
interpreted as the average change in the TFR that can be assigned to the change in the 
legal system of divorce. From a theoretical point of view, as mentioned above, the sign 
of this parameter is not clear, since these new divorce regimes can have both positive 
and negative effects on fertility. In this regression, we also include country fixed effects 
and year fixed effects, in addition to the interaction between the country fixed effects 
and the calendar time, and the quadratic calendar time, to control for evolving 
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unobserved country attributes. Regressions are estimated by population-weighted least 
squares.2 
This methodology only identifies a discrete series break (static model). However, it 
is conceivable that the impact of divorce law liberalization has very different short-run 
and long-run effects, which may induce a gradual change in fertility rates. To tackle this 
issue, we also estimate the dynamic response of fertility rates to divorce law reforms 
(dynamic model), as in Wolfers (2006): 
 
Fertility ratect = Σs  βsNoFaultcts +uct               (1.2) 
 
with the variable NoFaultcts  being a dummy set equal to “1” when country c has 
implemented a no-fault unilateral divorce law regime in year t for s periods, and “0” 
otherwise. These dummy variables are supposed to capture the entire dynamic response 
of fertility to the new legal regime, while the country-specific time trends identify pre-
existing trends. A negative sign of the β parameter indicates that the fertility rate in 
country c has fallen after s periods since the change in divorce law. The interpretation of 
a positive sign would be just the opposite. Again, we also add country fixed effects, 
year fixed effects, in addition to the interaction between the country fixed effects and 
the calendar time, and the quadratic calendar time as in Eq. (1.1). 
 
1.3 Data  
 
For the main analysis, we use the TFR for the period 1960 - 2006.3 The data for the 
fertility rate are publicly available from Eurostat. Figure 1.1 shows the temporal 
evolution of the TFR in Europe. From 1960 to 1964, the average TFR slightly increases, 
reaching a level of 2.88. Subsequently, there is a clearly observed decline in the average 
TFR until 1994, with this average rate being lower than the replacement level since 
1975. That was followed by a period of relative stability, around an average rate of 1.60. 
This stable rate was interrupted by an acceleration since 2003 that continues until the 
end of our sample in 2006. This behaviour is not limited to the TFR. Other common 
                                                          
2  We also repeat the analysis by introducing clusters at the country level. Results do not substantially change. 
3 To fill in the gaps, we use data from several issues of the UN Demographic Yearbooks, and the available data 
points, plus a linear trend, a quadratic trend, and mid-points. We also run regressions with the unbalanced and shorter 
versions of the panel (considering fewer years in the sample and dropping each country in turn). Results are quite 
robust to those presented here. 
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measures of fertility represented in Figure 1.2, such as the Crude Birth Rate (measured 
as the annual number of births per 100 inhabitants) and the Birth Rate (annual number 
of births per 100 women) for Europe, have a similar pattern to that of the average TFR. 
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This quick glance at fertility rates does not appear to reveal the presence of a causal 
link to the reforms of divorce laws. However, given that the drop in the TFR continued 
while European countries introduced their reforms, it is possible to argue that those 
reforms impacted the TFR. The timing of the main reforms in no-fault and unilateral 
divorce laws is summarized by Gonzalez and Viitanen (2009) (see Table 1.1). The 
period of reforms began in 1970, when Denmark implemented a divorce law reform that 
allowed unilateral divorce after a period of separation. After 1970, four European 
countries allowed divorce (Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland); two passed only no-fault 
divorce (Ireland and Italy); eleven countries permitted divorce when a couple had lived 
apart for a specified period of time, allowing unilateral divorce after separation in the 
1970s and 1980s (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands and the UK); two allowed this regime in the 1990s (Iceland and Norway), 
and another in 2000 (Switzerland). Only two countries (Finland and Sweden) 
recognized unilateral divorce, the right to divorce at the request of either spouse.4 As 
described previously in our empirical analysis, we categorize all these legal changes as 
no-fault unilateral divorce, because all reduce the value of marriage, regardless of the 
regime, and because the empirical literature does not distinguish between these types of 
reform, as in the case of US divorce law reforms.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 See Table 1 for a complete compilation of countries and years of introduction of divorce law reforms. 
5 As a robustness check, we re-run the baseline analysis by including a dummy variable that controls for those 
countries introducing divorce for the first time during the period considered. Results for our variables of interest do 
not vary. 
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Table 1.1- Data on the Year of Divorce Law Reforms, Year of Introduction of Cohabitation and 
Abortion laws, and the Pill 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Country 
Year Divorce 
Allowed 
No-Fault 
Unilateral 
Cohabitation 
Law 
Changes 
Abortion Law 
Changes 
(for cause) 
Abortion Law 
Changes 
(on demand) 
Pill 
Introduction 
Austria Pre-1950 1978 - - 1974 1962 
Belgium Pre-1950 1975 1998 1990 - 1961 
Denmark Pre-1950 1970  1970 1973 1966 
Finland Pre-1950 1988  1970 - 1962 
France Pre-1950 1976 1999 - 1975 1967 
Germany Pre-1950 1977  1975 1995 1961 
Greece Pre-1950 1979 - 1978 1986 1980 
Iceland Pre-1950 1993 1990 1975 - 1962 
Ireland 1997 1997 - - - 1976 
Italy 1971 1975 - - 1981 1968 
Luxembourg Pre-1950 1976 2004 1978 - 1967 
The Netherlands Pre-1950 1971 1998 - 1981 1962 
Norway Pre-1950 1993  1964 1978 1966 
Portugal 1976 1976 1999 1984 - 1963 
Spain 1981 1981 1987 1985 - 1964 
Sweden Pre-1950 1974 1987 - 1974 1964 
Switzerland Pre-1950 2000 - 1985 - 1961 
United Kingdom Pre-1950 1971 - 1967 - 1970 
Note: Column (1) shows the year in which divorce was first allowed in each country included in our analysis, and 
Column (2) shows the year of the first no-fault unilateral reform in divorce laws in those countries during the period 
under analysis (1960-2006). Column (3) shows the year of the introduction of cohabitation laws in each country during 
the period analysed. Column (4) shows the year of the introduction of abortion laws for cause in each country during the 
period analysed (1960-2006). Column (5) shows the year of the introduction of abortion-on-demand laws in each country 
during the period analysed (1960-2006). Column (6) shows the year of the introduction of the oral contraceptive pill in 
each country during the period analysed (1960-2006).  
 
1.4 Results 
 
1.4.1. Baseline Regression and Robustness Checks 
 
Table 1.2 reports the estimates for Equation (1.1). As can be seen in the first column, 
which includes country and year fixed effects, a change in divorce law is associated 
with a decline in the fertility rate. This is maintained even after adding country-specific 
linear and quadratic time trends in Columns (3) and (5), although the estimated 
coefficient on the divorce law reform increases (decreases in absolute value) by around 
14% after including those controls in the specifications. This is presumably because, in 
these specifications, not only are we removing country fixed characteristics but also 
time-variant unobservable factors that could bias the results presented in Column (1). 
To examine the impact of the liberalization of divorce laws, we also use an 
alternative strategy proposed by Wolfers (2006), which allows us to analyse the 
dynamic response of the fertility rate to the implementation of divorce law reforms. 
Table 1.2 also shows regressions for Equation (1.2) in Columns (2), (4) and (6). In all 
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these specifications, the dynamic estimates show a negative response of fertility 
following the adoption of no-fault unilateral divorce, and this effect does not fade over 
subsequent years. As in the previous case, the magnitude of the impact of divorce law 
reforms decreases in absolute value when quadratic trends are added.6  
 
Table 1.2- Baseline Regression: Static and Dynamic Effects of Divorce Law Reforms 
(Dependent Variable: Total Fertility Rate) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
No Fault Unilateral -0.262***  -0.236***  -0.225***  
 (0.036)  (0.028)  (0.028)  
No Fault Unilateral 1-2  -0.179***  -0.167***  -0.166*** 
  (0.045)  (0.034)  (0.032) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4  -0.266***  -0.255***  -0.242*** 
  (0.048)  (0.036)  (0.036) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6  -0.332***  -0.325***  -0.297*** 
  (0.051)  (0.039)  (0.041) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8  -0.407***  -0.406***  -0.356*** 
  (0.056)  (0.043)  (0.048) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10  -0.403***  -0.411***  -0.331*** 
  (0.059)  (0.047)  (0.054) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12  -0.409***  -0.438***  -0.329*** 
  (0.063)  (0.051)  (0.060) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14  -0.406***  -0.447***  -0.311*** 
  (0.066)  (0.054)  (0.065) 
No Fault Unilateral >15  -0.359***  -0.444***  -0.225*** 
  (0.067)  (0.059)  (0.075) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time2 No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 846 846 846 846 846 846 
R-squared 0.865 0.869 0.925 0.929 0.943 0.946 
Note: Sample: 1960–2006 (balanced panel). Estimated using country population weights. The countries considered in 
the analysis are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Standard errors in 
parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%.* Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
To reinforce the consistency of previous results, we run several robustness checks. 
We study whether our findings are driven by omitted economic and demographic 
variables. The impact of these variables correlated with the outcome of interest, if 
omitted, would be captured by the coefficients measuring the effect of divorce law 
reforms. To tackle this issue, we add controls to our baseline regression for several 
standard determinants of TFR that could explain the drop in our outcome of interest (see 
Tables 1.3 and 1.4).  
The first variable considered is Female Labour Force Participation (FLFP), with 
data from the OECD (see Appendix). The relationship between the FLFP and the TFR 
has been extensively analyzed in the economic literature, establishing a negative 
                                                          
6 From this point, all the estimates presented include country-specific linear and quadratic time trends. Results not 
including trends, or including only the linear trend, are similar to those presented in the article. 
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relationship between them (Mishra and Smyth 2010). Then, it is arguable that the 
increase in FLFP that occurred since the mid-1960s (see Figure 1.3) could cause the 
decline in the TFR, although other papers suggest that it was the drop in the TFR that 
instigated the rise in FLFP (Bloom et al. 2009). Despite the endogeneity concerns that 
the introduction of this variable may generate, its inclusion in Column (2) of Table 1.3 
does not change the estimated coefficients of the impact of divorce law reforms. The 
striking feature is that the coefficient picking up the FLFP effect is not significant. This 
could be due to the fact that this coefficient may not be fully capturing the relationship 
between both variables. Ahn and Mira (2002) suggested that the relationship between 
FLFP and the Fertility Rate is not linear, but U-shaped.7 To examine this issue, we have 
also included a quadratic term for FLFP in Column (2) of Table 1.4. In this case, the 
coefficients picking up the effect of FLFP on the TFR are significant, pointing to a 
quadratic relationship between them. With respect to the effect of divorce reforms, 
results do not change. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
7 Other papers, such as Kogel (2004), do not find a positive correlation between fertility and female employment. 
They simply present evidence of a reduction in the negative association between them since the mid-1980s.  
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Table 1.3- Robustness Check: Static and Dynamic Effects of Divorce Law Reforms 
(Dependent Variable: Total Fertility Rate) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
No Fault Unilateral 1-2 -0.166*** -0.165*** -0.200*** -0.192*** -0.170*** -0.166*** -0.170*** -0.137*** -0.163*** -0.172*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4 -0.242*** -0.243*** -0.289*** -0.251*** -0.249*** -0.242*** -0.250*** -0.214*** -0.253*** -0.248*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6 -0.297*** -0.298*** -0.355*** -0.303*** -0.304*** -0.297*** -0.305*** -0.254*** -0.308*** -0.305*** 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.041) (0.039) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8 -0.356*** -0.358*** -0.416*** -0.359*** -0.369*** -0.356*** -0.371*** -0.331*** -0.372*** -0.378*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.044) (0.048) (0.045) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10 -0.331*** -0.335*** -0.378*** -0.340*** -0.344*** -0.332*** -0.347*** -0.324*** -0.346*** -0.361*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.051) (0.050) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.050) (0.054) (0.051) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12 -0.329*** -0.333*** -0.364*** -0.345*** -0.341*** -0.329*** -0.344*** -0.303*** -0.341*** -0.353*** 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.057) (0.056) (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.056) (0.060) (0.057) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14 -0.311*** -0.317*** -0.335*** -0.329*** -0.331*** -0.312*** -0.334*** -0.257*** -0.317*** -0.333*** 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.062) (0.061) (0.066) (0.065) (0.067) (0.061) (0.065) (0.062) 
No Fault Unilateral >15 -0.225*** -0.238*** -0.218*** -0.270*** -0.254*** -0.226*** -0.260*** -0.208*** -0.224*** -0.260*** 
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.070) (0.070) (0.077) (0.075) (0.077) (0.069) (0.074) (0.071) 
Control 1  0.003 0.009*** -0.046*** 0.021 -0.0004 0.024* -0.035*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 
  (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.013) (0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.031) (0.010) 
Control 2       -0.002    
       (0.003)    
Observations 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 
R-squared 0.946 0.946 0.952 0.952 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.953 0.946 0.951 
Note: Sample: 1960–2006 (balanced panel). Column (1) shows our baseline estimate. Column (2) includes a control for the Female Labour Force Participation. 
Column (3) includes a control for the Female Gross Enrolment Ratio. Column (4) includes a control for the infant mortality. Column (5) includes a control for the 
per Capita GDP in thousands. Column (6) includes a control for the percentage of women in each national Parliament. Column (7) includes a control for both the 
per Capita GDP (Control 1) and the percentage of women in Parliament (Control 2), simultaneously. Column (8) includes a control for the unemployment rate, as 
percentage of the civilian labour force. Column (9) includes a control for the crude divorce rate. Column (10) includes a control for the crude marriage rate. 
Estimated using country population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%. * Statistical 
significance at 10% level. In all specifications are included: Year FE, Country FE, Country*Time and Country*Time2. 
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Table 1.3- Robustness Check: Static and Dynamic Effects of Divorce Law Reforms Including Variables of Family Policies 
(Dependent Variable: Total Fertility Rate) 
 (1) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
           
No Fault Unilateral 1-2 -0.166*** -0.166*** -0.171*** -0.128*** -0.177*** -0.166*** -0.164*** -0.234*** -0.063*** -0.062*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.023) (0.023) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4 -0.242*** -0.241*** -0.247*** -0.198*** -0.251*** -0.238*** -0.239*** -0.336*** -0.130*** -0.130*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.029) (0.029) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6 -0.296*** -0.292*** -0.299*** -0.257*** -0.303*** -0.293*** -0.291*** -0.410*** -0.191*** -0.191*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.034) (0.034) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8 -0.356*** -0.350*** -0.359*** -0.321*** -0.361*** -0.350*** -0.348*** -0.495*** -0.264*** -0.265*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.041) (0.041) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10 -0.330*** -0.320*** -0.335*** -0.294*** -0.343*** -0.318*** -0.318*** -0.483*** -0.269*** -0.273*** 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.046) (0.046) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12 -0.328*** -0.315*** -0.334*** -0.290*** -0.345*** -0.314*** -0.314*** -0.491*** -0.299*** -0.302*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.051) (0.051) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14 -0.310*** -0.295*** -0.317*** -0.266*** -0.325*** -0.293*** -0.293*** -0.478*** -0.314*** -0.319*** 
 (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.067) (0.069) (0.056) (0.056) 
No Fault Unilateral >15 -0.223*** -0.206*** -0.232*** -0.180** -0.232*** -0.200*** -0.201*** -0.422*** -0.323*** -0.330*** 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.077) (0.079) (0.063) (0.063) 
Control 1  -0.008*** -0.001 -0.001*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.003 0.0001 0.003 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0001) (0.002) 
Control 2        -0.005*   
        (0.003)   
Control 3        0.0003**   
        (0.001)   
Observations 799 799 799 799 799 799 799 759 587 587 
R-squared 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.948 0.947 0.946 0.946 0.953 0.961 0.961 
Notes: Each monetary value in this table is expressed in constant euros of 2005. Column (1) shows our baseline estimate. Column (11) includes a control for the 
total number of weeks of maternity leave. Column (12) includes a control for the cash benefits paid during maternity leave, as percentage of female wages in 
manufacture. Column (13) includes a control for the total number of weeks of parental leave. Column (14) includes a control for the cash benefits paid during 
parental leave, as percentage of female wages in manufacture. Column (15) includes a control for the total number of weeks of childcare leave. Column (16) 
includes a control for the cash benefits paid during childcare leave, as percentage of female wages in manufacture. Column (17) includes monthly family 
allowances for the first (Control 1), second (Control 2) and third child (Control 3, assuming a three-child family). Column (18) includes a control for the value of 
tax and benefit transfers of one-earner-two-parent two-child families (value calculated by subtracting the disposable income, after taxes and transfers, of a one-
earner-two-parent-two-child family from that of a comparable childless single earner). Column (19) includes a control for the previous variable, but divided by the 
average gross earnings of a production worker. Estimated using country population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 1%. 
**Statistical significance at 5%. * Statistical significance at 10% level. In all specifications are included: Year FE, Country FE, Country*Time and 
Country*Time2. 
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Table 1.4- Robustness Check: Static and Dynamic Effects of Divorce Law Reforms 
(Dependent Variable: Total Fertility Rate) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Controls:  FLFP 
Education: 
GER 
% Infant 
Mortality 
Per Capita 
GDP 
% Women in 
Parliament 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Divorce 
Rate 
Marriage 
Rate 
          
No Fault Unilateral 1-2 -0.166*** -0.145*** -0.219*** -0.180*** -0.121*** -0.149*** -0.119*** -0.108*** -0.157*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4 -0.242*** -0.205*** -0.315*** -0.237*** -0.181*** -0.214*** -0.174*** -0.138*** -0.247*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6 -0.297*** -0.244*** -0.385*** -0.284*** -0.218*** -0.256*** -0.213*** -0.203*** -0.312*** 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.038) (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8 -0.356*** -0.289*** -0.452*** -0.338*** -0.269*** -0.304*** -0.287*** -0.272*** -0.395*** 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.046) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10 -0.331*** -0.255*** -0.423*** -0.315*** -0.229*** -0.272*** -0.288*** -0.248*** -0.381*** 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.051) (0.050) (0.054) (0.054) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12 -0.329*** -0.240*** -0.415*** -0.317*** -0.219*** -0.265*** -0.270*** -0.257*** -0.378*** 
 (0.060) (0.062) (0.057) (0.055) (0.060) (0.061) (0.055) (0.057) (0.056) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14 -0.311*** -0.221*** -0.392*** -0.300*** -0.200*** -0.240*** -0.198*** -0.216*** -0.364*** 
 (0.065) (0.067) (0.062) (0.060) (0.066) (0.066) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) 
No Fault Unilateral >15 -0.225*** -0.164** -0.286*** -0.236*** -0.122 -0.161** -0.172** -0.139** -0.303*** 
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.071) (0.069) (0.076) (0.075) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) 
Control  -0.072*** 0.016*** -0.022*** 0.228*** -0.021*** 0.003 -0.609*** 0.381*** 
  (0.015) (0.002) (0.006) (0.030) (0.005) (0.008) (0.077) (0.057) 
Control Square/100   0.118*** -0.006*** -0.044*** -0.533*** 0.063*** -0.153*** 18.926*** -1.958*** 
  (0.023) (0.001) (0.008) (0.069) (0.013) (0.030) (1.921) (0.382) 
Observations 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 
R-squared 0.946 0.948 0.953 0.954 0.950 0.948 0.955 0.953 0.953 
Note: Sample: 1960–2006 (balanced panel). Estimated using country population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. ***Statistical 
significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%. * Statistical significance at 10% level. In all specifications are included: Year FE, Country 
FE, Country*Time and Country*Time2. 
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The fall in the TFR can also be attributed to the rise of female schooling in the 
European countries considered (Leon 2004). Female education can lower fertility by 
way of an increase in the opportunity cost of women’s time (Barro and Becker 1988; 
Willis 1973), or by increasing the age at marriage (Breierova and Duflo 2004), which 
can delay births and so lower the level of completed fertility (Kalwij 2000). To capture 
the impact of female education, we introduce the Female Gross Enrolment Ratio 
constructed by UNESCO (see Appendix) in Column (3) of Table 1.3. Results on the 
effect of divorce law reforms do not change, even after the inclusion of a quadratic term 
for female education in Column (3) of Table 1.4.8  
The decline in the infant mortality rate could also contribute to the decline of the 
TFR. The lower the infant mortality, the fewer children need to be replaced. On the 
other hand, falling mortality rates lower the cost of having a surviving child, and for this 
reason fertility should increase as mortality declines (Sah 1991). We incorporate in our 
analysis the ratio of the number of deaths of children under 1 year old during the year, 
to the number of live births in that year, using data from Eurostat. After adding this 
variable, the dynamic response of the TFR to the introduction of the new divorce 
regimes is quite similar (Column (4) in Tables 1.3, linear relationship, and 1.4, 
quadratic relationship). 
Per capita GDP has also been included as a control in Column (5) of Table 1.3 and 
Table 1.4 (with a quadratic term), since several studies have found that fertility has 
fallen in economic expansions and risen during contractions (Hazan and Berdugo 
2002).9 Results are unchanged to the introduction of per capita GDP. Unstable 
employment and unemployment may also influence the variation in the TFR by 
increasing uncertainty about future wages, which may encourage women to postpone 
(or even abandon) childbearing (Ahn and Mira 2001; Doiron and Mendolia 2011).10 
Column (8) of Table 1.3 and Column (7) of Table 1.4 (adding the quadratic term) show 
the estimated effect of the unemployment rate on the TFR, with the expected negative 
sign. Our coefficients of interest are not sensitive to its inclusion in the model.11 
                                                          
8 Results are also quite robust to the use of other measures of female education provided by UNESCO, which allow 
us to consider separately the Gross Enrolment Ratio by level of education (secondary and tertiary) and the 
introduction of the Total Gross Enrolment Ratio (male and female education). 
9 Per capita GDP can also be considered as a proxy of the increase in female and male earnings, which are also 
expected to affect fertility (Galor and Weil 1996; Ward and Butz 1980). 
10 Although we have not included a control for male employment, which is another potential determinant of fertility 
(Ahn and Mira 2001), the introduction of the unemployment rate may be partly capturing the importance of both 
female and male employment. 
11 The youth unemployment rate and the large number of temporary contracts may also have an important effect on 
the drop in the fertility rate by increasing uncertainty regarding future careers and earnings, as well as by lowering 
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Other public policies can account for a sizable fraction of the fluctuation in the TFR 
(see, for example, Acs 1996; Dickert-Conlin and Chandra 1999; Lalive and Zweimüller 
2009; Manuelli and Seshadri 2009; Milligan 2005; Whittington et al. 1990). This is 
relevant to our analysis, since improvements in family policies may raise the level of 
fertility (Björklund 2006), compensating for the impact of divorce law reforms. Thus, 
we include a wide range of controls for family policies in columns (11) to (19) of Table 
1.3, including the total number of weeks of maternity, parental and childcare leave; cash 
benefits during leave; the monthly family allowances for the first, second and third 
child; the value of transfers to a family type; and an index of direct and indirect cash 
benefits (variables properly defined in the Appendix). We observe that the negative and 
statistically significant effect of divorce law reforms on fertility is maintained in all 
cases. In addition, and recognizing the importance of these family policies as fertility 
determinants, we include two different proxies for the effect of public policies. First, we 
use per capita GDP, since the greater the GDP, the more family policies may be 
implemented. As shown before, this does not affect our estimates. Another possibility is 
the use of data on women in parliament, since female legislators are more likely to place 
priority on women’s, children’s and family issues (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). We 
then introduce the percentage of women in each national parliament on the total of seats 
in the parliament, using data from the Inter- Parliamentary Union, in Columns (6) and 
(7) (adding the per capita GDP) of Table 1.3 and in Column (6) of Table 1.4 (with the 
quadratic term). Our results are robust to the inclusion of all these controls. 
The marriage rate is another variable considered to be one of the principal 
determinants of fertility (Bongaarts 1978). The lower the marriage rate, the lower the 
marital fertility. Since children are a marital-specific investment (Becker et al. 1977; 
Stevenson 2007), we would expect that the decline in the marriage rate, which can be 
seen in Figure 1.3, leads to a drop in the TFR. Following this argument, we can justify 
the introduction of the divorce rate, since the greater the divorce rate, the lower the 
marital fertility. Again, our results do not vary substantially, even after adding quadratic 
terms for all these regressors (see Tables 1.3 and 1.4). Similarly, changes in 
cohabitation decisions can also affect the fertility behaviour of women. To examine this 
issue, we incorporate in our analysis changes in cohabitation laws that were approved 
                                                                                                                                                                          
current income for young men and women. But, because of the scarcity of the data, which are only available since the 
1980s, we cannot add these as regressors. We have a similar problem with the fluctuations of the price of housing. 
We would expect that these effects can be captured by the controls for fixed and trending unobserved factors at the 
country level, incorporated in the analysis. 
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during recent decades in several European countries to increase protections for 
cohabiting couples (see column (3) of Table 1.1). The introduction of these laws took 
place several years (in certain cases, decades) after the introduction of divorce law 
reforms. Then, the permanent impact of divorce law reforms on fertility observed in our 
baseline estimates may be capturing the effect of both cohabitation laws and divorce 
law reforms. Results are presented in Column (2) of Table 1.5. Column (1) shows our 
baseline regression to facilitate the comparison. Our findings do not change. 
 
Table 1.5-Total Fertility Rate: Dynamic Effects of Divorce Law Reforms including Cohabitation 
Laws, Abortion Law Reforms and Oral Contraception 
(Dependent Variable: Total Fertility Rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
No Fault Unilateral 1-2 -0.166*** -0.144*** -0.160*** -0.204*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4 -0.242*** -0.211*** -0.265*** -0.305*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6 -0.297*** -0.255*** -0.334*** -0.377*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8 -0.356*** -0.307*** -0.377*** -0.447*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10 -0.331*** -0.280*** -0.394*** -0.424*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12 -0.329*** -0.271*** -0.474*** -0.414*** 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14 -0.311*** -0.244*** -0.504*** -0.386*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
No Fault Unilateral >15 -0.225*** -0.167** -0.438*** -0.289*** 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.072) (0.073) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time2 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 846 846 846 846 
R-squared 0.943 0.949 0.958 0.950 
Note: Sample: 1960–2006 (balanced panel). Estimated using country population weights. Column (1) shows our 
baseline estimates. Columns (2), (3) and (4) show results after including the dynamic effect of the introduction of 
cohabitation laws, the liberalization of abortion laws on demand and for cause, and the introduction of the pill, 
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%.* 
Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
To check whether our results are sensitive to the measure of fertility used in the 
previous analysis, we run simple robustness checks. We use four additional common 
measures of fertility as dependent variables: the Crude Birth Rate, defined as the annual 
number of births per 100 inhabitants; the Birth Rate, measured as the annual number of 
births per 100 women; the Log(TFR), which is the TFR in logarithm; and the 
Completed Fertility Rate, which is the average number of children born to a cohort of 
women up to the end of their childbearing age, from the cohort´s beginning of exposure 
to risk (at age 15) until the age when all members of the cohort have reached the end of 
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the reproductive period (at age 49).12 Results for the first three dependent variables are 
presented in Figure 1.4, which shows that, although the magnitude of the impact varies 
a little, the behaviour of the impact is quite similar. The growing negative impact of the 
reforms stabilizes after 7-8 years of the adoption of no-fault unilateral divorce laws, and 
13-14 years after the reforms, the negative and significant effect is smoothed. 
Meanwhile, in order to use the Completed Fertility Rate as dependent variable, we must 
re-define our variables of interest, which in this case are defined as the number of years 
that each cohort of women lives under the new divorce laws. Data on the Completed 
Fertility Rate was obtained from two different sources.13 As expected, results show that 
the cohorts of women who spend more years under the new divorce laws experience 
greater declines in their completed fertility rate (see Table 1.6). This result is in line 
with previous results using the TFR as dependent variable. This is not surprising, since 
certain papers have pointed to the close relationship between the TFR and the 
Completed Fertility Rate (Bongaarts 2002).  
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Since women are mainly the ones who decide to have children, we also use the Birth Rate, whose denominator is 
the total number of women. 
13 Data come from the Council of Europe (1940 to 1944 and 1961 to 1970), and are computed by the author using 
data from Eurostat and from the UN Demographic Yearbooks (several issues) for years 1945 to 1960. Then, we have 
the Completed Fertility Rate of those women who were born from 1940 to 1970. 
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Table 1.6- Static and Dynamic Effects of Divorce Law Reforms 
(Dependent Variable: Completed Fertility Rate) 
 (1) (2) 
   
No Fault Unilateral -0.156**  
 (0.072)  
No Fault Unilateral 1-2  -0.204** 
  (0.082) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4  -0.239*** 
  (0.092) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6  -0.324*** 
  (0.103) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8  -0.395*** 
  (0.115) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10  -0.417*** 
  (0.126) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12  -0.491*** 
  (0.142) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14  -0.513*** 
  (0.152) 
No Fault Unilateral >15  -0.574*** 
  (0.160) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Country*time Yes Yes 
Country*time2 Yes Yes 
Observations 434 434 
R-squared 0.932 0.934 
Note: Sample consists of cohorts of women who were born between 1940 and 1970 (balanced panel). In this case, our 
variables of interest are defined as the number of years that each cohort of women lives under the new divorce laws. 
The sample does not include data for Germany, United Kingdom, Sweden, and Spain, due to the lack of data. For this 
reason, the sample is formed by the remaining fourteen countries. Data on the Completed Fertility Rate come from 
the Council of Europe (cohorts 1940 to 1944 and 1961 to 1970) and the Eurostat and the UN Demographic 
Yearbooks (data on live births and total number of women born in each cohort, cohorts 1945 to 1960). Estimated 
using country population weights. Standard errors in parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical 
significance at 5%.* Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
Finally, we have also used as a dependent variable the fertility rate by age of 
women, to test whether we are capturing the behaviour of a specific group of women. 
As an increase in women’s education may decrease the fertility rate of younger women, 
one can argue that we are capturing the decrease in the TFR of those women who spend 
more years in education, rather than the entire response to divorce law reforms. Figure 
1.5 presents the response of the TFR for women aged 15 to 19, 20 to 24, 25 to 29, 30 to 
34, 35 to 39, and 40 to 44. All coefficients are negative, indicating that the TFR 
decreases regardless of the age of the women. However, there are slight differences; the 
greater impact is observed for those women aged 25 to 29, suggesting that women 
delayed their births, or that they do not have children at all.  
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1.4.2. Is it divorce law, or is it the liberalization of abortion laws? 
 
While reforms in laws of divorce were introduced throughout Europe, all but one 
country (Ireland) established new abortion laws that overturned prior legislation. Eight 
of the eighteen countries permitted only abortion for cause since the mid-1960s (see 
Table 1.1). Under this regime, the reasons for allowing abortion include: rape, incest, 
severe foetal abnormality, and physical and mental health problems of the mother. Five 
countries adopted abortion on demand, that is, without restrictions, although gestation 
limits (i.e. first trimester, or until viability) were established in most countries. The 
remaining four countries passed both regimes during the period analysed. Abortion laws 
were classified using Brooks (1992), Henshaw and Morrow (1990), and information 
from the United Nations Population Division (2003). 
These reforms lowered the cost of abortion, which of course could have an effect 
on fertility (Ananat et al. 2007). Women could now abort pregnancies that would have 
resulted in unwanted births. Another concern is that the effect of abortion reforms may 
be confounded with the impact of divorce law reforms. To tackle this issue, we use the 
variation in the timing of abortion reforms to capture their effect on the TFR (see a 
similar strategy in, for example, Ananat et al. 2007; Donohue and Levitt 2001). We 
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introduce as explanatory variables dummies to control for the years since abortion laws 
by grounds (on demand or by cause) were adopted.14 
Results are shown in Table 1.5. Column (1) includes the estimates of the main 
specification, and Column (3) shows the response of the TFR to the divorce law 
reforms, after adding controls for abortion law reform. As can be seen, even after 
adding controls for abortion, divorce law reforms negatively impact the TFR. 
 
1.4.3. Is it divorce law, or is it the Pill? 
 
Another important phenomenon that began in the 1960s was the emergence of the oral 
contraceptive, better known as The Pill. It gave women the opportunity to safely decide 
when to have children and allowed the separation between sexual activity and 
procreation (Goldin and Katz 2000, 2002). This is important in our analysis, since one 
may surmise that it was the use of the pill that caused the drop in the number of births in 
Europe. Several papers have pointed to the access to the Pill as an important 
determinant of the decline in post-1960 US fertility (Bailey 2006, 2009, 2010).  
In the case of Europe, as can be seen in Figure 1.6, when the population with access 
to the Pill reached almost 50%, the Crude Birth Rate began to decrease. Note that, in 
Figure 1.6, we use information on the year in which the pill was first authorised but, in 
some countries (such as Spain and Ireland), it was not prescribed as a contraceptive 
until the late 1970s; its use was restricted to regulation of the menses.15 The information 
on the year in which the Pill was available was compiled by the author from each 
National Agency for the Regulation of Medicines, and from the International Planned 
Parenthood Federation (IPPF) (see Table 1.1). To our knowledge, there is no prior 
research using this kind of information for all the European countries considered in this 
analysis. 
 
                                                          
14 We have not incorporated in our analysis other methods that offer women a safe and effective alternative to the 
surgical abortion, such as mifepristone or RU-486, licensed in most European countries since the late 1980s, 
inasmuch as, despite the widespread introduction of this drug, women’s access to and the use of this technology 
remains limited by the abortion legislation (see Entre Nous 2005). 
15 We have also run the analysis using information on the year in which the Pill was allowed as a contraceptive. 
Results are quite similar.  
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To capture the effect of the Pill, we use a similar methodology to that utilized for 
the case of divorce law reforms, and for the abortion laws.16 In our work, we add to the 
main specification dummies to control for the years since the Pill was available. Table 
1.5 reports the results. Column (1) includes the baseline and Column (4) shows the 
dynamic response of the TFR to divorce law reforms, after controlling for the access to 
the Pill. Once again, our results on the TFR’s reaction to divorce law reforms are not 
significantly affected.  
Finally, Table 1.7 presents the results of the main specification in Column (1), and 
the estimates after adding all controls that are available for the 18 countries in our 
analysis in Column (2).17 Although the magnitude of the negative effect diminishes 
after adding all controls, we still find that divorce law reforms had a negative and 
significant effect on the TFR, and that this effect is lasting. After this analysis, we are 
confident that we are capturing the effect of divorce law reforms, rather than other 
observed or unobserved factors, or other reforms that directly affect family planning.18  
                                                          
16 An alternative strategy could be the use of data on the use or sales of the Pill, but this is not possible since this 
information is quite scarce. 
17 We introduce as controls economic and demographic variables, data for cohabitation and abortion laws, and data 
for the introduction of the pill. Data on family policies are not included since there are no data available for Iceland. 
However, we re-estimate this regression including also data for family policies, available from 1960 to 2006, and 
results are quite similar.  
18 Of course, these estimates should be treated with a certain caution, since we have included some variables that may 
generate endogeneity concerns. 
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Table 1.7-Total Fertility Rate: Dynamic Effects of Divorce Law Reforms With All Controls 
(Dependent Variable: Total Fertility Rate) 
 (1) (2) 
   
No Fault Unilateral 1-2 -0.166*** -0.081*** 
 (0.032) (0.024) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4 -0.242*** -0.102*** 
 (0.036) (0.030) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6 -0.297*** -0.135*** 
 (0.041) (0.034) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8 -0.356*** -0.183*** 
 (0.048) (0.039) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10 -0.331*** -0.176*** 
 (0.054) (0.044) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12 -0.329*** -0.186*** 
 (0.060) (0.049) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14 -0.311*** -0.135** 
 (0.065) (0.055) 
No Fault Unilateral >15 -0.225*** -0.102* 
 (0.075) (0.061) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Country*time Yes Yes 
Country*time2 Yes Yes 
Observations 846 846 
R-squared 0.943 0.980 
Note: Sample: 1960–2006 (balanced panel). Estimated using country population weights. Standard errors in 
parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%.* Statistical significance at 10% level. 
Adding all controls. 
 
1.5 How do divorce laws operate through marital and 
non-marital fertility? 
 
1.5.1 Fertility by marital status 
 
Up to this point, we have empirically studied the impact of divorce law reforms on the 
TFR. In this section, we explore the mechanisms through which these reforms affect 
fertility. To address this issue, we would have liked to have information on what 
motivates fertility behaviour, but this is not available for all countries analysed, in the 
period covered. Instead, we examine whether fertility’s response to divorce law reforms 
differs depending on the marital status of individuals. This is also an interesting issue 
since, as explained above, it has been suggested that these legal reforms affect marital 
and non-marital fertility in different ways. 
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Table 1.8-Marital Birth Rate, Non-Marital Birth Rate and Illegitimacy Ratio: How Does Divorce 
Law Reforms Operate Through Marital Status? 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
No Fault Unilateral -0.422***  -0.048*  -0.052  
 (0.088)  (0.025)  (0.036)  
No Fault Unilateral 1-2  -0.235**  -0.079***  -0.104** 
  (0.103)  (0.028)  (0.041) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4  -0.436***  -0.138***  -0.161*** 
  (0.116)  (0.032)  (0.047) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6  -0.535***  -0.204***  -0.230*** 
  (0.132)  (0.036)  (0.053) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8  -0.632***  -0.308***  -0.339*** 
  (0.152)  (0.042)  (0.061) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10  -0.479***  -0.408***  -0.471*** 
  (0.172)  (0.047)  (0.069) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12  -0.421**  -0.495***  -0.584*** 
  (0.191)  (0.052)  (0.077) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14  -0.340  -0.549***  -0.656*** 
  (0.209)  (0.057)  (0.084) 
No Fault Unilateral >15  -0.150  -0.545***  -0.672*** 
  (0.238)  (0.065)  (0.096) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 846 846 846 846 846 846 
R-squared 0.958 0.959 0.977 0.980 0.983 0.984 
Note: Sample: 1960–2006 (balanced panel). Estimated using country population weights. The dependent variable in 
Columns (1) and (2) is the Marital Birth Rate (Marital Births/500 Inhabitants); the dependent variable in Columns (3) 
and (4) is the Non-Marital Birth Rate (Out of Wedlock Births/500 Inhabitants); the dependent variable in Columns 
(5) and (6) is the Illegitimacy Rate (Out of Wedlock Births/10 Births). Standard errors in parentheses. ***Statistical 
significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%. * Statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
Results on the marital fertility rate are shown in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.8. 
There, the dependent variable is defined as the number of births within marriage per 500 
inhabitants (see Appendix).19 The dynamic estimates show that the negative effect of 
divorce law reforms on marital fertility rates dissipates over the subsequent decade, so 
the effect appears to be transitory. These findings are consistent with certain theoretical 
predictions proposed in the economic literature. The decrease in the value of marriage 
because of the decline in divorce costs (Peters 1992), in addition to the rise in couple´s 
instability, as expected, seem to drive the behaviour of the marital fertility rate at least 
until 10 years after the legal shift in divorce laws. However, thenceforth, no effect is 
observed. This could be due to an increase in the number of marriages, since the 
decision to marry can be less difficult to take under the new divorce law regimes 
(Alesina and Giuliano 2007; Drewianka 2008). It could also be due to an increase in the 
number of couples already married who decide to have children to compensate for the 
                                                          
19 We also re-ran the analysis using as dependent variable the number of births within marriage over the number of 
women, and over the number of women aged 15-49. Results are quite similar. 
Divorce laws and fertility 
 
- 33 - 
 
decrease in the value placed on the marriage institution (Stevenson 2007), although we 
admit that this change in the behaviour of married couples seems at odds. 
Another possibility is that the reaction in marital fertility is driven by the decisions 
of those who married after the reform. Over time, the number of couples who married 
before the reform grew older, and so they were less likely to have children, but the 
number of marriages that took place after the adoption of the new divorce law regime 
increased. Since, as documented by Weiss and Willis (1997), the divorce law regime at 
the time of marriage is relevant in determining the likelihood of divorce, if a great 
number of couples who married under the new divorce law regime are those who were 
able to sort themselves better at marriage, then the divorce rate for them should fall 
(Matouschek and Rasul 2008; Weiss and Willis 1997). This is considered in the 
literature as the selection effect. As a consequence of that, we would expect the marital 
fertility rate to remain constant or even increase as the number of couples married under 
the new law grows. This potential explanation can shed light on the somewhat puzzling 
change in the response of marital fertility over time. A more detailed analysis of marital 
fertility by duration of marriage (see the following subsection) helps us to confirm this 
prediction. 
The effect on the non-marital fertility rate, calculated as non-marital births per 500 
inhabitants (see Appendix), is negative, significant, and permanent.20 Results are 
reported in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.8. When using the illegitimacy ratio as 
dependent variable, defined as the number of non-marital births per 10 births, the 
negative and statistically significant impact of divorce law reforms is observed again 
(see Columns (5) and (6) of Table 1.8).21 Our findings are in line with those of 
Drewianka (2008), who suggested that unilateral divorce law increases the legitimacy 
ratio. As proposed in the theoretical literature, the decrease in the costs of divorce can 
make entering marriage easier, even for those who are more likely to enter into a low-
quality match (Alesina and Giuliano 2007; Drewianka 2008). This could explain the 
reduction in the non-marital birth rate. Additionally, since divorce law reforms 
increased the number of outside options, not only for those who are married, but also for 
those who cohabit, individuals would be less likely to bear a child until they envision a 
stable relationship. 
                                                          
20 As in the case of the marital birth rate, we have also run this analysis changing the denominator of the dependent 
variable to the total number of women, and the number of women aged 15-49. Results do not vary. 
21 Results are also consistent with the inclusion of all controls. 
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In sum, our findings suggest that the negative effect on the TFR immediately after 
the adoption of the new divorce regimes, is driven by the reaction of both marital and 
non-marital fertility rates. But, 11-12 years later, the reduction in the TFR is maintained 
by the decrease in the non-marital fertility rate. 
 
1.5.2. Fertility by duration of marriage 
 
For further evidence on the mechanisms through which divorce law reforms operate, we 
also examine its impact on marital fertility, considering marriages of the same duration. 
As described in Lillard (1993), the probability of pregnancy in a marital setting rises 
during the first five years of marriage, and declines thereafter, but if divorce law 
reforms increase the probability of marital dissolution over the marriage duration, this 
pattern can change. Since divorce costs are reduced with the liberalization of divorce 
laws, the decision to marry immediately after becoming pregnant can be easier, since a 
bad marriage can more easily be dissolved (Alesina and Giuliano 2007; Drewianka 
2008), and it would be reasonable to expect an increase in the fertility of those married 
for less than a year. However, the considerable increase in the likelihood of marital 
dissolution over the first year of marriage (Lillard 1993), due to the new divorce 
regimes, can reduce the number of conceptions. Thus, the impact of divorce law reforms 
on marital fertility during the first year of marriage seems to be an empirical question. 
As long as the marriage continues, the probability of dissolution tends to decline, 
because those couples who survive are more experienced in dealing with potential 
breakdowns (Becker et al. 1977). For instance, they may be capable of behaving 
strategically by over-investing in children, a marital-specific investment (Stevenson 
2007), bringing about an increase in marital fertility after the changes in the divorce 
law. Then, the longer the duration of the marriage, the greater the hazard of another 
pregnancy (Lillard 1993), and the greater the probability of over-investing in children. 
Nevertheless, women, who have traditionally been responsible for the child after 
divorce, can also be less motivated to have another child if they feel more fearful of 
being deserted, which becomes easier under new divorce law regimes. This negative 
response is expected to be more pronounced after 9-10 years of marriage, which is the 
average duration of marriages prior to divorce (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007). Then, 
again, the response of marital fertility as the duration of marriage increases is 
ambiguous. 
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To explore this issue empirically, we use data from 1960 to 1998 on the number of 
births by total duration of married life. This dataset is available in several special issues 
of the UN Demographic Yearbooks.22 The marital duration is defined as the number of 
completed years elapsed between the exact dates of marriage of the wife and the exact 
date of birth of the child. We recognise that this can bias our results, since it is not 
limited to first marriages, and the decision to become pregnant can differ if the wife has 
been married more than once. Another problem with this dataset is that the duration of 
marriage is not calculated simply by difference of years. This implies that the 
coefficients measuring the fertility response of couples of marital duration r to a divorce 
law reform k years after its adoption in year t are capturing the reaction of those who 
gave birth in year t, and the response of those who had a child in year t+1 only if the 
time that elapsed between the exact date of marriage of the wife and the exact date of 
birth of the child is greater than r years but lower than r+1.23  
Results on the dynamic response of fertility by duration of marriage are displayed 
in Table 1.9.24 In all those regressions, the dependent variable is defined as the number 
of legitimate births of couples of marital duration r, over the total number of legitimate 
births.25 We show results for 8 (under 1 year of duration, each two years since then until 
9 years married, and the intervals 10-14, 15-19, 20 and over) of the 14 available 
categories in the UN Demographic Yearbooks.26 Column (1) presents our estimates for 
the response of fertility to divorce law reforms, for those who have been married for less 
than 1 year. It is observed that the marital fertility rate decreases as a result of divorce 
law reforms 5-6 years after adoption. The effect is not significant immediately after the 
implementation of divorce law reforms. These findings suggest that the so-called “shot-
gun” marriages are not driving the behaviour of the marital fertility of those married for 
less than 1 year. Rather, the unstable situation of couples during this first year of 
marriage, which increases after divorce law reforms, is more likely to be the cause of 
the reduction in this marital fertility rate. 
                                                          
22 Since 1998, this information has been removed from the minimum list of recommended tables and no data is 
shown in the UN Demographic Yearbooks. For robustness, we have also checked all our results by using data until 
1998 and results are unchanged. 
23 For instance, the UN classifies in the category “births after 2 years of marriage” the child of a couple who was born 
in October 1973 and the parents were married in December 1970, rather than placing the child in the category “births 
after 3 years of marriage”. 
24 Results are also quite similar after adding all controls, but because of endogeneity concerns we prefer the estimates 
without controls. 
25 We have also run this analysis using other denominators, such as the total number of births, the total population, 
the total number of women, and the number of women aged 15-49. Differences with the results shown here are not 
discernible. 
26 Results are quite similar in those categories not included in the chapter (2 years married, 4 years married, 6 years 
married, and 8 years married). We excluded the category with duration of marriage “unknown”. 
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Table 1.9.-Marital Fertility (Varying by Duration of Marriage): Static and Dynamic Effects of Divorce Law Reforms 
(Dependent variable: Marital Births / Total Marital Births) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
No Fault Unilateral 1-2 0.003 0.006*** 0.002 -0.001 -0.002*** -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.001*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0003) 
No Fault Unilateral 3-4 -0.010 0.011*** 0.006*** 0.0004 -0.002*** -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.001*** 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0004) 
No Fault Unilateral 5-6 -0.023*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.003** -0.000 -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.001*** 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0004) 
No Fault Unilateral 7-8 -0.032*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.001 -0.004 -0.007*** -0.001*** 
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.0004) 
No Fault Unilateral 9-10 -0.038*** 0.007*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.002* -0.0004 -0.007*** -0.001*** 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.0005) 
No Fault Unilateral 11-12 -0.039*** 0.007** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.002 -0.006*** -0.001** 
 (0.012) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
No Fault Unilateral 13-14 -0.040*** 0.007** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.004 -0.005*** -0.001** 
 (0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
No Fault Unilateral >15 -0.035** 0.003 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.006*** 0.006 -0.004** -0.001 
 (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 702 702 702 702 702 702 702 702 
R-squared 0.887 0.905 0.905 0.861 0.874 0.892 0.949 0.970 
Note: Sample: 1960–1998 (balanced panel). Estimated using country population weights.  In column (1) the variable "marital births" includes live births of couples 
who have been married less than 1 year. In column (2) the variable "marital births" includes live births of couples who have been 3 years married. In column (3) 
the variable "marital births" includes live births of couples who have been 5 years married. In column (4) the variable "marital births" includes live births of 
couples who have been 7 years married. In column (5) the variable "marital births" includes live births of couples who have been 9 years married. In column (6) 
the variable "marital births" includes live births of couples who have been between 10 and 14 years married. In column (7) the variable "marital births" includes 
live births of couples who have been between 15 and 19 years married. In column (8) the variable "marital births" includes live births of couples who have been 
married 20 years or more. Standard errors in parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 1%. **Statistical significance at 5%.* Statistical significance at 10% level. 
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Column (2) shows results on the legitimate fertility of couples who have been 
married for 3 years. All but one of our estimates are positive and statistically significant, 
pointing to an increase in the marital fertility rate. This may indicate that couples decide 
to invest in children to compensate for the decrease in the value placed on the marriage 
after the reforms. One can also surmise that this response of the marital fertility rate is 
due to the fact that couples surviving three years of marriage are in a stable relationship, 
with a long-term perspective, and so they feel more confident having a child. Although 
these explanations appear to be valid, since their predictions coincide with the results 
obtained, they have little to do with the changes in the behaviour observed when the 
marital duration increases. 
Focusing on Columns (3), (4) and (5) of Table 1.9 - which report the response of 
those married for 5, 7, and 9 years, respectively - we can clearly observe two distinct 
patterns. After the adoption of the new divorce regimes, the effect is either not 
significant, or negative and statistically significant, and some years later the impact 
becomes positive and significant. Note that this startling change in the behaviour of 
couples does not occur in the same period: the greater the duration of the marriage, the 
fewer the number of positive and significant coefficients. Then, it is hard to find a 
unique explanation for this puzzling response, unless we consider that marriages that 
took place before and after divorce law reforms behave in different ways.  
As explained above, if divorce law reforms have a selection effect on the 
composition of marriages, those who were married under the new regimes would be less 
likely to divorce (Matouschek and Rasul 2008), changing their incentive to have 
children. Using data on total marital fertility, this hypothesis was hard to test, but we 
can probe this further through the dataset on births by duration of marriage, since this 
allows us to observe separately the responses of couples married under different 
regimes. For instance, the sample of marriages of 5 years duration contains couples 
married under the old and under the reformed divorce regime, but our estimates of the 
dynamic effect do not consider the response of those couples together. For instance, the 
coefficient measuring the response of the marital fertility rate of those married 5 years 
ago, after 1-2 years of the adoption of the reform, is unable to capture the behaviour of 
those married under the new regime; the reaction of those who were married the same 
year as the change in the law is picked up by the coefficient measuring the impact of the 
divorce law reforms 5-6 years after adoption. The response of couples who married two 
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years after the reform is captured by the coefficient measuring the effect of divorce law 
reforms 7-8 years after adoption, and so on.  
Then, if the changing response is due to the selection effect, we would expect to 
observe a variation in the coefficients picking up the response of couples married under 
the new regime. Results presented in Columns (3) to (5) of Table 1.9 seem to confirm 
this, the estimates that capture the reaction of the marriages that took place under the 
new divorce laws are always positive and significant, but the coefficients measuring the 
response of those married under the old regime are either not significant, or negative 
and significant. It is important to note that, in some of our estimates, the response 
changes one year earlier than we would expect. In column (3) -those married for five 
years-, we would expect that the first positive and significant coefficient would be the 
estimate measuring the effect of divorce law reforms 5-6 years after adoption, since it is 
supposed to be capturing the behaviour of those married in the same year as the 
implementation of the divorce law reforms. However, we see that the coefficient 
picking up the impact of the reforms 3-4 years after implementation is also positive and 
significant. One can argue that this contradicts our prediction, but because of the way in 
which the duration of married life is calculated (see the explanation above), the 
coefficient measuring how divorce law reforms affect the marital fertility rate of those 
married for 5 years 3-4 years after the introduction of the legal reform, could be partly 
capturing the behaviour of those married under the new regime. A similar pattern is 
observed in Columns (4) and (5). Therefore, our findings suggest that the selection 
effect matters in determining how divorce law reforms operate through marital fertility. 
When considering the fertility response to divorce law reforms on marriages of 10 
years or longer duration (see Columns (6), (7), and (8)), we observe that those reforms 
had a negative or non-significant effect on the marital fertility rate. As before, this can 
be explained by the selection effect, since in those cases almost all estimates capture the 
performance of those married under the old regime. Then, women married before 
divorce law reforms are more fearful of the break-up of their marriages, and so, under 
the new divorce regimes, they are less likely to want a child. This decreases the marital 
fertility rate.  
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1.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter analyses the impact of the liberalization of divorce laws on fertility. Since 
divorce law reforms may reduce the value of marriage, and given that children are 
considered to be a marital-specific investment, it is expected that the implementation of 
these new regimes affects fertility. To examine this issue, we use data from 18 European 
countries for the period 1960 to 2006. Results suggest that divorce law reforms have a 
negative and permanent effect on fertility. This response of fertility is quite robust to the 
introduction of a whole array of explanations that can also be responsible for the drop in 
the fertility rate since the late 1960s. These findings are also consistent to alternative 
specifications and controls for unobserved country-specific factors, time-variant factors 
at the country level, and different measures of fertility. 
We further explore the mechanisms that conduct the reaction of fertility to divorce 
law reforms by analysing the effect on out-of-wedlock fertility, as well as on marital 
fertility. We find that both decrease after the introduction of divorce law reforms, but 
the fall in marital fertility does not seem to be permanent, indicating that the negative 
response of the fertility rate is maintained over time by the decline in the non-marital 
fertility rate.  
We also study the impact of divorce law reforms on legitimate fertility by duration 
of marriage. The clear result of this analysis is that the fertility behaviour of couples 
who married under the new divorce law regimes differs from those married before the 
reforms. Thus, we suggest that the selection effect, which implies improvements in 
marriage match quality in response to divorce law reforms (Matouschek and Rasul 
2008), plays an important role in fertility behaviour. 
Our findings may have economic consequences for women. Although we do not 
account for the possible effect on the participation of women in the labour market of a 
decline in fertility, the literature suggests that a decrease in fertility may instigate a rise 
in female labour force participation (see Bloom et al. 2009). This also has consequences 
for women’s education, since it can encourage women to invest in education due to the 
increase in the returns to women’s education that generate the increase in participation 
in the labour market. The decline in the fertility rate, jointly with the aging of European 
society, may also have negative consequences for the European welfare system, and 
specifically the pensions system, based on the maintenance of benefits to seniors by the 
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taxes paid by the young. Then, although the number of women contributing to the 
system increases as they join the labour market in greater numbers, the decrease in the 
number of younger, contributing individuals gives rise to a problem of large dimension, 
endangering the entire system.   
     
1.A Appendix: Data sources and definition of variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Figure Variables   
Crude Birth Rate Annual number of births per 100 inhabitants Eurostat 
Abortion Rate  Annual number of abortions per one thousand inhabitants Eurostat 
Marriage Rate Annual number of marriages per one thousand inhabitants Eurostat 
Divorce Rate Annual number of divorces per one thousand inhabitants Eurostat 
Birth Rate Annual number of births per one hundred women Computed by the author 
using data from the Eurostat 
Dependent Variable   
Total Fertility Rate The mean number of children that would be born alive to a 
woman during her lifetime if she were to pass through her 
childbearing years conforming to the fertility rates by age of a 
given year. 
Eurostat and UN 
Demographic Yearbook 
Marital Birth Rate Annual number of births within marriage per five hundred 
inhabitants 
Computed by the author 
using data from the Eurostat 
Non-Marital Birth Rate Annual number of out of wedlock births per five hundred 
inhabitants 
Computed by the author 
using data from the Eurostat 
Ilegitimacy Ratio Annual number of out of wedlock births per ten births Computed by the author 
using data from the Eurostat 
Completed Fertility Rate The average number of children born to a cohort of women up to 
the end of their childbearing age, from the cohort´s beginning of 
exposure to risk (at age 15) until the age when all members of the 
cohort have reached the end of the reproductive period (at age 
49) 
Council of Europe (1940 to 
1944 and 1961 to 1970), and 
computed by the author 
using data from the Eurostat 
and from the UN 
Demographic Yearbooks 
(several issues)(1945 to 
1960) 
  
Control Variables   
Female Labour Force Participation Female Civilian Labour Force over number of women, in 
percentage 
Computed by the author 
using data from the OECD 
and Eurostat 
Gross Enrolment Ratio Total female enrolment in education, regardless of age, expressed 
as a percentage of the official school-age population 
corresponding to the same level of education in given school-
year 
Unesco 
Infant Mortality The ratio of the number of deaths of children under one year of 
age during the year to the number of live births in that year. The 
value is expressed per 1,000 live births. 
Eurostat 
Per Capita GDP Gross Domestic Product divided by the population of each 
country, expressed in thousands  
Computed by the author 
using data from the United 
Nations 
Women in Parliament Percentage of women in each national parliament on the total of 
seats of the parliament 
Computed by the author 
using data from the Inter 
Parliamentary Union 
Unemployment Rate Unemployment rate as percentage of the civilian labour force OECD 
Crude Divorce Rate The ratio of the number of divorces during the year to the 
average population in that year. The value is expressed per 1,000 
inhabitants. 
Eurostat 
Crude Marriage Rate The ratio of the number of marriages during the year to the 
average population in that year. The value is expressed per 1,000 
inhabitants 
Eurostat 
Monthly Family Allowances (First, 
Second and Third Child) 
Monthly family allowances for the first, second and third child 
(assuming a three-child family), in constant euros of 2005. It is 
expressed in hundreds of euros. 
Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. 
Gauthier 
Total Weeks of Maternity leave Total number of weeks of maternity leave Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. 
Gauthier 
  
Cash Benefits During Maternity Leave Cash benefits paid during maternity leave (as a percent of female 
wages in manufacturing) 
Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. 
Gauthier 
Total Weeks of Parental Leave Total number of weeks of parental leave Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. 
Gauthier 
Cash Benefits During Parental Leave Cash benefits paid during parental leave (as a percent of female 
wages in manufacturing) 
Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. 
Gauthier 
Total Weeks of Childcare Leave Total number of weeks of childcare leave Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. 
Gauthier 
Cash Benefits During Childcare Leave Cash benefits paid during childcare leave (as a percent of female 
wages in manufacturing) 
Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. 
Gauthier 
Value of Transfers to Family Type Value of tax and benefit transfers of one-earner-two-parent two-
child families. The value was calculated by subtracting the  
disposable income (after taxes and transfers) of a one-earner-
two-parent-two-child family from that of a comparable childless 
single earner, in constant euros of 2005 
Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. 
Gauthier 
Index of Direct and Indirect Cash Benefits This indicator represents the difference between the disposable 
income of a two-child one-earner family and that of a single 
earner and is expressed as a percentage of the average earnings of 
a production worker, in constant euros of 2005 
Comparative Family Policy 
Database, by Anne H. 
Gauthier 
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Chapter 2: Teen mothers and culture 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
During the last four decades, there has been a considerable decline in many countries in 
the number of young women giving birth. For example, in both Italy and Germany, the 
number of live births per hundred women under 20 dropped from 4.5 in 1970 to less 
than 1 in 2010 (UN Demographic Yearbooks). However, there are still developed 
countries that sustain high levels of teen motherhood rates, such as the UK, where this 
indicator reached the rate of 2.5 in 2010 (UN Demographic Yearbooks). This is even 
more remarkable in certain less developed countries, such as Mexico, where this rate 
was 8.5 in 2010 (UN Demographic Yearbooks). Although it constitutes a sizable 
percentage of total fertility, this is nevertheless a concern, due to the negative 
consequences for those countries. Teen motherhood can be associated with socio-
economic disadvantages for women (Chevalier and Viitanen 2003) and their children 
(Francesconi 2008). Also, teen mothers have a higher probability of reducing schooling 
(Hofferth et al. 2001; Klepinger et al. 1999), of having lower market wages when older 
(Chevalier and Viitanen 2003; Hoffman et al. 1993; Klepinger et al. 1999) and of being 
overweight (Webbink et al. 2008), than those women who delay motherhood (Miller 
2011). Thus, the study of the determinants of teen motherhood is an important issue. 
Researchers have examined several potential determinants of teen motherhood, 
focusing on institutional factors, such as changes in abortion laws (Donohue et al. 
2009), welfare reform (Lopoo and DeLeire 2006; Lundberg and Plotnick 1995), family 
planning policy (Lundberg and Plotnick 1995), public assistance payments (Blank 
1995), and reforms in compulsory schooling legislation (Black et al. 2008). Research 
has also focused on family and socio-economic factors, such as family size and family 
structure (Cooksey 1990; Hofferth and Goldscheider 2010), parental education 
(Cooksey 1990), maternal employment (Cooksey 1990; Lopoo 2004), family income 
(Aassve 2003; South 1999), neighborhood socio-economic disadvantages (South 1999), 
peer effects (Monstad et al. 2011), marriage and cohabitation expectations (Wolfe et al. 
2007), income expectations (Wolfe et al. 2007), and racial differences (South 1999), 
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among others. This chapter explores the importance of culture on the fertility decisions 
of adolescent women. 
Following the definition of culture proposed by UNESCO (2001), we consider 
culture as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of 
society or a social group, that encompasses, not only art and literature, but lifestyles, 
ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs. Although most economic 
researchers would agree that culture is an important determinant of human behavior, it 
is not always possible to measure such beliefs and values directly. As Fernández (2007) 
argues, the interrelation among institutions, economic conditions, and social norms is 
the source of this difficulty. To isolate the impact of culture from the effect of 
institutions and markets on the fertility decisions of adolescent women, we explore the 
fertility behavior of adolescent women who were born and have lived in the US and 
report their ethnicity or national origin. The young women considered in our analysis 
were all born in the US, so that they have all lived under common laws, institutions, and 
markets. Then, dissimilarities in fertility rates by ancestor’s home country may be 
considered to document the significance of culture since their attitudes are probably 
similar to the preferences of their parents, ancestors and ethnic communities.  
We base our work on an epidemiological approach (see Fernández 2011; Fernández 
and Fogli 2009) to estimate the probability that an adolescent woman who was born and 
lives in the US and reports a national origin or ancestor’s home country is a teen mother 
using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 79 (NLSY79). Our findings 
point to culture being relevant factor in determining the fertility patterns of adolescent 
women, even after adding controls for an array of women’s socio-economic 
characteristics. We find that, when the ancestor’s home country live birth rate of women 
under 20 rises by one, the probability that an adolescent woman in the US is a teen 
mother rises by about 2.3%. Thus, an adolescent woman with ancestors from Cuba, the 
country with the highest live birth rate of women under 20, is around 16.5 percentage 
points more likely to be a teen mother than an adolescent woman from France, the 
country of origin with the lowest live birth rate of women under 20. 
There is a substantial literature analyzing the impact of culture on socio-economic 
outcomes (see, for a review, Fernández 2011). Utilizing empirical strategies quite 
analogous to ours, researchers have explored the role of culture on savings rates, finding 
no effect (Carroll et al. 1994). They have also shown a substantial effect of culture on 
female labor force participation and fertility (Blau et al. 2013; Contreras and Plaza 
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2010; Fernández and Fogli 2006; Fernández 2007; Fernández and Fogli 2009), on living 
arrangements (Giuliano 2007), on unemployment (Brügger et al. 2009) and on divorce 
(Furtado et al. 2013). We contribute to these lines of research by exploring the impact of 
culture on the fertility decisions of adolescent women when they take the decision to 
have a child. 27 
In our main empirical analysis, we include controls for the socio-economic 
characteristics of teen women that are considered in the literature to be determinants of 
fertility decisions of adolescents. The NLSY79 also contains information on other 
potential determinants of the fertility decisions of adolescents, which we do not include 
in our main model because of endogeneity concerns. One of these determinants is the 
marital status of teen women. Since, in the period considered, women who become 
pregnant at a young age tend to get married in a higher proportion than their peers 
without a child (Manning 1993), then controlling for this endogenous factor would lead 
us to biased estimates. Being aware of these endogeneity problems, we have repeated 
the analysis, adding controls for these attributes at the individual level. Our results do 
not change substantially. 
Additionally, we check whether unobserved heterogeneity across ethnic groups is 
driving our findings. For instance, it is possible to argue that differences in fertility of 
adolescent women across countries are due to variations in the age at first marriage 
preferences, rather than fertility culture. To take this issue into account, we add to our 
main analysis controls for home country characteristics, such as the average age of 
females at first marriage, per capita GDP, and the minimum legal age of consent. In all 
specifications, the estimated coefficient on the country of origin live birth rate varies 
very little. Further, we run placebo tests to check whether our results are driven by the 
fertility culture of adolescent women rather than other unobserved characteristics that 
can be correlated with our cultural proxy. If, for example, these unobserved variables, 
such as risk attitudes, differences in human capital accumulation, and social norms, 
were the main determinant of divergences in fertility behavior of adolescent women, we 
would expect them to also affect the fertility behavior of all women. However, in that 
case, we observe no impact of the national origin live birth rates of women under 20, 
indicating that we are not erroneously identifying the effect of culture.  
                                                          
27 Prior literature on the effect of culture only uses information of individual characteristics when the sample was 
collected. In most cases, this does not coincide with the period in which the decisions are taken (see, for example, 
Furtado et al. 2013). 
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the 
empirical strategy, and Section 2.3 describes the data. Results are discussed in Section 
2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.  
 
2.2 Empirical strategy 
 
In order to separate the impact of culture from that of markets and institutions on 
fertility decisions of adolescent women, we use information on adolescent women who 
were born and live in the US and report a country of origin or ethnicity. These women 
live under the same markets and institutions in the US, so that, if only institutions and 
markets are relevant to their fertility decisions, home country live birth rates of women 
under 20 should have no impact on the probability of being a teen mother. However, if 
home country live birth rates can explain the fertility propensities of young women, 
cross-country differences in fertility can be considered to document the effect of culture. 
To test this issue, we estimate the following equation: 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑘 =  𝛽1𝐿𝐵𝑅𝑗 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝛾𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘                                  (2.1) 
 
where Fijk is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when a woman i of cultural origin j 
who lives in region k is a teen mother.28 In the baseline regression, our measure of 
culture, LBRj, is the live birth rate of women under 20 in country of origin j, measured 
in the year when woman i is 19 years old (see Appendix B for a detailed definition).29 
The vector Xijk includes individual characteristics, such as education (Manlove 1998) 
and whether they live in a rural area (Berry et al. 2000; Lee 1997), which may have an 
impact on fertility decisions for reasons independent of culture. Since laws affecting 
fertility decisions (abortion laws, the access to the pill, welfare reforms, or family 
planning policies, among others) vary by place of residence (Bailey et al. 2011; 
Stevenson and Wolfers 2007), the absence of controls for the place of residence may 
bias our results. However, information on the geographical location of women is quite 
                                                          
28 Note that we use a linear probability model for simplicity, as in previous works on the study of the effect of culture. 
Results are similar when using probit or logit models, see Appendix 2.A. 
29 We revisit this definition of culture below. 
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limited, in this survey, for non-American researchers.30 For this reason, and recognizing 
that it is not the best option, we have only been able to control for the region of 
residence.31 Region fixed effects, denoted by δk ,  are added to the analysis to mitigate 
the problem that may exist with place of residence.32 We have also introduced year 
fixed effects in our main estimation, represented in equation (2.1) by γr, to pick up 
unobserved characteristics that can bias our points estimated since the women in our 
sample are 19 years old in a range of years, from 1979 to 1984. Finally, in order to 
consider any within-ethnicity correlation in the error terms, standard errors are clustered 
at the country of origin level. 
Our variable of interest is LBRj. Higher live birth rates are assumed to correspond 
to cultural attitudes more accepting of teen motherhood. If culture plays a role here, then 
young women originating from countries with a more accepting culture regarding teen 
motherhood should have, everything being equal, a higher probability of having a child 
at a young age than women from countries with a less accepting attitude. Then, we 
would expect β1 to be positive. 
Instead of controlling directly for the country of origin live birth rates, an 
alternative strategy would be to include dummy variables for these countries. The 
benefit of this approach would be that it does not require a linear relationship between 
the cultural proxy and fertility. However, this technique does not allow for a clear 
identification of how culture matters. Evidence suggests that the two approaches lead to 
similar conclusions. Young women originating from countries with a more accepting 
attitude towards teen motherhood tend to be more likely teen mothers. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 Non-American researchers do not have access to information on the place of residence. As can be read in the web 
page of the Bureau of Labor Statistics: “To protect respondent confidentiality, the NLS public-use files do not include 
geographic variables such as state, county, and metropolitan area” http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsfaqs.htm#anch25;  “The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) only grants access to geocode files for researchers in the United States who agree in 
writing to adhere to the BLS confidentiality policy and whose projects further the mission of BLS and the NLS 
program to conduct sound, legitimate research in the social sciences. Applications from abroad cannot be accepted.” 
http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsfaq2.htm#anch32. 
31 The US is divided into four regions, North East, North Central, South, and West. North East is the omitted variable 
in the analysis. 
32 As can be seen in the literature, the effect of culture on socio-economic outcomes does not disappear after adding 
controls for the place of residence (introducing state fixed effects or even MSAs fixed effects), although it is 
somewhat reduced(see, for example, Furtado et al. 2013). 
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2.3 Data 
 
In order to implement this analysis, we use data from the US National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY79). This survey covers 12,686 young men and women who 
were first interviewed in 1979, when all of them were between 14 and 22 years old. 
They were interviewed annually until 1994, and biennially thereafter, providing a wide 
range of information on Americans living in the US in 1979. The survey includes 
questions on environmental characteristics, training investments, schooling, family 
income, labor market experience, health conditions, household composition, and marital 
and fertility histories.   
Our sample consists of adolescent women born in the US who report an ethnicity or 
national origin. As the preferences and attitudes of these young women are likely 
similar to those of their parents, ancestors and ethnic communities, we argue that 
differences in live birth rates by national origin can be considered as supporting 
evidence of the importance of culture. To identify ancestry or national origin we use 
information on the first reported ancestry. We incorporate second-and-higher generation 
immigrants in our analysis. Prior literature on culture mainly uses information on 
second-generation immigrants, to avoid language barriers (Fernández 2007; Fernández 
and Fogli 2006; Fernández and Fogli 2009; Giuliano 2007). In our case, we cannot 
restrict our sample to second-generation immigrants, due to data availability in the 
NLSY79. Although language problems are avoided, the effect of the ancestor country 
culture can be diminished as generations go by. Thus, our estimated impact of culture 
on the fertility decisions of adolescent women should be seen as a lower bound. 
In our main analysis, we use as cultural proxy the Live Birth Rate (LBR) of women 
under 20 in the country of origin, measured in the year when they are 19 years old. The 
LBR data, obtained from the UN Demographic Yearbooks (several issues), is calculated 
as the number of live births per hundred women under 20 (see Appendix B for a 
description). The selection of this birth rate as the cultural proxy reflects the notion that 
adolescent women’s behavior is better determined by the behavior of their counterparts 
in their country of origin. However, it is possible to argue that teen women’s pattern of 
behavior is best characterized by the preferences of their parents. Thus, we should 
utilize as cultural proxy the LBR of their country of origin in the year of their birth. 
Alternatively, it is possible to argue that the attitudes of adolescent women when they 
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take fertility decisions are better characterized by the behavior of their counterparts at 
that moment (we revisit this issue below.) It is worth noting that we do not expect 
considerable differences in our results, since culture changes slowly (Fernández 2007; 
Furtado et al. 2013). 
Our final sample contains 1,885 observations of adolescent women, with 10 
different ancestries.33 Table 2.1 presents summary statistics of the relevant variables by 
country of origin, ordered from the highest to the lowest average LBR of women under 
20, for the period 1979-1984, the period when women are 19 years old in the sample. 
Column (1) displays large LBR differences across countries: from 8.78 live births per 
hundred women under 20 in Cuba to 1.62 in France. The other columns describe our 
main sample. Overall, 12.4% of women are teen mothers, but Mexicans and Portuguese 
are substantially more likely to be teen mothers. About 48% of women have graduated 
from high school, although educational levels vary substantially across countries of 
origin, with Cuba, Poland and Germany having the highest proportion of women 
enrolled in a college degree and Portugal having the lowest. Most women do not live in 
a rural area although, as previously, there are variations across countries of origin, with 
those from the UK and Germany having the highest proportion of women living in a 
rural area (more than 20%). In most cases, women originating from countries with a 
high LBR are teen mothers in higher proportion. However, this can also be explained, 
for example, by differences in educational attainment. Thus, a more detailed analysis is 
needed. 
                                                          
33 As in prior literature on culture, in order to make meaningful comparisons across averages of adolescent women by 
country of origin, we exclude those women from countries of origin with less than 10 observations (China, Greece, 
Japan, Korea, Philippines and Russia). Although our results are not expected to change, since we run the analysis at 
the individual level, we have repeated the analysis including these women and our results do not vary. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 - Summary Statistics by Country of Origin 
Country 
Origin 
Mean Home Country 
Live Birth Rate 
Women Under 20 
Proportion 
Teen 
Mothers 
Proportion 
Enrolled 
High School 
Proportion 
High School 
Graduated 
Proportion 
Enrolled 
College 
Proportion 
Living 
Rural Area 
GDP per 
Capita 
Mean Female 
Age 
First Marriage 
Number 
Observations 
Cuba 8.785 0.062 0.058 0.383 0.483 0.000 2.1 19.8 13 
Mexico 7.873 0.349 0.063 0.376 0.324 0.095 2.9 21.6 52 
Portugal 3.993 0.320 0.313 0.190 0.090 0.000 3.1 23.4 19 
Poland 3.404 0.098 0.000 0.369 0.489 0.039 1.8 22.7 29 
United Kingdom 2.890 0.140 0.021 0.466 0.382 0.251 8.5 23.0 800 
Spain 2.375 0.133 0.000 0.572 0.323 0.078 5.1 23.4 18 
Italy 2.178 0.074 0.000 0.483 0.357 0.171 7.3 23.8 67 
Germany 2.148 0.114 0.009 0.499 0.409 0.219 10.2 22.9 530 
Ireland 2.141 0.090 0.000 0.507 0.400 0.175 5.9 24.6 157 
France 1.625 0.109 0.026 0.532 0.314 0.172 10.8 23.0 200 
Average 2.508 0.124 0.016 0.484 0.384 0.217 8.8 23.1  
Std. Dev. 0.785 0.329 0.127 0.500 0.486 0.412 1.9 0.5  
Notes: Countries of origin ordered by home country live birth rate (live births per hundred women under 20). This variable was constructed using information 
from the UN Demographic Yearbook. The other descriptive statistics were constructed using the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLSY79), except GDP per 
Capita –United Nations Statistics Division (2010) “Per Capita GDP at Current Prices in US$”- and the Average Female Age at First Marriage –Population 
Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and World Marriage Data -. The Home Country Live Birth of 
Women under 20 and the GDP per Capita are a mean of the period 1979-1984 when young women were aged 19. The sample consists of 1,885 women born in the 
US and aged 19 who report an ethnic origin. 
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2.4 Results 
 
2.4.1 Baseline regression 
 
In Table 2.2, we show the estimates for the baseline specification. In this case, the 
variable used as a cultural proxy is the home country live birth rate of women under 20, 
measured in the year in which each woman is aged 19. In the first column, it can be seen 
that a rise in the home country live birth rate of an adolescent woman is related to a 
greater probability that this woman is a teen mother. In this column, we add controls for 
individual-level socio-economic characteristics measured when the women are aged 19. 
These variables may have an effect on the probability of being a teen mother for causes 
independent of culture. With respect to the education level, since women who do not 
drop out of school are less likely to have a child when they are adolescent (Manlove 
1998), our finding that more educated women are less likely to be teen mothers than 
those with low levels of education is not striking.34  
As mentioned above, the place of residence of women is a potential factor affecting 
fertility decisions. Again, note that we only have information on whether our women 
live in a rural area, and on the region of residence since, currently, non-American 
researchers are not allowed to obtain more information on this issue. Living in a rural 
area is not statistically significant, although the coefficient is negative.  
It is comforting that, regardless of the controls included in our regressions, the 
cultural proxy has a positive and statistically significant impact on the probability of 
being a teen mother. Focusing on Column (2), which includes year and region fixed 
effects, an increase of 1 point in the cultural proxy is associated with an increase of 
2.3% in the probability of being a teen mother. Put another way, an average woman 
from Cuba, the country with the highest LBR (8.8 live births per hundred women under 
20 on average from 1979 to 1984) is 16.5 percentage points more likely to have a child 
when she is under 20 than an average woman from France, the country with the lowest 
LBR (1.6 on average). 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 The variable omitted is Not enrolled in high school, which includes women who completed less than the 12th grade. 
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Table 2.2 - Teen Fertility Culture and the Probability of Being a Teen Mother 
(Dependent Variable: Teen Mother) 
 (1) (2) 
Home Country Live Birth Rate  0.024*** 0.023*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Enrolled High School -0.335*** -0.335*** 
 (0.030) (0.031) 
High School Graduated -0.247*** -0.243*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
Enrolled in College -0.381*** -0.378*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) 
Rural -0.012 -0.018 
 (0.013) (0.011) 
Constant 0.367*** 0.334*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) 
Year FE YES YES 
Region FE NO YES 
Observations 1885 1885 
R-squared 0.148 0.150 
Notes: Home country live birth rate is the number of live births per hundred women under 20, and is 
measured when women were 19 years old. The sample consists of women aged 19 and born in the 
US. For both women who are teen mothers (have a child at 19 or less) and those who are not, we take 
their personal information when they are aged 19. We estimate linear probability models where the 
dependent variable is equal to 1 if the woman is a teen mother and 0 otherwise. Column (1) controls 
for the level of education, whether the woman’s current residence is rural, and year fixed effects. 
Column (2) adds region of current residence fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Observations are weighted using survey weights. ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
2.4.1.1 Robustness checks 
 
To check whether our findings are sensitive to the definition of the cultural proxy, 
and/or the sample selection, we run several simple robustness checks. We show these 
results in Tables 2.3 to 2.5.  
Existing literature on the effect of culture on socio-economic variables typically 
employs as a cultural proxy the information on the variable of interest for several years. 
As Fernández and Fogli (2009) claim, it is not clear, theoretically, which year to utilize. 
Since most of the prior literature uses information on immigrants, they suggest that the 
culture of immigrants is best measured at the time of migration. Alternatively, as 
Furtado et al. (2013) explain, if immigrants remain in contact with their family and/or 
friends in their home countries during several years after migrating, then their attitudes 
can be better characterized by the behavior of their counterparts in the country of 
ancestry, at the time of the survey. For those studies using second-and-higher generation 
immigrant samples, it can also be argued that the preferences of these individuals are 
better measured by their parents’ counterparts in their country of origin when they were 
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born, or some years after their arrival, assuming that parents transmit their preferences 
when the child is young. To tackle this issue rather than solving it theoretically, as in 
Furtado et al. (2013), we use alternative definitions of our variable of interest, the 
cultural proxy. Specifically, we use the home country LBR of women under 20 over 
seven years (see Table 2.3). In Column (1), we use the value of this indicator in the year 
1950, in Column (2) the indicator refers to 1960, and so on, up to Column (7), in which 
this variable refers to 2005. As expected, since changes in culture occur slowly, results 
are quite similar. Coefficients of interest are always positive and statistically significant 
at the 5% and 1% level, although the effect decreases somewhat. Additionally, we test 
this issue by measuring the cultural proxy when women were born. In this case, the 
range of years of the cultural proxy is 1960 to 1965 and our results are shown in Table 
2.4. As before, results do not change substantially.  
Another potential problem with our estimates is that adolescent women in the US 
may not be a representative sample of their counterparts in their ancestor’s home 
countries. As explained in Furtado et al. (2013), for example, those living in home 
countries may show patterns of adventure-seeking behavior, risk aversion, or political 
preferences that are quite different from those living in the US. In addition, following 
Furtado et al. (2013), individuals tend to migrate from specific areas; for example a 
specific region with economic problems, which possibly makes adolescent women in 
the US very similar to each other but, probably, quite different from the average women 
in their ancestor’s home countries. This can be a problem for our estimates. However, as 
explained in Furtado et al. (2013), if, for instance, all adolescent women living in the 
US and reporting an ancestry were less “risk adverse” than the women in their country 
of origin, irrespective of their ancestry, then our work would not be affected by any bias 
since it is based on cross-country variation.  
It could be the case that those women originating from Cuba and living in the US 
are different from those living in the home country, mainly because their parents had to 
migrate to the US for political reasons in the 1950s and 1960s, during the Cuban 
revolution and after the establishment of the Communist regime. Thus, it could be 
argued that there are differences in the preferences and attitudes of ethnic-Cubans born 
in the US and their counterparts living in Cuba. If these differences matter, then we 
should observe changes in our estimates after excluding women originating from Cuba. 
We check this in Table 2.5. Column (1) displays the estimated coefficients after 
excluding young Cuban women, and we observe that the impact of the cultural proxy 
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increases slightly in magnitude. The interpretation is difficult, since the impact of 
eliminating Cubans does not seem particularly important - but this result can also be 
conditional on the scarcity of observations from Cuba, just 13. All in all, adding or 
deleting these observations does not substantially change our results.  
In Table 2.5, we show other simple robustness checks, following Furtado et al. 
(2013), in order to test whether our findings are sensitive to sample selection. Column 
(2) excludes information for women originating from the country with the most 
observations, the UK, and Column (3) excludes women from Cuba and the UK, the 
countries with the fewest and the highest number of observations, respectively. Results 
remain unchanged. Similarly, Column (4) excludes the country with the lowest average 
live birth rate, France (the highest LBR is for Cuba, and Column (2) already reports 
these estimates). Finally, Column (5) does not incorporate observations for Cubans and 
French. Again, results do not vary. The positive impact of culture on fertility of teen 
women appears to be quite consistent. 
 
     
 
Table 2.3 - Teen Fertility Culture and the Probability of Being a Teen Mother Using the Cultural Proxy in Different Years 
(Dependent variable: Teen Mother) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Home Country Live Birth Rate 1950 0.013**       
 (0.005)       
Home Country Live Birth Rate 1960  0.015**      
  (0.005)      
Home Country Live Birth Rate 1970   0.013**     
   (0.004)     
Home Country Live Birth Rate 1980    0.028***    
    (0.008)    
Home Country Live Birth Rate 1990     0.016***   
     (0.004)   
Home Country Live Birth Rate 2000      0.016**  
      (0.005)  
Home Country Live Birth Rate 2005       0.017*** 
       (0.005) 
Enrolled High School -0.332*** -0.333*** -0.331*** -0.335*** -0.334*** -0.333*** -0.334*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
High School Graduated -0.244*** -0.244*** -0.245*** -0.243*** -0.244*** -0.244*** -0.244*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Enrolled in College -0.379*** -0.379*** -0.380*** -0.378*** -0.378*** -0.378*** -0.378*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Rural -0.018 -0.019 -0.020* -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Constant 0.359*** 0.345*** 0.339*** 0.315*** 0.353*** 0.358*** 0.359*** 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1885 1885 1885 1885 1885 1885 1885 
R-squared 0.149 0.150 0.149 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 
Notes: Home country live birth rate is the number of live births per hundred women under 20, and is measured in different years. For both women who are teen 
mothers (have a child at 19 or less) and those who are not we take their personal information when they are aged 19. We estimate linear probability models where 
the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the woman is a teen mother and 0 otherwise. All columns include controls for level of education, whether the woman’s current 
residence is rural, year fixed effects and region of current residence fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Observations are weighted using survey 
weights. ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.4 - Teen Fertility Culture and the Probability of Being a Teen Mother Using the Cultural 
Proxy in the Year in Which Women Were Born 
(Dependent Variable: Teen Mother) 
 (1) (2) 
Home Country Live Birth Rate  0.015** 0.014** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Enrolled High School -0.335*** -0.333*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) 
High School Graduated -0.249*** -0.245*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
Enrolled in College -0.384*** -0.380*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) 
Rural -0.013 -0.019* 
 (0.012) (0.010) 
Constant 0.367*** 0.338*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) 
Year FE YES YES 
Region FE NO YES 
Observations 1885 1885 
R-squared 0.148 0.150 
Notes: Home country live birth rate is the number of live births per hundred women under 20, and is 
measured when each woman was born. For both women who are teen mothers (have a child at 19 or 
less) and those who are not, we take their personal information when they are aged 19. We estimate 
linear probability models where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the woman is a teen mother and 
0 otherwise. Column (1) includes controls for the level of education, whether the woman’s current 
residence is rural and year fixed effects. Column (2) adds region of current residence fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Observations are weighted using survey weights. ***, **, * 
Significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 2.5 - Teen Fertility Culture and the Probability of Being a Teen Mother 
Using Different Samples 
(Dependent Variable: Teen Mother) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Home Country Live Birth Rate 0.028*** 0.022** 0.028*** 0.023** 0.029*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) 
Enrolled High School -0.335*** -0.379*** -0.381*** -0.342*** -0.343*** 
 (0.032) (0.047) (0.048) (0.037) (0.038) 
High School Graduated -0.243*** -0.250*** -0.250*** -0.259*** -0.259*** 
 (0.020) (0.039) (0.039) (0.019) (0.019) 
Enrolled in College -0.378*** -0.359*** -0.359*** -0.395*** -0.395*** 
 (0.020) (0.034) (0.034) (0.008) (0.008) 
Rural -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.014 -0.015 
 (0.011) (0.021) (0.021) (0.013) (0.012) 
Constant 0.262*** 0.262*** 0.249*** 0.353*** 0.340*** 
 (0.023) (0.045) (0.043) (0.018) (0.012) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1872 1085 1072 1685 1672 
R-squared 0.151 0.152 0.153 0.156 0.158 
Notes: Home country live birth rate is defined as in Table 2.2. For both women who are teen mothers (have a child at 
19 or less) and those who are not, we take their personal information when they are aged 19. We estimate linear 
probability models where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the woman is a teen mother and 0 otherwise. Column 
(1) does not include information on the country with fewer observations (Cuba). Column (2) does not include 
information on the country with more observations (United Kingdom). Column (3) does not include information on 
the countries with more observations (United Kingdom) and with fewer observations (Cuba). Column (4) does not 
include information on the country with the lower Live Birth Rate (France). Column (5) does not include information 
on the countries with the higher Live Birth Rate (Cuba) and with the lower Live Birth Rate (France). Robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis. Observations are weighted using survey weights. ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% 
level, respectively. 
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2.4.2 Other family and individual attributes 
 
Heretofore, we have included in the baseline regression many of the factors determining 
fertility decisions among adolescent women. The NLSY79 also contains information on 
other potentially relevant variables, not included by us in the baseline model mainly 
because of endogeneity concerns.35 One of these determinants is the marital status of 
women. Married women have children in higher proportion than non-married women. 
The ratio of births to married mothers per 100 total live births for women aged 18-19 
years old pregnant was almost 60% in 1979 (data come from the US National Vital 
Statistics Report). However, a child conceived as a result of premarital intercourse also 
increases the probability of marriage, the popularly known as shotgun marriages. The 
marriage and cohabitation expectations of young women appear to be a relevant issue 
when having a child at a young age (Manning 1993; Wolfe et al. 2007). Then, the 
inclusion of these endogenous factors would lead to bias our estimates. Being aware of 
this, we have repeated the analysis, adding controls for whether adolescent women have 
never been married. Table 2.6 presents our findings. As expected, never-married 
adolescent women are less likely to be teen mothers. Oddly enough, our estimate of the 
impact of culture on the probability of being a teen mother does not change.  
Similarly, the income variables are not included in the baseline model because of 
potential endogeneity concerns. Teen mothers live in poor families in higher proportion 
than non-teen mothers (Hobcraft and Kiernan 2001). If teen mothers are those living in 
poor families and having low income expectations, controlling for income variables 
would lead to bias our results. Mindful of this, we have repeated the analysis by adding 
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a woman reports that her family is in 
poverty. Estimated coefficients are shown in Table 2.7. As before, our coefficient of 
interest does not vary substantially in Column (1), it remains positive and statistically 
significant, although its impact decreases slightly. 
Religious affiliation can also be an important determinant of fertility decisions 
among teen women (Cooksey 1990). As previously, the introduction of these variables 
can be problematic if they are highly correlated with unobserved determinants of teen 
fertility. For example, the use of contraceptive methods, which is unobserved, is related 
                                                          
35 It is possible to argue that the level of education of adolescent women is an endogenous factor which can bias our 
estimates. As with the rest of potential endogenous variables, for consistency, we have also repeated the analysis 
without controls for educational level and results do not vary although we do not show the results in the chapter. 
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with the probability of getting pregnant but it is also correlated with the religious 
affiliation of women since some religions reject the use of these methods. Then, adding 
controls for religion affiliation may generate biased estimates. Being aware of this 
problem, we have run our main regression after adding controls for religion variables in 
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2.7. Note that we have separately considered the religious 
affiliation when the subjects are 19, Column (3), and the religious affiliation in which 
they were raised, Column (2). Results show that only those women who were raised in 
the Roman Catholic religion are less likely to be teen mothers. With respect to our 
variable of interest, once again, the impact of culture on the probability of being a teen 
mother remains unchanged. 
The NLSY79 also reports the family size of the respondents. Since this variable can 
also generate endogeneity concerns, we have not included it in the main analysis 
(Cooksey 1990). Just to check whether our results are robust to the inclusion of the 
family size, we have repeated the analysis including this variable. We observe that our 
results are quite similar. Finally, we have added all controls in Column (5) of Table 2.7. 
It is again comforting that our results do not change, even while we are conscious of the 
endogeneity problems that the inclusion of these variables can generate. 
In Table 2.8, we have included other personal characteristics that are potential 
determinants of fertility decisions. As before, they are not added to the baseline 
analysis, mainly because they can bias our estimates. Since teen mothers are more likely 
to grow up under mono-parental families, or without parents at all (Painter and Levine 
2000), if an unobserved process jointly determines family structure and the fertility 
behavior of adolescent women, adding controls for family structure may lead to biased 
results. We have checked whether our results vary after adding variables picking up the 
effect of family structure. Columns (1), (2) and (3) include variables controlling for 
whether respondent’s father, mother, or none of them are still living, respectively. Our 
results remain unchanged. 
Risk attitudes can also be a determinant of fertility behavior of adolescent women 
(Cooper 2002). The omission of controls for this is due to the potential correlation of 
these risk attitude characteristics and the unobserved determinants of fertility decisions. 
Having knowledge of the endogeneity concerns, we have included in the analysis 
controls for risk attitudes to check whether our results do not vary. Column (4) controls 
for whether the respondent started drinking at least once a week when she was 16 or 
younger; Column (5) controls for whether the respondent ever had an abortion; Column 
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(6) includes a variable controlling for whether the respondent had used narcotics when 
she was 18 or younger; and Column (7) controls for whether the respondent had her first 
sexual intercourse when she was 16 or younger. As can be seen, our findings do not 
substantially change. Note that the interpretation of some of these results is difficult, 
due to the scarcity of observations and the potential difference between the response 
young women give to this kind of question in a survey, and what they actually do. 
Finally, Columns (8), (9) and (10) include controls for female attitudes that, again, 
can be related with unobserved determinants of fertility decisions. Although the 
inclusion of these variables generates doubts because of the endogeneity concerns, we 
have run the analysis to check the consistency of our findings. In these columns, women 
are considered traditional if they strongly agree/disagree with different statements (see 
Table 2.8 for a description). Again, after adding these variables, our results do not vary, 
nor do they change when we introduce all these controls in the same specification. We 
conclude that culture appears to play an important role in the fertility decisions of teen 
women. 
 
Table 2.6 - Teen Fertility Culture and the Probability of Being a Teen Mother 
Controlling for the Marital Status 
(Dependent Variable: Teen Mother) 
 (1) 
Home Country Live Birth Rate  0.021*** 
 (0.005) 
Enrolled High School -0.146*** 
 (0.024) 
High School Graduated -0.133*** 
 (0.021) 
Enrolled in College -0.187*** 
 (0.029) 
Rural -0.032* 
 (0.014) 
Never Married -0.339*** 
 (0.014) 
Constant 0.512*** 
 (0.026) 
Year FE YES 
Region FE YES 
Observations 1885 
R-squared 0.278 
Notes: Home country live birth rate is defined as in Table 2.2. For both women who are teen 
mothers (have a child at 19 or less) and those who are not, we take their personal information 
when they are 19 years old. We estimate linear probability models where the dependent 
variable is equal to 1 if the woman is a teen mother and 0 otherwise. Column (1) controls for 
the marital status of women. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Observations are 
weighted using survey weights. ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.7 - Teen Fertility Culture and the Probability of Being a Teen Mother Including 
Family Characteristics and Religion 
(Dependent Variable: Teen Mother) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Home Country Live Birth Rate  0.021** 0.023*** 0.023** 0.023*** 0.021** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
Enrolled High School -0.339*** -0.336*** -0.331*** -0.334*** -0.340*** 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) 
High School Graduated -0.250*** -0.245*** -0.244*** -0.243*** -0.254*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) 
Enrolled in College -0.375*** -0.380*** -0.379*** -0.377*** -0.381*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
Rural -0.012 -0.018 -0.021* -0.018 -0.012 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) 
Povstat 0.048    0.045 
 (0.043)    (0.042) 
Protestant  -0.010   0.009 
  (0.010)   (0.056) 
Roman Catholic  -0.027*   0.015 
  (0.014)   (0.065) 
No Religion  0.032   0.046 
  (0.024)   (0.061) 
Protestant Current   -0.013  -0.021 
   (0.013)  (0.066) 
Roman Catholic Current   -0.035  -0.048 
   (0.019)  (0.072) 
No Religion Current   -0.023  -0.049 
   (0.022)  (0.033) 
Family Size    -0.001 0.003 
    (0.002) (0.004) 
Constant 0.340*** 0.351*** 0.300*** 0.336*** 0.293*** 
 (0.026) (0.020) (0.028) (0.020) (0.030) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1767 1881 1882 1885 1761 
R-squared 0.155 0.151 0.151 0.150 0.156 
Notes: Home country live birth rate is defined as in Table 2.2. For both women who are teen mothers (have a child at 19 or 
less) and those who are not, we take their personal information when they are 19 years old. We estimate linear probability 
models where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the woman is a teen mother and 0 otherwise. Column (1) adds a control 
for family poverty status. Column (2) includes controls for the religion within which women were raised (Other religions is 
omitted). Column (3) controls for the current religious affiliation (Other religions is omitted). Column (4) controls for the 
family size. Finally, Column (5) includes all controls. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Observations are weighted 
using survey weights. ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.8 - Teen Fertility Culture and the Probability of Being a Teen Mother Including 
Personal Characteristics 
(Dependent Variable: Teen Mother) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Home Country Live Birth Rate  0.028*** 0.024** 0.027** 0.024*** 0.023*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Enrolled High School -0.277*** -0.292*** -0.275*** -0.332*** -0.335*** 
 (0.043) (0.038) (0.047) (0.031) (0.038) 
High School Graduated -0.193*** -0.210*** -0.195*** -0.241*** -0.240*** 
 (0.034) (0.031) (0.034) (0.021) (0.024) 
Enrolled in College -0.326*** -0.346*** -0.327*** -0.374*** -0.374*** 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.027) (0.021) (0.019) 
Rural -0.029** -0.033** -0.034** -0.022 -0.021 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) 
With Father -0.016     
 (0.016)     
With Mother  0.006    
  (0.041)    
Orphan   0.020   
   (0.045)   
Drink    0.046**  
    (0.015)  
Abortion     0.041 
     (0.030) 
Constant 0.285*** 0.295*** 0.273*** 0.324*** 0.267*** 
 (0.033) (0.025) (0.044) (0.024) (0.027) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1263 1282 1259 1863 1796 
R-squared 0.126 0.135 0.128 0.153 0.151 
Notes: Home country live birth rate is defined as in Table 2.2. For both women who are teen mothers (have a child at 
19 or less) and those who are not, we take their personal information when they are 19 years old. Columns (1) and (2) 
include a variable for whether respondent´s father and mother are still alive, respectively. Column (3) controls for 
whether respondent is orphan. Column (4) controls for whether the respondent began drinking at least once a week 
when she was 16 years old or before. Column (5) controls for whether women ever had an abortion. All columns 
include controls for the level of education, whether the woman’s current residence is rural, year fixed effects and 
region of current residence fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Observations are weighted using 
survey weights. ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.8 - Teen Fertility Culture and the Probability of Being a Teen Mother 
Including Personal Characteristics (Continuation) 
(Dependent Variable: Teen Mother) 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Home Country Live Birth Rate  0.023*** 0.016* 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Enrolled High School -0.342*** -0.375*** -0.333*** -0.330*** -0.335*** 
 (0.036) (0.078) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) 
High School Graduated -0.247*** -0.316*** -0.242*** -0.240*** -0.243*** 
 (0.023) (0.066) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) 
Enrolled in College -0.383*** -0.450*** -0.376*** -0.374*** -0.378*** 
 (0.021) (0.057) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Rural -0.024* 0.021 -0.019 -0.016 -0.018 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Drug 0.052     
 (0.046)     
Sex Under 16  0.149**    
  (0.050)    
Traditional I   -0.030   
   (0.022)   
Traditional II    0.132*  
    (0.061)  
Traditional II     0.004 
     (0.027) 
Constant 0.278*** 0.347*** 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.273*** 
 (0.031) (0.069) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1826 515 1882 1882 1882 
R-squared 0.155 0.244 0.151 0.154 0.150 
Notes: Column (6) controls for whether respondent had used narcotics when she was 18 years old or before. Column 
(7) controls for whether respondent had her first sexual intercourse when she was 16 years old or before. Columns 
(8), (9) and (10) include controls for female attitudes. In Column (8) women are considered traditional if they 
strongly disagree with the affirmation “Men should share the work around the house with women, such as doing 
dishes, cleaning and so forth”. In Column (9) women are considered traditional if they strongly agree with the 
affirmation “It is much better for everyone concerned if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman 
takes care of the home and family”. In Column (10) women are considered traditional if they strongly agree with the 
affirmation “Women are much happier if they stay at home and take care of their children”. ***, **, * Significant at 
the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
2.4.3 Unobserved heterogeneity and differences across ancestries 
 
In this analysis, we consider more deeply the possibility that our estimates could be 
picking up differences in other country of origin characteristics, in addition to or instead 
of fertility culture. For example, it is possible to argue that those women originating 
from countries where women marry young also have children when they are younger. 
Similarly, if young women from poor countries of origin have a child (Becker 1960; 
Singh 1998), then the differences in fertility of young women could be due to poverty 
conditions (considering that this situation is translated to the US) rather than to fertility 
culture. 
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Although this problem should be mitigated by adding controls for marital status and 
poverty status at the individual level (see above), we have tested this further by adding 
home country characteristics in Table 2.9. We first add per capita GDP at the country of 
origin level (data from the United Nations Statistics Division, see Appendix B) to our 
main model in Column (1). Surprisingly, we obtain a positive relationship between per 
capita GDP and the probability of teen motherhood. This can be explained by 
differences in migration patterns. For example, it can be argued that rich people living 
in poor countries tend to migrate to more developed countries, such as the US; then, the 
fertility behavior of these adolescent women can be different from their counterparts in 
their ancestor home country. In this case, our cultural proxy is still positively correlated 
with the probability of being a teen mother, and the magnitude of the effect has slightly 
increased. We then incorporate controls for the average age at first marriage at the 
country level (see, for a description, Appendix B). Results are reported in Column (2) of 
Table 2.9. As expected, an increase in the age at first marriage decreases the probability 
of being a teen mother. In this case, the coefficient picking up the cultural effect 
decreases in magnitude.  
Finally, we introduce controls for the minimum legal age of consent (several 
sources, see Appendix B) in each country, in Column (3). Again, as expected, an 
increase in the minimum legal age of consent decreases the probability of being a teen 
mother. The effect of culture on the probability of being a teen mother remains positive 
and statistically significant. We also add all controls in Column (4). In this case, 
coefficients on the control variables turn out to be non-significant. Our variable of 
interest is still positive and statistically significant. It appears that we are not 
misguidedly interpreting our results as evidence of culture. 
 
2.4.4 Placebo tests 
 
We present additional evidence that we are not capturing unobserved characteristics, 
such as risk attitudes or norms that can be correlated with our cultural proxy. If, for 
example, these unobserved variables were the main factor in divergence in the fertility 
behavior of adolescent women, we would expect it to affect the fertility behavior of all 
women. Similarly, unobserved characteristics of the parents of the young women that 
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can also be correlated with our cultural proxy, and that may impact the fertility behavior 
of adolescent women, can certainly have an effect on the family income. 
 
Table 2.9 - Teen Fertility Culture and the Probability of Being a Teen Mother, Cross-Country 
Differences 
(Dependent Variable: Teen Mother) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Home Country Live Birth Rate 0.029*** 0.020** 0.024*** 0.027*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Enrolled High School -0.336*** -0.336*** -0.334*** -0.336*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
High School Graduated -0.244*** -0.243*** -0.243*** -0.243*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Enrolled in College -0.378*** -0.378*** -0.378*** -0.378*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Rural -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Per Capita GDP  0.005**   0.003 
 (0.002)   (0.003) 
Age at First Marriage  -0.014**  -0.003 
  (0.005)  (0.012) 
Age Consensual Relations   -0.005* -0.002 
   (0.003) (0.005) 
Constant 0.287*** 0.656*** 0.409*** 0.394 
 (0.025) (0.130) (0.041) (0.246) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Region FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1885 1885 1885 1885 
R-squared 0.151 0.150 0.150 0.151 
Notes: Home country live birth rate is defined as in table 2.2. For both women who are teen mothers (have a child at 19 
or less) and those who are not, we take their personal information when they are 19 years old. We estimate linear 
probability models where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the woman is a teen mother and 0 otherwise. Column (1) 
controls for the per capita GDP of the country of origin (see Appendix B for a description). Column (2) controls for the 
mean age at first marriage in each country in 1980. Column (3) controls for the minimum legal age of consent. Finally, 
Column (4) includes all controls. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Observations are weighted using survey 
weights. ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
To tackle this issue, we follow Fernández and Fogli (2009) and Furtado et al. 
(2013) by running placebo tests. We first consider as dependent variable an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the women forming the sample have been a mother 
in any period of their life. Results are reported in Column (1) of Table 2.10. We also 
repeat the analysis, but now including as dependent variable the total net family income 
measured in logarithm in Column (2). As can be seen, we obtain no statistically 
significant coefficient of the cultural proxy, implying that these unobserved factors are 
not likely to bias our main point estimates. 
 
 
 
 
 Teen mothers and culture  
 
- 70 - 
 
Table 2.10 - Teen Fertility Culture and the Probability of Being a Teen Mother 
Placebo tests 
(Dependent Variables: Mother and Log Total Net Family Income) 
 (1) (2) 
Home Country Live Birth Rate  -0.010 0.009 
 (0.018) (0.008) 
Enrolled High School -0.187** 0.440*** 
 (0.073) (0.102) 
High School Graduated -0.091** 0.574*** 
 (0.030) (0.078) 
Enrolled in College -0.174*** 1.024*** 
 (0.041) (0.096) 
Rural 0.039 -0.155*** 
 (0.037) (0.033) 
Constant 0.830*** 9.224*** 
 (0.067) (0.150) 
Year FE YES YES 
Region FE YES YES 
Observations 1885 1481 
R-squared 0.031 0.105 
Notes: Home country live birth rate is defined as in table 2.2. For both women who are teen mothers (have a child 
at 19 or less) and those who are not, we take their personal information when they are 19 years old. Column (1) 
includes the variable mother as dependent variable that takes value 1 if the woman is a mother and 0 otherwise. 
Column (2) includes the logarithm of the Total Net Family Income as dependent variable. All columns include 
controls for the level of education, whether the woman’s current residence is rural, year fixed effects and region of 
current residence fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Observations are weighted using survey 
weights. ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
2.4.5 Fertility decisions 
 
Although in the previous subsection we have included as controls a range of 
characteristics of women when they are 19 years old, it could be argued that what is 
relevant in determining the effect of culture are the characteristics of these women when 
they decide, or not, to have a child. One of these potential factors may be the education 
level of adolescent women at the time of the decision. It is even possible to hypothesize 
that the social norms and preferences of adolescent women are better measured when 
they decide, or not, to have a child, thus the cultural proxy should be measured at the 
time of the decision. 
To further analyze this issue, we incorporate in our analysis the home country live 
birth rate, measured in the year of the birth, if they are teen mothers, and when they are 
18 or 19 years old, if they are not teen mothers. In the case of teen mothers, we choose 
the year of birth as a proxy of the characteristics of women when they decide to have a 
child. We consider this a good proxy, since the decision to have a child, or to abort, is 
normally taken in the period between becoming pregnant (information on when these 
women become pregnant is not available), and the legal limit of abortion, then close to 
the date in which this young women have the child. For non-teen mothers, it is more 
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complicated, although since almost 70% of women have their children when they are 18 
or 19 years old, with the greater percentage being when they are 19 (40%), it is possible 
to argue that non-teen mothers took the decision not to have a child when they were 18 
and 19 years old.36 
We also introduce in our analysis controls for the level of education of women 
when they decide, or not, to have a child. As before, for teen mothers, we would not 
expect important variations in these dummies during the short period between taking the 
decision and having the child. Results are shown in Table 2.11. As can be seen, our 
findings are maintained even after using information of the moment in which women 
take the decision. In sum, the fertility culture of adolescent women appears to be a 
relevant factor in determining fertility decisions. 
 
Table 2.11 - Teen Fertility Culture and the Probability of Being a Teen Mother 
Using Live Birth Rates of the Year of Birth of the First Child 
(Dependent Variable: Teen Mother) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Home Country Live Birth Rate 0.038*** 0.024** 0.026*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) 
Enrolled High School -0.337*** -0.334*** -0.321*** 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.064) 
High School Graduated -0.240*** -0.243*** -0.247** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.087) 
Enrolled in College -0.375*** -0.377*** -0.338*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.087) 
Rural -0.018 -0.018 -0.002 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) 
Enrolled High School at    -0.088 
Fertility Decision   (0.065) 
High School Graduated at    -0.002 
Fertility Decision   (0.086) 
Enrolled in College at   -0.120 
Fertility Decision   (0.075) 
Constant 0.297*** 0.331*** 0.368*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.018) 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Region FE YES YES YES 
Observations 1885 1885 1538 
R-squared 0.155 0.150 0.227 
Notes: Home country live birth rate is the number of live births per hundred women under 20. In Columns (1) and 
(2), the home country live birth rate is measured in the year of birth of the first child if the woman is a teen mother, or 
when a young woman is 19 or 18 if they are not teen mothers, respectively. We estimate linear probability models 
where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the woman is a teen mother and 0 otherwise. All columns include 
controls for the level of education, whether the woman’s current residence is rural, year fixed effects and region of 
current residence fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. In Column (3), the home country live birth 
rate is measured when women were 19 years old. In this column, we add dummies to control for the education level 
of women when they take the fertility decisions. For teen mothers it is the year in which they have their first child and 
for non-teen mothers it is assumed to be the year in which they are 18 years old. Observations are weighted using 
survey weights. ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
                                                          
36 Note that problems of availability of data make quite complicated a consistent comparison at the country level with 
a sample of women under 18. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter examines the impact of culture on teen motherhood. To pick up its effect, 
we exploit the variation in fertility rates of adolescent women by country of origin of 
their ancestors. The differences in fertility rates of adolescent women by national origin 
can be interpreted as supporting evidence of the relevance of fertility culture. This 
epidemiological approach allows us to strictly separate the impacts of markets and 
institutions from the effects of culture in ascertaining fertility decisions of teen women.  
We find that home country live birth rates, our main cultural proxy, have economically 
and statistically significant effects on the probability of being a teen mother.  
Our findings are robust to alternative specifications, to different samples, and to 
individual characteristics, measured when women take the decision, or not, to have a 
child. In addition, we check whether unobserved heterogeneity across ethnic groups is 
driving our results, by adding to the main analysis controls for home country 
characteristics, such as the average age at first marriage, per capita GDP, and the 
minimum legal age of consent. In all specifications, the estimated coefficient on home 
country live birth rates varies very little. Placebo tests also suggest that we are not 
erroneously interpreting the impact of our cultural proxy.  
Our results suggest that differences in fertility rates of teen women by ethnicity can 
explain, at least in part, the fertility behavior of adolescent women who have spent their 
lives in the US. This can be understood as supporting evidence that cultural differences 
are, at least, a partial explanation for the variations in fertility rates of adolescent women 
across countries. 
This finding can explain the differences in the effects of traditional or conventional 
policies, such as the diffusion of contraception information, and the improvement of 
adolescent sex education. Policy makers should take cultural differences into 
consideration to act more efficiently in decreasing teen motherhood rates in the US.  
The tools used for this should be focused on the specific characteristics of each segment 
of teenagers by ethnicity, for example, by providing family planning specialists of 
appropriate racial/ethnic background, or by hiring social workers who can more fully 
understand the specific circumstances and culture of teen women. In our opinion, this 
investment in policies to prevent teenage pregnancies will be more appropriate than 
policies conducted to help lone mothers (Himmelweit et al. 2004). 
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2.A Appendix A: Logit / Probit models 
 
Table A.- Teen Fertility Culture and the Probability of Being a Teen Mother 
Using Logit and Probit Models 
(Dependent Variable: Teen Mother) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Home Country Live Birth Rate  0.023*** 0.195*** 0.107*** 
 (0.006) (0.040) (0.022) 
Enrolled High School -0.335*** -2.361*** -1.303*** 
 (0.031) (0.475) (0.245) 
High School Graduated -0.243*** -1.362*** -0.791*** 
 (0.020) (0.119) (0.069) 
Enrolled in College -0.378*** -3.994*** -2.022*** 
 (0.020) (0.242) (0.109) 
Rural -0.018 -0.190* -0.114* 
 (0.011) (0.104) (0.063) 
Constant 0.334*** -1.033*** -0.584*** 
 (0.023) (0.141) (0.094) 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Region FE YES YES YES 
Observations 1885 1885 1885 
R-squared 0.150   
Pseudo R-squared  0.207 0.209 
Notes: Home country live birth rate is defined as the number of live births per hundred women under 20 and is measured in the 
year in which women were 19 years old. The sample consists of women aged 19 and born in the US. For both women who are 
teen mothers (these who become mothers when they are 19 years old or less) and those who are not teen mothers we take their 
personal information in the year in which they are 19 years old. We estimate a linear probability model in Column (1) –our 
baseline regression-, a logit model in Column (2) and a probit model in Column (3), where the dependent variable is an 
indicator variable equals to 1 if the woman is a teen mother, and 0 otherwise. All columns include controls for the level of 
education, whether the woman’s current residence is rural, year fixed effects and region of current residence fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Observations are weighted using survey weights that adjust both for the complex 
survey design and for using data from multiple years. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * 
Significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
     
2.B Appendix B: Data sources and definition of variables 
 
Variable Definition Source 
 
Dependent Variable 
   
Teen Mother 
 
Mother 
Log tnfi 
1 if woman is a teen mother (she had her 
first child under 20 years old). 0 otherwise 
1 if woman is a mother. 0 otherwise 
Logarithm of the total net family income 
 
NLSY79 
NLSY79 
NLSY79 
 
Control Variables  
   
Enrolled High School 1 if woman reports that is enrolled in high 
school. 0 otherwise NLSY79 
High School Graduated 1 if woman reports that is not enrolled but 
is high school graduated. 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Enrolled in College 1 if woman reports that is enrolled in 
college. 0 otherwise 
 
NLSY79 
Rural 1 if woman reports that her current 
residence is rural. 0 if it is urban 
 
NLSY79 
Region FE Dummy variables for the region of 
residence (North East (omitted), North 
Central, South, and West) NLSY79 
Year FE Dummy variables for the years: 1979, 
1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983 (1984 
omitted) NLSY79 
Never Married 1 if woman has never been married. 0 
otherwise NLSY79 
Povstat 1 if woman reports that in 1979 her family 
was in poverty. 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Protestant 1 if woman reports that she was raised in a 
protestant religion (Protestant, Baptist, 
Episcopalian, Lutheran, Methodist, 
Presbyterian). 0 otherwise NLSY79 
   
  
Roman Catholic 1 if woman reports that she was raised in 
the Roman Catholic religion. 0 otherwise 
 
NLSY79 
No Religion 1 if woman reports that she was raised 
following no religion. 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Protestant Current 1 if woman reports that her current 
religious affiliation is Protestant 
(Protestant, Baptist, Episcopalian, 
Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian). 0 
otherwise 
 
 
 
 
NLSY79 
Roman Catholic Current 1 if woman reports that her current 
religious affiliation is Roman Catholic. 0 
otherwise NLSY79 
No Religion Current 1 if woman reports that her current 
religious affiliation is none. 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Family Size  
 
With Father 
 
With Mother 
 
Orphan 
 
Abortion 
 
Use Drugs  
 
Teen Sex 
 
 
Traditional I 
 
 
 
 
Traditional II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of family members, ranging from 
1 to 14 
1 if woman´s biological father is still alive. 
0 otherwise 
1 if woman´s biological mother is still 
alive. 0 otherwise  
1 if woman´s father and mother are both 
dead. 0 otherwise 
1 if woman has ever had an abortion. 0 
otherwise 
1 if woman first took narcotics when she 
was 18 years old or younger. 0 otherwise 
1 if woman had her first sexual intercourse 
when she was 16 years old or younger. 0 
otherwise  
1 if woman strongly disagrees with the 
affirmation “Men should share the work 
around the house with women, such as 
doing dishes, cleaning, and so forth”. 0 
otherwise  
1 if woman strongly agrees with the 
affirmation “It is much better for everyone 
concerned if the man is the achiever 
outside the home and the woman takes 
care of the home and family”. 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
NLSY79 
 
NLSY79 
 
NLSY79 
 
NLSY79 
 
NLSY79 
 
NLSY79 
 
 
NLSY79 
 
 
 
 
NLSY79 
 
 
 
 
NLSY79 
 
 
  
Traditional III 1 if woman strongly agrees with the 
affirmation “Women are much happier if 
they stay at home and take care of their 
children”. 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
NLSY79 
 
Cultural Proxies 
  
Home Country Live Birth 
Rates of Women Under 20  
The number of live births per hundred 
women under 20 
Data on Live Birth Rates of women under 20 were obtained from the UN Demographic Yearbooks (several issues). I use data 
related to the Home Country Live Birth Rates of the year in which adolescent women were 19 years old (1979-1984). In the case 
of Germany I calculate the data based on the information available about the Federal Republic of Germany and the Former 
German Democratic Republic and in the case of United Kingdom, for the years 1979-1981 I calculate the data based on the 
information available about England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland. I have data for each country of origin and each 
year, with the exception of Italy 1983 (I use 1982), Mexico 1981-1984 (I use 1980 for 1981 and 1982 and I use 1985 for 1983 
and 1984), Spain 1979 and 1981-1984 (I use 1978 for 1979 and 1981 for the rest of years) and Portugal 1982 (I use 1981) 
Home Country Live Birth 
Rate 1950 
The number of live births per hundred 
women under 20 in 1950 
Data on Live Birth Rates in 1950 of women under 20 were obtained from the UN Demographic Yearbooks (several issues). In 
the case of Germany I calculate the data based on the information available about the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Former German Democratic Republic and in the case of United Kingdom, for the year 1950 I calculate the data based on the 
information available about England and Wales and Scotland. I have data for each country of origin and each year, with the 
exception of Italy (I use 1951), Germany (1955), Ireland (1956), and Mexico (1955) 
Home Country Live Birth 
Rate 1960 
The number of live births per hundred 
women under 20 in 1960 
Data on Live Birth Rates in 1960 of women under 20 were obtained from the UN Demographic Yearbooks (several issues). In 
the case of Germany I calculate the data based on the information available about the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Former German Democratic Republic and in the case of United Kingdom, for the year 1960 I calculate the data based on the 
information available about England and Wales and Scotland. I have data for each country of origin and each year, with the 
exception of Ireland (1961) 
Home Country Live Birth 
Rate 1970 
The number of live births per hundred 
women under 20 in 1970. 
Data on Live Birth Rates in 1970 of women under 20 were obtained from the UN Demographic Yearbooks (several issues). In 
the case of Germany I calculate the data based on the information available about the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Former German Democratic Republic and in the case of United Kingdom, for the year 1970 I calculate the data based on the 
information available about England and Wales and Scotland. I have data for each country of origin and each year, with the 
exception of Italy (I use 1971) 
Home Country Live Birth 
Rate 1980 
The number of live births per hundred 
women under 20. in 1980 
Data on Live Birth Rates in 1980 of women under 20 were obtained from the UN Demographic Yearbooks (several issues). In 
the case of Germany I calculate the data based on the information available about the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Former German Democratic Republic and in the case of United Kingdom, for the year 1980 I calculate the data based on the 
information available about England, Northern Ireland and Wales and Scotland. I have data for each country of origin and each 
year, with the exception of Spain (I use 1981) 
Home Country Live Birth 
Rate 1990 
The number of live births per hundred 
women under 20 in 1990 
Data on Live Birth Rates in 1980 of women under 20 were obtained from the UN Demographic Yearbooks (several issues). In 
the case of Germany I calculate the data based on the information available about the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Former German Democratic Republic. I have data for each country of origin and each year, with the exception of Germany (I use 
1989) and Portugal (1989)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Home Country Live Birth 
Rate 2000 
The number of live births per hundred 
women under 20 in 2000 
Data on Live Birth Rates in 2000 of women under 20 were obtained from the UN Demographic Yearbooks (several issues). I 
have data for each country of origin and each year, with the exception of Germany (I use 2001), Ireland (1999), Mexico (1995), 
Spain (2001), Poland (2001), Portugal (2001) and United Kingdom (1999) 
Home Country Live Birth 
Rate 2005 
The number of live births per hundred 
women under 20 in 2005 
Data on Live Birth Rates in 2005 of women under 20 were obtained from the UN Demographic Yearbooks (several issues). I 
have data for each country of origin and each year, with the exception of Germany (2006), Mexico (1995), Poland (2006) and 
United Kingdom (2004)  
Home Country Live Birth 
Rates of Women Under 20 of 
the Year in Which They Were 
Born 
 
The number of live births per hundred 
women under 20 
Data on Live Birth Rates of women under 20 were obtained from the UN Demographic Yearbooks (several issues). I use data 
related to the Home Country Live Birth Rates of the year in which women were born (1960-1965). In the case of Germany I 
calculate the data based on the information available about the Federal Republic of Germany and the Former German Democratic 
Republic and in the case of United Kingdom, for the years 1960-1965 I calculate the data based on the information available 
about England and Wales and Scotland. I have data for each country of origin and each year, with the exception of Ireland in 
1960 and 1962-1965 (I use 1961 for 1960, 1962 and 1963 and I use 1966 for 1964 and 1965), Mexico 1961-1964 (I use 1960 for 
1960 and 1962 and I use 1965 for 1963 and 1964), Spain 1961-1965 (I use 1960 for 1961-1964 and I use 1968 for 1965) and 
Portugal 1961, 1962 and 1965 (I use 1960 for 1961, 1963 for 1962 and 1964 for 1965) 
Home Country Live Birth 
Rates of Women Under 20 of 
the Year in Which They Take 
the Fertility Decision 
 
The number of live births per hundred 
women under 20 
Data on Live Birth Rates of women under 20 were obtained from the UN Demographic Yearbooks (several issues). I use data 
related to the Home Country Live Birth Rates of the year in which their first child was born (1979-1984) for teen mothers and of 
the year in which they were 19 years old and 18 years old (1979-1984) for non-teen mothers. In the case of Germany I calculate 
the data based on the information available about the Federal Republic of Germany and the Former German Democratic Republic 
and in the case of United Kingdom, for the years 1979-1981 I calculate the data based on the information available about 
England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland. I have data for each country of origin and each year, with the exception of 
Italy 1983 (I use 1982), Mexico 1981-1984 (I use 1980 for 1981 and 1982 and I use 1985 for 1983 and 1984), Spain 1979 and 
1981-1984 (I use 1978 for 1979 and 1981 for the rest of years) and Portugal 1982 (I use 1981) 
 
Country of Origin Variables  
 
Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) 
Per capita GDP in hundreds of thousands 
of US dollars  
United Nations Statistics Division (2010). The value of this variable for teen mothers is of the year in which their first child was 
born and for non-teen mothers of the year in which they were 19 years old 
Age at First Marriage 
 
 
 
Age Consensual Relations 
The average length of single life expressed 
in years among those women who marry 
before age 50 in 1980 
 
The minimum legal age for having 
consensual relations  
For Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal and United Kingdom I use data from the Population Division of the 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. For Cuba and Mexico I use data from World 
Marriage Data 2008 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division). In the case of Cuba I 
use data of the year 1981.  
Data for Mexico comes from the Federal Penal Code, last published 17/04/2012 (art. 261-263). Data for Germany comes from 
the German Criminal Code (art. 176). Data for Ireland comes from the Criminal Law (Sexual Offenders) Act. 2006. Data for 
Italy comes from the Italian Penal Code (art. 609). Data for Portugal comes from the Portuguese Penal Code. Data for Spain 
comes from the Spanish Civil Code (art. 181-183). Data for United Kingdom comes from the Sexual Offences Act. 2003. Data 
for France comes from the French Penal Code (art. 227-25). Data for Polish comes from the Criminal Code (art. 200). Data for 
Cuba comes from the Cuban Penal Code (art. 300). 
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Chapter 3: Which children stabilize 
marriage? New evidence from the NLSY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Over the last five decades, the divorce rate in the United States has not maintained a 
steady trend. From the early 1960s to the early 1980s, the divorce rate increased 
significantly, and then began a steady decline (Drewianka 2008). As Figure 3.1 shows, 
the Crude Divorce Rate - defined as the annual number of divorces per 1,000 mid-year 
population - began to increase by the year 1960, reaching its maximum value of 5.27 in 
1981. From that point, this indicator leveled off to 3.5 divorces per 1,000 population in 
the year 2007. The data come from several issues of the UN Demographic Yearbook 
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The 
evolution of this variable has focused the attention of researchers, since it has been one 
of the major determinants of the dramatic changes in the institution of the family: an 
increasing percentage of single-parent families, a rapid growth in cohabitation, an 
increase of the age at first marriage, and a continuing decline in the number of 
traditional families, consisting of a breadwinner-husband and a homemaker-wife 
(Bianchi and Casper 2000; Gruber 2004; Wolfers 2006). Simultaneously, the average 
population under 18 years old per household - and also the population under 18 years 
old per family - experienced a sharp fall from the early 1960s to the early 1980s, then 
stabilized and even grew slightly (data from the US Census Bureau). In this chapter, we 
study whether there is a causal relation between these two variables, by analyzing the 
impact that the number of children conceived during first marriage has on the risk of 
marital disruption of the couple.37 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37 Children conceived during first marriage do not include those children who were born during the first eight months 
of marriage, or before the marriage took place.  
The marital dissolution can be reported by declaring that the marital status is separated or divorced. However, since 
every person in our sample is married, not cohabiting, and the marital status "separated" normally is the threshold of 
legal divorce, we make no distinction, following Chan and Halpin (2002). 
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Prior research has shown that the negative consequences of divorce are many and 
significant, not only for the members of the couple, but also for their children (see, for a 
review, Amato 2004). Many studies have examined the effect of divorce on the 
financial situation of the spouses. McManus and DiPetre (2001) focus their research on 
the economic situation of men after divorce, finding that most men lose economic 
status, while Peterson (1996) determines that women have to address serious financial 
problems as a consequence of divorce, since they experience a decline in their standard 
of living of up to 27%. Zagorsky (2005) finds that divorced women experience a greater 
decline in their wealth than divorced men. McKeever and Wolfinger (2001) confirm the 
negative economic consequences of divorce for women, although the impact is less than 
in previous years due to women’s greater participation in the labour market and their 
improved human capital. Ananat and Michaels (2008), in turn, conclude that marital 
disruption has important welfare consequences through increased poverty and social 
differences. In addition, they find increased probabilities that women will have either 
much lower or much higher income after divorce. Burkhauser et al. (1990) present a 
cross-country comparison between the US and Germany, finding that in both countries 
the post-marital economic situation of women and children is worse than for men, 
despite the more developed German tax and transfer system. In addition, previous 
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researches have shown that a divorce affects not only economically, but also in terms of 
well-being and health (see, for a review, Amato 2004; Williams and Dunne-Bryant 
2006; Williams 2003). It has also been shown that children suffer the impact of divorce 
through academic, emotional, and health outcomes, which has been widely documented 
in the sociological, psychological and economic literature (Amato 2001; Ermisch and 
Francesconi 2001; Evenhouse and Reilly 2004; Frisco et al. 2007; Fronstin et al. 2001; 
Gennetian 2005; Gruber 2004; Kim 2011; Strohschein 2005; Sun and Li 2001).  
All these negative consequences of marital disruption justify the efforts made by 
researchers to identify the determinants of divorce, among which are the negative 
impact of a slowing or depressed economy, and changes in the couple’s economic 
circumstances (Böheim and Ermisch 2001; Conger et al. 1990; Hoffman and Duncan 
1995; Voydanoff 1990; Weiss and Willis 1997; White and Rogers 2000). The impact of 
age at marriage on the probability of divorce has also been studied, with research 
finding that those who marry as teenagers or in their early twenties are more likely to 
divorce (Booth and Edwards 1985; Lehrer 2008). The level of education is also a factor, 
with those of low education being more likely to end their marriage in divorce (Amato 
and James 2010; Bramlett and Mosher 2002). Other risk factors for divorce are the 
presence of children in the household from a previous union (Waite and Lillard 1991), 
coming from a single-parent home (Amato 1996; Amato and DeBoer 2001; Cherlin and 
Kiernan 1999; McLanahan and Bumpass 1988), living in an urban area (Lyngstad and 
Jalovaara 2010; South and Spitze 1986) and having no religious affiliation (Call and 
Heaton 1997; Vaaler et al. 2009). This chapter adds to these studies by analyzing the 
effect that the number of children conceived during first marriage has on the probability 
of marital disruption.  
The influence of children on marital stability has been previously analyzed. 
Andersson (1997), using data from Sweden, finds that children reduce the risk of 
divorce, especially when they are young, but this effect disappears from the third child 
onwards. Chan and Halpin (2002), using data for Britain, show that the effect of 
children on marital stability turned from positive to negative during the 1980s, and 
Cherlin (1977) finds that, in the US, children have a deterrent effect on the dissolution 
of marriage only when they are very young, and this deterrent fades as the children 
grow up. To obtain these results, Cherlin used an OLS regression, and then a more 
appropriate logit-maximum likelihood estimation procedure, finding very similar 
results. However, these studies do not consider the potential endogeneity between the 
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children of a married couple and their marital stability. While it is true that, according to 
the theory developed by Becker (1981), children can be considered marriage-specific 
investments, and therefore should reduce the risk of marital breakdown, so it is also true 
that a couple with serious marital problems and close to divorce is less likely to 
conceive children, since they will hardly invest in something that is already devalued 
(Myers 1997). From this perspective, research has focused on this issue by considering 
the potential endogeneity. Koo and Janowitz (1983) address the potential endogeneity 
between childbearing and the marital dissolution process by developing a simultaneous 
logit model, finding neither an effect of the number of children on the risk of divorce, 
nor an impact of the risk of divorce on fertility decisions. Waite and Lillard (1993), 
using data for the US, also consider the possibility that the processes of childbearing 
and divorce are interrelated, and, including this simultaneous relationship in their 
model, they find that the first child contributes to marital stability, whereas subsequent 
children have the opposite effect. Another study that considers the potential endogeneity 
between childbearing and marital disruption is Steele et al. (2005), who employ a multi-
process model that allow them to jointly determine the processes of childbearing and 
marital stability. Using this simultaneous equation model, they determine that young 
children have a stabilizing effect on marital relations, and that this impact is greater than 
the effect of older children. Svarer and Verner (2008), using data for Denmark, initially 
find that children have a positive effect on marital stability, but when the endogeneity 
between marital duration and fertility decisions is accounted for, by applying the 
timing-of-event method (a bivariate duration model), they conclude that the effect of 
children is just the opposite: an increase in the risk of marital disruption. Other 
methodology that overcomes the potential endogeneity issue is the Instrumental 
Variable approach, which requires the presence of valid instruments related to the 
endogenous covariate but independent of the error term, providing the possibility of 
obtaining good estimates and solving endogeneity concerns. Vuri (2001) develops an 
instrumental variable model that relates the fertility decisions of a couple and their 
probability of marital dissolution, using as instrument for exogenous fertility 
movements the sex of the two previous children. Once she takes into account the 
endogeneity concern, she determines that children have a positive impact on the risk of 
marital disruption, the opposite result to the one that she obtained using the 
conventional least squares model.  
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As can be seen, there is conflicting evidence regarding the effect of the number of 
children on marital disruption. In an attempt to resolve some of these issues we first 
develop a model to exploit the panel structure of the data, which allows us to control for 
the unobserved heterogeneity of individuals. Results show that children conceived 
during first marriage have a deterrent effect on the risk of marital dissolution.  
Second, we consider the potential endogeneity in the relationship between the 
number of children and the risk of marital dissolution: children are supposed to act as a 
deterrent to marital dissolution, but couples who are more likely to divorce are less 
likely to have children. Considering this potential endogeneity, we develop a two-stage 
least squares model that allows us to determine the causal effect of fertility decisions on 
the risk of marital disruption. We contribute by creating two different sets of 
instruments - which is difficult due to the close relationship between childbearing 
decisions and partnership stability (Steele et al. 2005) – and our results, again, do show 
a deterrent effect of children conceived during first marriage on the risk of marital 
disruption. 
We also contribute by analyzing whether the deterrent effect of the number of 
children conceived during first marriage varies depending on the educational level of 
their parents. Following Becker (1981), children considered as a marriage-specific 
investment increase the value of the union, reducing the probability of marital 
disruption. However, since prior research has shown that there exists an 
intergenerational transmission of human capital (Black et al. 2005; Currie and Moretti 
2003), the offspring of parents with a higher level of education may have a greater 
"value" than the offspring of low-educated parents, so the former should have a greater 
deterrent effect on the risk of marital disruption. In other words, the investment of a 
high-educated couple in their marriage by having children should be greater than the 
investment made by a low-educated couple, so the increase in the value of the marriage 
would be greater in the first case, as well as the reduction in the risk of marital 
disruption. Our results confirm that the higher the educational level of the parents, the 
greater the deterrent effect of their children on the risk of marital dissolution.  
Finally, we specify a duration model of the first marriage duration to test the 
robustness of our estimates to the model specification adopted. Prior research, such as 
that of Svarer and Verner (2008) using Danish data, applied these duration models as an 
empirical strategy. As expected, we find empirical evidence of the deterrent effect of 
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children conceived during first marriage on the risk of marital disruption of their 
parents. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the 
empirical strategy. In Section 3.3, we present the data used in our analysis, while our 
main results and robustness checks are presented in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5 we 
analyze the impact of children on marital stability by the educational level of their 
parents. Section 3.6 introduces the survival analysis methodology, and Section 3.7 
presents our main conclusions. 
 
3.2 Empirical strategy 
 
We develop an empirical strategy that exploits the panel structure of our data, allowing 
us to observe the behavior of a range of individuals across time. Using fixed effects, we 
can remove the effect of those time-invariant characteristics of each individual that may 
have an influence on their divorce decisions and that would bias our results; that is, we 
control for individual unobserved heterogeneity. We estimate Equation (3.1) to obtain 
the effect of the number of children conceived during first marriage on the risk of 
marital dissolution, controlling for individual fixed effects: 
 
                                   Divorceit = β1 Childrenit + β2 Xit + αi + εit                                                  (3.1) 
 
where Divorceit is a dummy variable that takes value 1 in year t  if individual i suffers a 
marital disruption in year t+1.38 In our estimates, the variable of interest is Childrenit, 
defined as the number of children conceived during first marriage by individual i until 
year t, and Xit is a vector of characteristics widely considered as standard determinants 
of the risk of marital disruption, such as age, level of education, and region of residence. 
Furthermore, αi is the unknown intercept for each individual in our database, and εit is 
the error term.  
Our main concern is that we cannot know the state of origin of the individuals, due 
to data restrictions for foreign researchers.39 The only geographical information 
                                                          
38 We revisit this definition of the variable divorce below. 
39 Non-American researchers do not have access to information on the place of residence. As can be read on the web 
page of the Bureau of Labor Statistics: “To protect respondent confidentiality, the NLS public-use files do not include 
geographic variables such as state, county, and metropolitan area” http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsfaqs.htm#anch25; “The  
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available in the dataset divides the US territory into four regions: North East, North 
Central, South, and West. North East is the omitted variable in the analysis.40  
 
3.2.1 Instrumental variables 
 
As mentioned above, several studies discuss the possibility of endogeneity in the 
number of children-divorce relationship. On the one hand, and according to Becker 
(1981), children conceived within marriage act as a deterrent to marital disruption, since 
they can be considered as marriage-specific investments. So, if the couple "invests" in 
their marriage by having children, its value will rise, decreasing the incentives for 
marital disruption. On the other hand, those couples who have more marital problems 
have lower "quality" marriages, and therefore their incentives to invest in their union by 
having children are lower (Myers 1997). Throughout this subsection, we present the 
two-stage least squares model developed to study the effect of the number of children 
conceived during first marriage on marital stability, considering the potential 
endogeneity between them. 
To develop this methodology, we need a range of instruments correlated with the 
variable suspected to be endogenous - the number of children conceived during first 
marriage - conditional on the other covariates, but that are independent with respect to 
the dependent variable, the risk of marital disruption, i.e. they are not correlated with the 
error term. Thus, we estimate the following equations: 
 
Divorceit = γ1 Childrenit + γ2 Xit + λit                                            (3.2) 
 
Childrenit = θ1 IVit + θ2 Xit + µit                                                (3.3) 
 
where Divorceit is a dummy variable that takes value 1 in year t  if individual i suffers a 
marital disruption in year t+1, since we want to show the effect of characteristics in 
year t in the divorce decision made in year t+1 –we revisit this issue below-. Childrenit 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) only grants access to geocode files for researchers in the United States who agree in 
writing to adhere to the BLS confidentiality policy and whose projects further the mission of BLS and the NLS 
program to conduct sound, legitimate research in the social sciences. Applications from abroad cannot be accepted.” 
http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsfaq2.htm#anch32.   
40 Since divorce laws vary by state (Cáceres-Delpiano and Giolito 2008), and they have an impact on the probability 
of divorce (Friedberg 1998; Marcassa 2011; Wolfers 2006), this absence of geographical information may bias our 
results. However, we make use of the only geographical information available for foreign researchers to try to 
mitigate the problem.   
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indicates the number of children conceived during the marriage by the individual i, and 
Xit is a set of personal, household, and partner characteristics of individual i that are 
considered to be potential determinants of marital instability, such as educational level, 
age at first marriage, and the existence of an age gap between the members of the 
couple. Previously, we had estimated the endogenous variable, Childrenit, using as 
covariates the same set of characteristics collected by Xit, and some excluded 
instruments included in IVit.  
As instruments to identify the selection equation (3.3) we present two different 
options that meet the requirements to be valid instruments. First, we create dummy 
variables indicating the number of siblings of the respondent to the questionnaire. Thus, 
there are five dummies indicating whether the respondent has no siblings, has only one, 
two, three, and four or more. The reasoning behind these variables is that if an 
individual has been raised in a family with a large number of siblings, the individual has 
a greater tendency to form a large family with many children, replicating the fertility 
behavior of his/her parents. This intergenerational transmission of fertility behavior has 
been shown by many studies (Axinn et al. 1994; Booth and Kee 2006; Kotte and 
Ludwig 2011; Murphy and Wang 2001; Regnier-Loilier 2006). Second, we create as 
instrument a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent has a multiple birth 
(twins, triplets…) during first marriage.41 In addition, the presence of an unplanned 
child (as a consequence of a multiple birth) is not related to the probability of marital 
disruption (Jacobsen et al. 2001). 
 
3.3 Data and variables 
 
In our research, we use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
(NLSY79), a national representative database formed by 12,686 young men and women 
who were born between 1957 and 1965 (so they were aged between 14 and 22 years old 
in 1979, the year of the first wave). These individuals were interviewed each year until 
1994 and from that point only in even-numbered years. This survey provides 
information on several significant life events related to marital and fertility histories, 
family background, educational experience, labor market behavior, health issues, and 
assets and incomes, among others.  
                                                          
41 Cáceres-Delpiano (2012) also uses the presence of a multiple birth as instrumental variable for the family size. 
Which children stabilize marriage? New evidence from the NLSY 
  
- 89 - 
 
Our sample consists of individuals who married when they were at least 21 years 
old.42 We consider them from the first moment they appear in the sample being married, 
until they cease to be interviewed or they report their marriage dissolution. From that 
moment, we remove them from the database. We also remove from our sample those 
individuals whose first marriage ends with the death of the spouse.  
With respect to our dependent variable -whether the individual is married or 
separated/divorced- we emphasize that it is delayed one period of time in order to obtain 
the effect of individual characteristics in year t-1 on the decision taken on marital status 
in year t, since individual characteristics are measured once per year. Other way, the 
explanatory variables could have already suffered variations due to the divorce 
experienced the same year. It is also important to note that the variable measuring 
fertility decisions only considers those children conceived from the month the marriage 
occurs, so those children born before or during the first 8 months of marriage are 
considered to be conceived out of marriage and are not included (Amato 2010; Becker 
et al. 1977; Waite and Lillard 1991; White and Booth 1985). So, since we do not know 
whether those children conceived before marriage are the natural children of the 
partners in the marriage or not, we do not include them in the variable measuring the 
number of children –we revisit this issue below-. 
Our final sample is formed by 5,622 individuals. Table 3.1 presents the summary 
statistics of the entire sample, while Table 3.1.1 shows the statistical differences 
between individuals who suffer a marital disruption at some time, and those who never 
do. Among the members of the first group, the mean age at divorce is almost 32, while 
the mean age at first marriage is 24.47. Those who never suffer a marital disruption 
marry later, when they are 25.07 years old, and have an average of 0.42 more children 
conceived during first marriage than those who suffer a marital disruption. In addition, 
those who remain married have a higher educational level. The percentage of blacks 
among those who remain married is 10 points lower than among those who experience 
marital disruption. 
 
 
 
                                                          
42 We consider those people who married at 21 or after since when they were born, the mean age at first marriage was 
22.6 and 20.3 in 1957 for men and women, respectively, and 23.1 and 20.5 in 1964. People in our database were born 
between 1957 and 1964. Some cultural preferences can be transmitted by parents to their offspring during the early 
childhood (Furtado et al. 2013). We revisit this issue below. Source: United States Census Bureau  
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/ms2.pdf 
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Table 3.1 - Summary Statistics 
(Variables Used in our Baseline Regression) 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Divorce 45,632 0.046 0.209 0 1 
Children Conceived Within Marriage 45,632 1.090 1.085 0 10 
Gender 45,632 0.534 0.499 0 1 
Age 45,632 33.161 7.039 21 51 
Age Squared 45,632 1,149.228 497.113 441 2,601 
Wife Five Years Older 45,632 0.034 0.180 0 1 
Husband Five Years Older 45,632 0.191 0.393 0 1 
Same Age 45,632 0.775 0.417 0 1 
Highest Educ: Lowest Level 45,632 0.074 0.262 0 1 
Highest Educ: High School Level 45,632 0.369 0.483 0 1 
Highest Educ: College Level 45,632 0.247 0.431 0 1 
Highest Educ: More Than College Level 45,632 0.309 0.462 0 1 
Highest Educ Spouse: Lowest Level 45,632 0.087 0.282 0 1 
Highest Educ Spouse: High School Level 45,632 0.386 0.487 0 1 
Highest Educ Spouse: College Level 45,632 0.237 0.425 0 1 
Highest Educ Spouse: More Than College Level 45,632 0.289 0.453 0 1 
Father in Household in 1979 45,632 0.679 0.467 0 1 
Without Father Figure in 1979 45,632 0.010 0.102 0 1 
Father out Household in 1979 45,632 0.311 0.463 0 1 
Charged Illegal by 1980 45,632 0.073 0.261 0 1 
Age First Marriage 45,632 24.925 3.893 21 49 
Child Before Marriage 45,632 0.154 0.361 0 1 
Race: Hispanic 45,632 0.163 0.370 0 1 
Race: Black 45,632 0.191 0.393 0 1 
Race: Other 45,632 0.646 0.478 0 1 
Notes: This table contains the main summary statistics of variables in our baseline estimates, including the dependent variable, 
our variable of interest and the rest of covariates included in our analysis.  
 
 
Table 3.1.1 - Summary Statistics  
(People Divorced at Anytime/People Never Divorced) 
Variables Those Divorced at Anytime Those Never Divorced 
Observations 11,240 34,392 
Mean Age at Divorce 31.80 - 
Mean Age at First Marriage 24.47 25.07 
Mean Number Children Conceived During First Marriage 0.77 1.19 
% With Lowest Level of Education 10.62 6.39 
% With High Level of Education 44.72 34.41 
% With College Level of Education 26.21 24.22 
% With More Than College Level of Education 18.44 34.98 
% With Spouse Lowest Level of Education 12.15 7.58 
% With Spouse High Level of Education 46.62 36.05 
% With Spouse College Level of Education 23.83 23.65 
% With Spouse More Than College Level of Education 17.39 32.72 
% With father in Household in 1979 61.81 69.88 
% Without Father Figure in 1979 1.37 0.94 
% With Father out Household in 1979 36.81 29.18 
% With Child Before Marriage 22.39 13.09 
% race: Black 26.41 16.71 
% race: Hispanic 17.90 15.84 
% race: Other 55.69 67.46 
Notes: This table contains the main summary statistics, dividing the sample between those who were divorced at any time, 
Column (1), and those who never experienced a divorce, Column (2).  
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3.4 Results: number of children and marital instability 
 
3.4.1 Baseline results 
 
Before applying our empirical strategy, we use the Haussman test (Hausman 1978) to 
decide between using the Fixed Effects or the Random Effects technique. As expected, 
the Hausman test recommends the Fixed Effects method (Table 3.2). However, we also 
present the estimates using Random Effects, allowing us to observe the effect of factors 
that do not vary over time, but that do have a recognized effect on the probability of 
marital disruption, such as age at marriage, the presence of children conceived before 
marriage, and race. 
Table 3.2 - Hausman Test 
(Fixed Effects vs Random Effects) 
 Coefficients  
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
 (b) (B) (b-B) Sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
Children Conceived Within Marriage -0.015 -0.015 0.001 0.001 
Age 0.039 0.030 0.001 0.001 
Age Squared -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0001 6.31e-06 
Highest Education: Lowest Level -0.038 0.044 -0.082 0.015 
Highest Education: High School Level -0.010 0.036 -0.046 0.010 
Highest Education: College Level 0.019 0.031 -0.013 0.006 
Highest Education Spouse: Lowest Level -0.027 0.018 -0.046 0.008 
Highest Education Spouse: High School Level -0.012 0.010 -0.022 0.006 
Highest Education Spouse: College Level -0.001 0.010 -0.010 0.005 
North Central -0.005 0.003 -0.007 0.007 
South -0.007 0.006 -0.013 0.006 
West 0.006 0.015 -0.009 0.007 
Notes: The Hausman test is a general implementation of Hausman’s (1978) specification test. This test is a chi-square test that 
determines whether the differences between two estimates are systematic and significant. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, 
there should be no systematic difference between the two estimators. 
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2 (11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 952.87 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Table 3.3 shows the results derived from our baseline regression. We find that the 
effect of our variable of interest (the number of children conceived during first 
marriage) on the risk of marital disruption is negative and statistically significant. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of this impact is the same in Columns (1), (2) and (3), 
which include results from the Random Effects methodology, and in Column (4), which 
shows results from the Fixed Effects methodology, recommended by the Hausman test. 
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Table 3.3 - Children Conceived During First Marriage and Risk of Marital Dissolution: 
 Random and Fixed Effects 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Children Conceived Within Marriage -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Gender -0.013** -0.013** -0.013**  
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  
Age 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.039*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age Squared -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0005*** 
 (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
Wife Five Years Older 0.038** 0.038** 0.037**  
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  
Husband Five Years Older 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***  
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  
Highest Education: Lowest Level 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.044*** -0.038* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.022) 
Highest Education: High School Level 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.036*** -0.010 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) 
Highest Education: College Level 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.019** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Highest Education Spouse: Lowest Level 0.019* 0.019* 0.018* -0.027* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) 
Highest Education Spouse: High School Level 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* -0.012 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) 
Highest Education Spouse: College Level 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Father in Household in 1979 -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.027***  
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
Without Father Figure in 1979 -0.006 -0.007 -0.010  
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)  
Charged Illegal by 1980 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.046***  
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  
Age First Marriage -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008***  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Child Before Marriage 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.046***  
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
Race: Hispanic 0.000 -0.003 -0.004  
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)  
Race: Black 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.049***  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
Constant -0.287*** -0.294*** -0.258*** -0.678*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.034) 
Region FE NO YES YES YES 
Cohort FE NO NO YES YES 
Observations 45,632 45,632 45,632 45,632 
Number of Caseid 5,622 5,622 5,622 5,622 
Notes: Children conceived during first marriage include only those children who were born during or after the ninth month of 
marriage. The sample consists of men and women who were at least 21 years old when they first married. They appear in our 
database since the year of their first marriage until the previous year of their divorce –since we want to find the impact of 
personal and familiar characteristics in year t-1 on divorce decisions in year t- or until they no longer appear in the survey, 
whichever comes first. Columns (1), (2) and (3) show results for the Random Effects methodology and Column (4) shows results 
for the Fixed Effects methodology. Column (1) includes controls for the sex, the age and the age gap, the education of respondent 
and his/her spouse, family structure when young, risk activities when young, age at first marriage, whether there exists a child 
who was conceived before first marriage, and the race. Column (2) adds controls for the region of current residence. Columns (3) 
and (4) also include controls for the cohort of respondent. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * 
Significant at the 10% level. 
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This result is in line with prior studies showing that the presence of children has a 
deterrent effect on the likelihood of marriage dissolution, in the US (Morgan and 
Rindfuss 1985; South 2001; Tzeng and Mare 1995; Weiss and Willis 1997) and in 
several European countries (Andersson 1997; Berrington and Diamond 1999; Jalovaara 
2001). When we analyze our results from the Fixed Effects model, each additional child 
conceived within the marriage produces a decrease of 0.015 in the probability of marital 
disruption.  
Considering the remaining explanatory variables, we observe that the variable 
related to the gender of the respondent indicates that men are less likely to divorce or 
separate than women in our database. This result is in line with prior studies finding that 
women more often take the initiative to begin the process of separation (Hewitt et al. 
2006; Kalmijn and Poortman 2006). The variables Age and Age squared show a U-
shaped inverse relationship with the risk of marital dissolution, indicating that younger 
and older couples have a lower risk of divorce than middle-aged couples (Levenson et 
al. 1993). Variables indicating an age gap of at least five years between members of the 
couple are significant and positive, confirming the idea that a greater age gap implies a 
higher risk of marital disruption (Reinhold 2010).  
Variables of the level of education reveal the expected results, in line with prior 
research (Blackburn 2003), with lower levels of education being linked to higher 
probabilities of marital disruption, since our reference variable is for those with the 
highest level of education.  
The impact of other variables is also what we would expect from prior research. 
The presence of the father in the household in 1979 - rather than being deceased or 
living elsewhere - when the respondent was aged between 14 and 22, reduces the 
probability of the respondent’s marital disruption (Amato 1996; Amato and DeBoer 
2001). The respondent having been charged with illegal activity in youth is related to a 
higher probability of marital disruption later in life (Apel et al. 2010). The younger the 
individual at first marriage, the greater the probability that the marriage ends in 
disruption (Lehrer 2008). 
We also include in our estimates a dummy variable indicating whether the 
individual had at least one child before first marriage, and our results show that those 
who did so are more likely to suffer marital disruption (see, for a similar result, Liu 
2002).  
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Finally, the variable related to race is divided into three categories, due to the 
available information in our database: black, hispanic, and others. According to our 
estimates, black individuals have a higher probability of marital disruption than the 
others (Bulanda and Brown 2007). 
 
3.4.2 Instrumental variable results 
 
While the presence of children in a marriage does act as a deterrent to marital 
disruption, it is also the case that couples with more marital problems - who are thus 
more likely to divorce - have a lower probability of having children. To deal with this 
endogeneity concern, we apply an instrumental variable approach. 
As a first step, we regress the variable suspected to be endogenous - number of 
children conceived during first marriage - using the same set of explanatory variables as 
in our baseline estimates of the probability of marital disruption, but now including a set 
of excluded instruments correlated with the variable suspected to be endogenous and 
independent of the error term.  
We create two different sets of variables. First, we use five dummies indicating 
whether the individual has no siblings, or has one, two, three, and four or more siblings. 
The reasoning is that if an individual comes from a large family with multiple siblings, 
there is a greater likelihood that he/she will want to have a large family with a higher 
number of children. This intergenerational transmission of fertility behavior has been 
widely demonstrated (Axinn et al. 1994; Booth and Kee 2006; Kotte and Ludwig 2011; 
Murphy and Wang 2001; Regnier-Loilier 2006). Second, we create a dummy for 
whether the respondent had a multiple birth during first marriage, since the presence of 
a multiple birth is linked to the family size (Cáceres-Delpiano 2012). In addition, the 
presence of an unplanned child as a consequence of this multiple birth has no relation to 
the probability of marital disruption (Jacobsen et al. 2001).  
We also include both sets of instruments in the same regression. As expected, a 
greater number of siblings and the presence of a multiple birth during first marriage are 
both positively related to a greater number of children conceived during first marriage. 
Results of this first step are shown in the Appendix A. 
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Table 3.4 - Children Conceived During First Marriage and Risk of Marital Dissolution: 
Instrumental Variables 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Children Conceived Within Marriage -0.015*** -0.237*** -0.075*** -0.104*** 
 (0.002) (0.074) (0.020) (0.020) 
Gender -0.013** -0.009 -0.008** -0.008* 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age 0.030*** 0.125*** 0.045*** 0.059*** 
 (0.002) (0.032) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age Squared -0.0003*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.00002) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Wife Five Years Older 0.037** -0.033 0.005 -0.002 
 (0.015) (0.028) (0.012) (0.012) 
Husband Five Years Older 0.018*** 0.013 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Highest Education: Lowest Level 0.044*** 0.076*** 0.044*** 0.049*** 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008) 
Highest Education: High School Level 0.036*** 0.048*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
Highest Education: College Level 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Highest Education Spouse: Lowest Level 0.018* 0.024** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
Highest Education Spouse: High School Level 0.010* -0.001 0.008 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Highest Education Spouse: College Level 0.010* -0.003 0.006 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Father in Household in 1979 -0.027*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) 
Without Father Figure in 1979 -0.010 -0.026 -0.017 -0.018 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.017) (0.019) 
Charged Illegal by 1980 0.046*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age First Marriage -0.008*** -0.035*** -0.013*** -0.017*** 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002) 
Child Before Marriage 0.046*** 0.002 0.021*** 0.018** 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.007) (0.007) 
Race: Hispanic -0.004 0.022* 0.003 0.006 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007) 
Race: Black 0.049*** 0.039*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) 
Constant -0.258*** -1.278*** -0.422*** -0.572*** 
 (0.030) (0.346) (0.093) (0.092) 
Region FE YES YES YES YES 
Cohort FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 45,632 45,632 45,632 45,632 
Number of Caseid 5,622 5,622 5,622 5,622 
Notes: Children conceived during first marriage include only those children who were born during or after the ninth month of 
marriage. The sample consists of men and women who were at least 21 years old when they first married. They appear in our 
database since the year of their first marriage until the previous year of their divorce –since we want to find the impact of 
personal and familiar characteristics in year t-1 on divorce decisions in year t- or until they no longer appear in the survey, 
whichever comes first. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) include controls for the sex, the age and the age gap, the education of 
respondent and his/her spouse, family structure when young, risk activities when young, age at first marriage, whether there 
exists a child who was conceived before first marriage, the race, the region of current residence and the cohort of respondent. 
Column (1) includes our baseline estimates using Random Effects to make results more easily comparable. Column (2) shows 
results using dummies for the number of siblings of respondent as instruments. Column (3) uses as instruments a dummy 
indicating whether the respondent has experienced a multiple birth. Column (4) presents results after using both sets of 
instruments simultaneously. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 3.4 presents results for our instrumental variable approach. Column (1) 
presents results from our baseline regression using Random Effects to facilitate the 
comparison, and Columns (2), (3) and (4) show results using the dummies for the 
number of siblings, the variable indicating the presence of a multiple birth during first 
marriage, and both sets of instruments simultaneously, respectively.43   
We can see that, again, these results obtained after considering the potential 
endogeneity behind the childbearing/marital disruption relationship are quite similar to 
those presented above, increasing the robustness of our estimates. Focusing on our 
variable of interest, we observe that, irrespective of the variables used as instruments, 
the effect of the number of children conceived during first marriage on the probability 
of marital disruption remains negative and significant at the 1% level.  
As for the other covariates included in our analysis, we can see that both the sign 
and the significance of the effect do not vary with respect to the results presented in our 
baseline regression. Thus, we observe again the U-shaped inverse relationship between 
age and the risk of marital disruption, and the greater probability of divorce in those 
couples with an existing age gap, but in this case only when the husband is older than 
the wife. With respect to educational level, we again find that the higher the level of 
education, the lower the probability of marital disruption. In addition, those more likely 
to end their marriage in disruption are those without a father living with them when they 
were young, those who presented higher risk attitudes when young (measured by the 
variable for being charged with any illegal activity), those who married young, those 
with children born before their marriage began, and those who are black. 
 
3.4.3 Robustness checks 
 
In this section, we check whether our previous estimates are sensitive to the definition 
of our variable of interest, our sample selection, and the inclusion of new covariates not 
included in our baseline estimates due to endogeneity concerns. Results are presented in 
Tables 3.5 to 3.9. 
First, we modify our sample. In our baseline estimate, we had considered only 
those individuals who married for the first time when they were at least 21 years old. 
                                                          
43 We test the validity of our instruments by applying a test of over-identifying restrictions, whose null hypothesis is 
that the excluded instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from 
the estimated equation. Following this strategy, we confirm the validity of our instruments.  
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We now redefine our sample to include every individual, irrespective of the age they 
married. Following this new strategy, the number of individuals is extended to 8,303.  
These new estimates are presented in Table 3.5, which presents our results after 
applying the instrumental variables approach to solve the problems of potential 
endogeneity. Focusing on our variable of interest, we observe that children conceived 
during marriage are a deterrent for marital disruption, and this variable is significant at 
the 1% significance level. The effect of the remaining covariates on the probability of 
marital disruption is also very similar to the findings from the main specification. 
Next, we experiment with alternative definitions of fertility. The existing literature 
has repeatedly found that the effect of children as a deterrent to marital disruption is 
stronger when they are younger (Steele et al. 2005; Waite and Lillard 1991). To check 
this point, we redefine our variable of interest to pick up only those children conceived 
during the marriage who are under 10 years old, and then those under 6 years old. 
Results are presented in Table 3.6. We observe that, regardless of the set of variables 
used as instruments, the younger the children conceived during first marriage, the 
greater their deterrent effect on marital disruption. Specifically, the deterrent effect of 
children under 10 years old increases between 13% and 21% with respect to all children 
conceived during first marriage. If we only consider children under age 6, the growth of 
the deterrent effect ranges from 26% to 53%. These results are in line with earlier work 
in this area. 
 The existing literature on the causes of marital disruption shows how children, 
under certain circumstances, can represent a problem for the marital stability of the 
couple. One of these circumstances is that the children were conceived before the 
marriage, or that one of their parents is not one of the members of the couple. Thus, in 
our baseline regression we exclude children conceived before marriage, since we cannot 
be certain of paternity. We now redefine our variable of interest to include those 
children conceived before first marriage. The expected result is a decrease of the 
deterrent effect of children on the probability of marriage disruption, with respect to that 
obtained in our baseline estimates in which we only included children conceived during 
first marriage. 
 
 
 
 
Which children stabilize marriage? New evidence from the NLSY 
  
- 98 - 
 
 
Table 3.5 - Children Conceived During First Marriage and Risk of Marital Dissolution: 
All Ages at Marriage 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Children Conceived Within Marriage -0.227*** -0.067*** -0.092*** 
 (0.069) (0.017) (0.016) 
Gender -0.018*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
Age 0.104*** 0.035*** 0.046*** 
 (0.025) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.0004*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0003) (0.00007) (0.0001) 
Wife Five Years Older -0.026 0.009 0.004 
 (0.026) (0.011) (0.011) 
Husband Five Years Older 0.013* 0.011*** 0.011** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
Highest Education: Lowest Level 0.115*** 0.062*** 0.069*** 
 (0.022) (0.007) (0.008) 
Highest Education: High School Level 0.052*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
Highest Education: College Level 0.016** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Highest Education Spouse: Lowest Level 0.009 0.019*** 0.018*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
Highest Education Spouse: High School Level -0.011 0.005 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
Highest Education Spouse: College Level -0.011 0.005 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
Father in Household in 1979 -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Without Father Figure in 1979 -0.016 -0.007 -0.009 
 (0.025) (0.014) (0.015) 
Charged Illegal by 1980 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age First Marriage -0.035*** -0.013*** -0.017*** 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) 
Child Before Marriage 0.001 0.020*** 0.017*** 
 (0.016) (0.006) (0.006) 
Race: Hispanic 0.023* -0.001 0.003 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) 
Race: Black 0.039*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant -0.842*** -0.229*** -0.322*** 
 (0.221) (0.053) (0.052) 
Region FE YES YES YES 
Cohort FE YES YES YES 
Observations 69,042 69,042 69,042 
Number of Caseid 8,303 8,303 8,303 
Notes: Children conceived during first marriage include only those children who were born during or after the ninth month of 
marriage. The sample consists of men and women who were married, irrespective of the age they were when they first married. 
They appear in our database since the year of their first marriage until the previous year of their divorce –since we want to find 
the impact of personal and familiar characteristics in year t-1 on divorce decisions in year t- or until they no longer appear in the 
survey, whichever comes first. Columns (1), (2), (3) include controls for the sex, the age and the age gap, the education of 
respondent and his/her spouse, family structure when young, risk activities when young, age at first marriage, whether there 
exists a child who was conceived before first marriage, the race, the region of current residence and the cohort of respondent. 
Column (1) shows results using dummies for the number of siblings of respondent as instruments. Column (2) uses as 
instruments a dummy indicating whether the respondent has experienced a multiple birth. Column (3) presents results after using 
both sets of instruments simultaneously. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% 
level. 
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Table 3.6 - Children Conceived During First Marriage and Risk of Marital Dissolution: 
Effect of Children Under 10 and 6 Years Old 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Children Conceived Within Marriage Under 6 -0.300***  -0.115***  -0.157***  
 (0.107)  (0.032)  (0.031)  
Children Conceived Within Marriage Under 10  -0.268***  -0.091***  -0.125*** 
  (0.093)  (0.025)  (0.024) 
Gender -0.007 -0.009 -0.007* -0.008** -0.007 -0.008* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age 0.130*** 0.176*** 0.053*** 0.063*** 0.070*** 0.084*** 
 (0.038) (0.053) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) 
Age Squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Wife Five Years Older -0.024 -0.032 0.004 0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Husband Five Years Older 0.018* 0.013 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.013** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Highest Education: Lowest Level 0.033** 0.055*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.037*** 0.044*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Highest Education: High School Level 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Highest Education: College Level 0.008 0.015 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Highest Education Spouse: Lowest Level 0.016 0.023** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Highest Education Spouse: High School Level -0.007 -0.001 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.005 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Highest Education Spouse: College Level -0.009 -0.005 0.003 0.005 0.0004 0.002 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Father in Household in 1979 -0.017* -0.020** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.019*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Without Father Figure in 1979 -0.018 -0.024 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.018 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
Charged Illegal by 1980 0.030** 0.033** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age First Marriage -0.011*** -0.019*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Child Before Marriage 0.013 0.002 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.017** 0.015** 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Race: Hispanic 0.024 0.022 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.006 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Race: Black 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant -1.609*** -2.272*** -0.615*** -0.766*** -0.833*** -1.049*** 
 (0.511) (0.730) (0.151) (0.190) (0.147) (0.186) 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cohort FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 45,632 45,632 45,632 45,632 45,632 45,632 
Number of Caseid 5,622 5,622 5,622 5,622 5,622 5,622 
Notes: Children conceived during first marriage under 6 and 10 include only those children who were born during or after the ninth month of 
marriage and who are under 6 and 10 years old, respectively. The sample consists of men and women who were at least 21 years old when 
they first married. They appear in our database since the year of their first marriage until the previous year of their divorce –since we want to 
find the impact of personal and familiar characteristics in year t-1 on divorce decisions in year t- or until they no longer appear in the survey, 
whichever comes first. All Columns include controls for the sex, the age and the age gap, the education of respondent and his/her spouse, 
family structure when young, risk activities when young, age at first marriage, whether there exists a child who was conceived before first 
marriage, the race, the region of current residence and the cohort of respondent. Columns (1) and (2) show results using dummies for the 
number of siblings of respondent as instruments. Columns (3) and (4) use as instruments a dummy indicating whether the respondent has 
experienced a multiple birth. Columns (5) and (6) present results after using both sets of instruments simultaneously. *** Significant at the 
1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 3.7 shows the results when we include in our variable of interest both 
children conceived before and during first marriage. The first thing we would like to 
stress from these results is that the variable measuring the number of children is still 
inversely related to the risk of marital disruption and statistically significant, regardless 
of the instrumental variables used, though this variable now also includes children 
conceived before first marriage, whose effect on marital stability may be different from 
the effect of those conceived during first marriage. However, the magnitude of the 
effect decreases. Specifically, the reduction of the deterrent effect of children on marital 
disruption ranges from 33% to 43%. 
The different effect of those children conceived before and during first marriage on 
the risk of marital disruption, suggested in results shown in Table 3.7, is fully confirmed 
in the estimates shown in Table 3.8. Here, we include the variables indicating the 
number of children conceived during first marriage and before first marriage separately. 
These two variables have a potential endogeneity with our dependent variable, the risk 
of marital disruption. For this reason, we include in our instrumental variable approach 
a range of instruments for children conceived before the first marriage, in addition to 
those we already had for those children conceived during the first marriage. 
We include information on the age at which respondents had their first sexual 
intercourse, since the earlier the sexual initiation, the greater the risk of being pregnant, 
and therefore, of conceiving a child before first marriage (Coker et al. 1994; Miller and 
Heaton 1991). We include a set of dummies to indicate whether the interviewee had 
his/her first sexual intercourse before the age of 16 years, between 16 and 18 years, after 
18 years, or had never had sex by the years 1983-1985, when respondents were between 
21 and 28 years old (the question about first sexual intercourse is only available in that 
waves). We select these intervals of age since the mean age of first intercourse after 
menarche for women aged 15-44 is 17.4 in 2002, and the mean age of first intercourse 
for men aged 15-44 is 17.0, also in 2002 (Chandra et al. 2005; Martínez et al. 2006). 
Thus, we consider that having first sexual intercourse between the ages of 16 and 18 can 
be considered normal. 
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Table 3.7 - Children Conceived and Risk of Marital Dissolution: 
All Children Conceived 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
All Children Conceived -0.134*** -0.050*** -0.065*** 
 (0.035) (0.013) (0.012) 
Gender -0.011** -0.009** -0.009** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age 0.076*** 0.034*** 0.041*** 
 (0.015) (0.006) (0.005) 
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Wife Five Years Older -0.013 0.010 0.006 
 (0.018) (0.011) (0.011) 
Husband Five Years Older 0.014** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Highest Education: Lowest Level 0.082*** 0.052*** 0.057*** 
 (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) 
Highest Education: High School Level 0.052*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Highest Education: College Level 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Highest Education Spouse: Lowest Level 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
Highest Education Spouse: High School Level 0.010 0.012** 0.011** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Highest Education Spouse: College Level 0.007 0.009** 0.009* 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Father in Household in 1979 -0.028*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Without Father Figure in 1979 -0.017 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) 
Charged Illegal by 1980 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age First Marriage -0.020*** -0.009*** -0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
Child Before Marriage 0.212*** 0.098*** 0.118*** 
 (0.045) (0.018) (0.017) 
Race: Hispanic 0.014 0.001 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
Race: Black 0.058*** 0.042*** 0.044*** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Constant -0.795*** -0.323*** -0.400*** 
 (0.173) (0.068) (0.064) 
Region FE YES YES YES 
Cohort FE YES YES YES 
Observations 45,632 45,632 45,632 
Number of Caseid 5,622 5,622 5,622 
Notes: All children conceived include those children who were born before or during the first marriage. The sample 
consists of men and women who were at least 21 years old when they first married. They appear in our database since 
the year of their first marriage until the previous year of their divorce –since we want to find the impact of personal and 
familiar characteristics in year t-1 on divorce decisions in year t- or until they no longer appear in the survey, whichever 
comes first. All Columns include controls for the sex, the age and the age gap, the education of respondent and his/her 
spouse, family structure when young, risk activities when young, age at first marriage, whether there exists a child who 
was conceived before first marriage, the race, the region of current residence and the cohort of respondent. Column (1) 
shows results using dummies for the number of siblings of respondent as instruments. Column (2) uses as instruments a 
dummy indicating whether the respondent has experienced a multiple birth. Column (3) presents results after using both 
sets of instruments simultaneously. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 
10% level. 
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Table 3.8 - Children Conceived Before and During First Marriage and Risk of Marital Dissolution:  
Children Conceived Before-During Marriage 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Children Conceived Within Marriage -0.336*** -0.159*** -0.193*** 
 (0.080) (0.026) (0.027) 
Children Conceived Before Marriage  0.080*** 0.122*** 0.100*** 
 (0.030) (0.020) (0.020) 
Gender 0.001 0.004 0.002 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) 
Age 0.170*** 0.085*** 0.102*** 
 (0.035) (0.011) (0.012) 
Age Squared -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wife Five Years Older -0.050 0.001 -0.011 
 (0.032) (0.015) (0.016) 
Husband Five Years Older 0.010 0.013** 0.012* 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) 
Highest Education: Lowest Level 0.054** -0.007 0.010 
 (0.025) (0.014) (0.015) 
Highest Education: High School Level 0.033** 0.006 0.014 
 (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) 
Highest Education: College Level 0.017* 0.011 0.014** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) 
Highest Education Spouse: Lowest Level 0.006 -0.006 -0.000 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) 
Highest Education Spouse: High School Level -0.015 -0.012* -0.011 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
Highest Education Spouse: College Level -0.012 -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
Father in Household in 1979 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) 
Without Father Figure in 1979 -0.048 -0.040* -0.039 
 (0.037) (0.022) (0.024) 
Charged Illegal by 1980 0.018 0.018* 0.020* 
 (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) 
Age First Marriage -0.051*** -0.029*** -0.033*** 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) 
Race: Hispanic 0.018 -0.004 0.002 
 (0.016) (0.008) (0.009) 
Race: Black -0.023 -0.042*** -0.029* 
 (0.023) (0.015) (0.016) 
Constant -1.692*** -0.742*** -0.937*** 
 (0.378) (0.116) (0.121) 
Region FE YES YES YES 
Cohort FE YES YES YES 
Observations 45,445 45,445 45,445 
Number of Caseid 5,577 5,577 5,577 
Notes: Children conceived during first marriage include only those children who were born during or after the ninth 
month of marriage. Children conceived before marriage includes only those children who were born before and during 
the first eight month of marriage. The sample consists of men and women who were at least 21 years old when they 
first married. They appear in our database since the year of their first marriage until the previous year of their divorce –
since we want to find the impact of personal and familiar characteristics in year t-1 on divorce decisions in year t- or 
until they no longer appear in the survey, whichever comes first. All Columns include controls for the sex, the age and 
the age gap, the education of respondent and his/her spouse, family structure when young, risk activities when young, 
age at first marriage, the race, the region of current residence and the cohort of respondent. Columns (1), (2) and (3) 
show results using as instruments for children conceived during first marriage dummies for the number of siblings of 
respondent, a dummy indicating whether the respondent has experienced a multiple birth, and both sets of instruments 
simultaneously, respectively. Columns (1), (2) and (3) show results using as instruments for children conceived before 
first marriage dummies indicating whether interviewees had their first sex before 16 years old, between 16 and 18 years 
old, with more than 18 years old, or had not had sex, by the years 1983-1985, when respondents were between 21 and 
28 years old. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Results are presented in Table 3.8, where we can see the deterrent effect of children 
conceived during first marriage on the risk of marriage disruption, while those children 
conceived before first marriage have a positive effect on marital dissolution. In addition, 
the instruments included for children conceived before first marriage have the expected 
effect. Specifically, the fact of having first sexual intercourse before age 16 has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of conceiving children 
before the first marriage, as does the fact of having had first sexual intercourse between 
ages 16 and 18, and later than 18 years old with respect to those who never had sex, but 
its positive effect is smaller. 
In Table 3.9 we include other personal and family characteristics that are potential 
determinants of the risk of marital disruption, which we exclude from our baseline 
estimates since they could bias our results due to endogeneity concerns. In this table, we 
use as instrumental variables the dummies for the number of siblings of the respondents 
and the dummy indicating the presence of a multiple birth simultaneously, but results 
using these sets of instruments separately do not vary. Column (1) shows our baseline 
estimates using both sets of instruments simultaneously. Since members of those 
couples with a higher risk of marital disruption may work longer hours, to increase their 
income in anticipation of a possible future divorce (Gray 1995; Johnson and Skinner 
1986; Papps 2006), including variables for family income may bias our results due to 
endogeneity concerns. With respect to these income variables, we use the “OECD 
modified equivalized scale”, an indicator that takes into account not only the family 
income, but also the number and the age of each member of the household. This 
indicator assigns a value of 1 to the respondent, a value of 0.5 to each additional 
member aged 14 or older, and a value of 0.3 to each household member under age 14 
(thus, the coefficient attributed to a two-parent family with two small children is 2.1). 
We include this indicator in our estimates, along with its squared, showing a U-shaped 
relationship to the probability of marital disruption, indicating that as the family income 
indicator increases, the risk of marital dissolution decreases, but at some point this 
relationship turns and the probability of marital disruption begins to grow. Prior 
research has shown that higher incomes decrease the risk of marital dissolution, 
especially in the case of males (Burgess et al. 2003). We can see that the effect of the 
number of children conceived during the marriage on the risk of marital disruption 
continues to be negative and statistically significant. 
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In Column (3), we include variables indicating the religion under which the 
respondent was raised (Call and Heaton 1997; Vaaler et al. 2009). Since religion 
establishes behaviors that are morally accepted, or rejected, if there is a process that 
jointly determines personal religious beliefs and the propensity to marital disruption 
when adult, then including controls for religious attitudes may bias our results. As we 
can check, our results do not change after introducing variables that control for 
individual religious belief. 
In Column (4), we show our results after including in our estimates a control for 
another potential predictor of marital stability, whether living in an urban or in a rural 
area (Amato and James 2010). Thus, again, if there is a process that simultaneously 
affects the probability of living in a rural or in an urban area and a propensity to marital 
disruption, including a dummy indicating whether the individual lives in a rural or in an 
urban setting may bias our results. Our estimates show that the number of children 
conceived during first marriage maintains its negative effect on marital instability. 
Living in an urban area has a positive effect on the risk of marital disruption as 
expected, but it is not statistically significant. 
Column (5) includes controls for the employment of the respondent, and the 
spouse, which we do not include in our baseline estimates due to endogeneity concerns. 
As stated above, members of couples with higher probabilities of divorce may change 
their labor force participation in the years prior to a marital disruption (Gray 1995; 
Johnson and Skinner 1986; Papps 2006). Being fully aware of these potential problems 
of endogeneity, we include variables related to employment, to check whether there are 
changes in our results. Results indicate that the fact that both the respondent and his/her 
partner are working is related to a decrease in the probabilities of the couple suffering a 
marital disruption. Again, the effect of children conceived during marriage on marital 
disruption remains negative and statistically significant.  
In Column (6), we show our results after including all new controls simultaneously, 
finding that our results do not substantially change. Again, the negative impact of 
children conceived during first marriage on the risk of marital disruption remains 
unchanged and statistically significant. 
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Table 3.9 - Children Conceived During First Marriage and Risk of Marital Dissolution:  
New Covariates 
  (Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Children conceived within marriage -0.104*** -0.121*** -0.104*** -0.093*** -0.166*** -0.157*** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) (0.032) (0.031) 
Gender -0.008* -0.006 -0.008* -0.007* -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Age 0.059*** 0.068*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.097*** 0.091*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) 
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Wife Five Years Older -0.002 -0.021 -0.003 -0.00002 0.011 0.004 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) 
Husband Five Years Older 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.012** 0.016** 0.016** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Highest Education: Lowest Level 0.049*** 0.039*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.055*** 0.048*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) 
Highest Education: High School Level 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.031*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Highest Education: College Level 0.025*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.031*** 0.026*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Highest Education Spouse: Lowest Level 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.020** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
Highest Education Spouse: High School Level 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Highest Education Spouse: College Level 0.004 -0.003 0.004 0.005 0.008 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Father in Household in 1979 -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Without Father Figure in 1979 -0.018 -0.029 -0.018 -0.012 -0.029 -0.023 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.025) (0.026) 
Charged Illegal by 1980 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
Age First Marriage -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.032*** -0.030*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Child Before Marriage 0.018** 0.007 0.019*** 0.016** 0.016* 0.013 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
Race: Hispanic 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.009 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Race: Black 0.035*** 0.026*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Family Income Indicator  -0.054***    -0.056*** 
  (0.011)    (0.012) 
Family Income Indicator Squared  0.009***    0.009*** 
  (0.002)    (0.002) 
Religion Raised: Protestant    -0.007   -0.013 
   (0.011)   (0.015) 
Religion Raised: Roman Catholic   -0.007   -0.009 
   (0.012)   (0.016) 
Religion Raised: Jewish   -0.001   -0.012 
   (0.021)   (0.028) 
Religion Raised: Other Religion   -0.004   -0.005 
   (0.013)   (0.016) 
Living Urban    0.002  0.005 
    (0.003)  (0.005) 
Employed     -0.033*** -0.032*** 
     (0.008) (0.008) 
Spouse Employed     -0.037*** -0.034*** 
     (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant -0.572*** -0.634*** -0.560*** -0.514*** -0.815*** -0.768*** 
 (0.092) (0.105) (0.096) (0.088) (0.145) (0.154) 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cohort FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 45,632 39,764 45,535 43,491 31,303 29,937 
Number of Caseid 5,622 5,395 5,604 5,404 5,190 4,950 
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Notes: Children conceived during first marriage include only those children who were born during or after the ninth 
month of marriage. The sample consists of men and women who were at least 21 years old when they first married. 
They appear in our database since the year of their first marriage until the previous year of their divorce –since we 
want to find the impact of personal and familiar characteristics in year t-1 on divorce decisions in year t- or until they 
no longer appear in the survey, whichever comes first. All columns include controls for the sex, the age and the age 
gap, the education of respondent and his/her spouse, family structure when young, risk activities when young, age at 
first marriage, whether there exists a child who was conceived before first marriage, the race, the region of current 
residence and the cohort of respondent. All Columns show results using as instruments dummies for the number of 
siblings of respondent and a dummy indicating whether the respondent has experienced a multiple birth 
simultaneously. Column (1) includes our baseline estimates using these instruments (Table 3.4, Column (4)). Column 
(2) incorporates controls for the family income and its squared. In Column (3) we introduce controls for the religion 
under which the interviewee was raised. Column (4) shows a control for whether the interviewee’s current residence 
is urban or rural. Column (5) incorporates dummies indicating whether the interviewee and his/her spouse are 
employed. Finally, Column (6) includes all controls at the same time. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant 
at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
 
3.5 By level of education 
 
Throughout this chapter, we have demonstrated the positive effect that children 
conceived during the first marriage have on the couple's marital stability, but we now 
consider whether all children conceived in wedlock have the same deterrent impact, or 
if, on the contrary, the magnitude of this effect varies. 
Children conceived during first marriage are marriage-specific investments, 
increasing the value of the marriage and making it more valuable, and therefore more 
difficult to break (Becker 1981), but we wonder whether each couple make the same 
investment in the marriage when they have children. As is widely known, there exists a 
mechanism of intergenerational transmission of human capital between parents and their 
offspring (Black et al. 2005; Currie and Moretti 2003). Thus, we would expect that the 
investment made by parents with a higher level of human capital would be greater than 
that made by other couples, assuming positive assortative mating, which is generally 
plausible. Consequently, the relationship between fertility and marital disruption may be 
very different as a function of parental education. 
To test this hypothesis, we re-estimate the model, splitting the sample according to 
the level of education of the respondent. Table 3.10 shows our results using the Random 
Effects and the Fixed Effects approaches, and we can see that, in each case, children 
conceived during first marriage have no effect on the risk of marital disruption for those 
individuals with the lowest level of education. On the contrary, the children maintain 
their negative and statistically significant effect when we consider those respondents 
with intermediate and higher level of education. Furthermore, the negative impact on 
the probability of marital disruption is between 25% and 35% greater for those with the 
highest level of education, than for those with an intermediate education level. 
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Table 3.10 - Children Conceived During First Marriage and Risk of Marital Dissolution:  
Analysis by Educational Level: Random and Fixed Effects 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Children Conceived Within Marriage -0.008 -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.008 -0.011*** -0.017*** 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.002) 
Gender -0.066*** -0.008 -0.015**    
 (0.025) (0.009) (0.006)    
Age 0.041*** 0.032*** 0.025*** 0.055*** 0.043*** 0.031*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) 
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0004*** 
 (0.0001) (0.00004) (0.00003) (0.0001) (0.00004) (0.00003) 
Wife Five Years Older 0.079 0.034 0.019    
 (0.050) (0.023) (0.021)    
Husband Five Years Older 0.025 0.009 0.026***    
 (0.024) (0.011) (0.009)    
Father in Household in 1979 -0.056** -0.036*** -0.012    
 (0.023) (0.010) (0.008)    
Without Father Figure in 1979 -0.056 -0.015 -0.007    
 (0.095) (0.040) (0.037)    
Charged Illegal by 1980 0.080*** 0.037** 0.038**    
 (0.031) (0.015) (0.017)    
Age First Marriage -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.008***    
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)    
Child Before Marriage 0.001 0.053*** 0.042***    
 (0.025) (0.013) (0.014)    
Race: Hispanic -0.035 -0.006 0.013    
 (0.028) (0.013) (0.010)    
Race: Black 0.065** 0.043*** 0.049***    
 (0.031) (0.014) (0.010)    
Same Education -0.026 -0.008 -0.010 -0.042 -0.024** 0.006 
 (0.021) (0.008) (0.006) (0.035) (0.012) (0.009) 
Respondent More Educated Than Spouse  0.008   -0.038*  
  (0.014)   (0.021)  
Constant -0.233* -0.211*** -0.198*** -0.880*** -0.737*** -0.580*** 
 (0.122) (0.051) (0.036) (0.129) (0.057) (0.040) 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cohort FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,391 16,860 25,381 3,391 16,860 25,381 
Number of Caseid 576 2,394 2,945 576 2,394 2,945 
Notes: Children conceived during first marriage include only those children who were born during or after the ninth month of marriage. The 
sample consists of men and women who were at least 21 years old when they first married. They appear in our database since the year of their 
first marriage until the previous year of their divorce –since we want to find the impact of personal and familiar characteristics in year t-1 on 
divorce decisions in year t- or until they no longer appear in the survey, whichever comes first. All columns include controls for the sex, the 
age and the age gap, family structure when young, risk activities when young, age at first marriage, whether there exists a child who was 
conceived before first marriage, the race, whether the spouse has the same level of education than the interviewed, the region of current 
residence and the cohort of respondent. Columns (1), (2) and (3) include our estimates using a Random Effects technique, and Columns (4), (5) 
and (6) show results using a Fixed Effects technique. In addition, Columns (1) and (4) show results for the less educated interviewees, 
Columns (2) and (5) show results for the interviewees with an intermediate level of education and Columns (3) and (6) show results for the 
interviewees with the highest level of education. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 3.10.1 - Children Conceived During First Marriage and Risk of Marital Dissolution: 
Analysis by Educational Level: Instrumental Variables 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Children Conceived Within Marriage -0.314 -0.091*** -0.105*** 
 (0.208) (0.033) (0.023) 
Gender -0.003 -0.002 -0.009* 
 (0.042) (0.007) (0.005) 
Age 0.134* 0.054*** 0.061*** 
 (0.072) (0.014) (0.011) 
Age Squared -0.002* -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Wife Five Years Older -0.075 0.006 -0.013 
 (0.103) (0.018) (0.016) 
Husband Five Years Older 0.059* 0.005 0.018*** 
 (0.033) (0.009) (0.007) 
Father in Household in 1979 -0.059*** -0.028*** -0.007 
 (0.023) (0.008) (0.006) 
Without Father Figure in 1979 -0.005 -0.033 0.006 
 (0.079) (0.027) (0.031) 
Charged Illegal by 1980 0.040 0.032*** 0.020* 
 (0.032) (0.011) (0.012) 
Age First Marriage -0.041* -0.015*** -0.017*** 
 (0.022) (0.004) (0.003) 
Child Before Marriage -0.068 0.027** 0.023** 
 (0.053) (0.011) (0.010) 
Race: Hispanic 0.051 0.007 0.015* 
 (0.061) (0.011) (0.008) 
Race: Black 0.082** 0.030*** 0.031*** 
 (0.034) (0.010) (0.007) 
Same Education 0.041 -0.005 -0.014*** 
 (0.048) (0.007) (0.005) 
Respondent More Educated Than Spouse  0.020*  
  (0.010)  
Constant -1.197 -0.448*** -0.604*** 
 (0.746) (0.143) (0.129) 
Region FE YES YES YES 
Cohort FE YES YES YES 
Observations 3,391 16,860 25,381 
Number of Caseid 576 2,394 2,945 
Notes: Children conceived during first marriage include only those children who were born during or after the ninth 
month of marriage. The sample consists of men and women who were at least 21 years old when they first married. 
They appear in our database since the year of their first marriage until the previous year of their divorce –since we 
want to find the impact of personal and familiar characteristics in year t-1 on divorce decisions in year t- or until they 
no longer appear in the survey, whichever comes first. All columns include controls for the sex, the age and the age 
gap, family structure when young, risk activities when young, age at first marriage, whether there exists a child who 
was conceived before first marriage, the race, whether the spouse has the same level of education than the 
interviewed, the region of current residence and the cohort of respondent. All Columns show results using as 
instruments dummies for the number of siblings of respondent and a dummy indicating whether the respondent has 
experienced a multiple birth, simultaneously. In addition, Column (1) shows results for the less educated 
interviewees, Column (2) shows results for the interviewees with an intermediate level of education and Column (3) 
shows results for the interviewees with the highest level of education. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant 
at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
 
In Table 3.10.1 we repeat this analysis by level of education of respondent, 
following the instrumental variable approach. In this table, we use as instruments the 
dummies for the number of siblings of the respondent and the dummy indicating the 
presence of a multiple birth simultaneously, but using both sets of instruments 
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separately we find similar results. Again, we find no evidence of the deterrent effect of 
children on marital disruption of those individuals with the lowest level of education, 
and we find evidence of a decrease in the risk of marital disruption when respondents 
with intermediate and higher level of education have children. In addition, we find that 
this decrease in the risk of marital disruption is 13% higher in those with the highest 
level of education, compared to those with the intermediate level.  
In view of these results, it is possible to argue that the deterrent effect of children 
conceived during first marriage on marital disruption is not homogeneous. In other 
words, those couples with higher human capital, measured by their educational level, 
make a greater investment in their child than couples with a lower human capital, which 
strengthens and protects more their marriage. 
 
3.6 Survival analysis 
 
The relation that we study here can be modeled alternatively by using a duration model, 
since our data can be considered as survival time data. As stated by Jenkins (2005), “we 
consider a particular life-course domain, which may be partitioned into a number of 
mutually-exclusive states at each point in time”. In our case, there are only two possible 
states44 - married and divorced - and only one transition, from the first state to the 
second. Thus, over time, individuals in our database must choose between remaining in 
the married state, or moving to the divorced. With respect to time, we can say that as 
our data are grouped into time periods of a year, we develop a model suited to the nature 
of our data: discrete time data rather than continuous time data. 
This methodology, which takes into account the sequential nature of our data, 
makes use of the so-called “hazard rates”, defined as the probability of moving from the 
current state to another state, conditional on survival up to the present period of time. 
However, hazard rates do not have a single shape applicable to all contexts. On the 
contrary, hazard rates have different functional forms whether we are dealing with 
continuous time parametric, continuous time semi-parametric, or discrete time (Jenkins 
2005). We focus on the last option, considering two different models. The first, leading 
to the so-called complementary log-log specification, is considered as “the discrete time 
                                                          
44 As stated, each individual in our database is legally married and not just living or cohabiting with her/his partner. 
For this reason, we consider that the marital status "separated" and "divorced" are exactly the same, since "separated" 
normally is the threshold of legal divorce. Previous research followed the same strategy (Chan and Halpin 2002). 
Which children stabilize marriage? New evidence from the NLSY 
  
- 110 - 
 
representation of a continuous time proportional hazards model”, but can also be 
applied when survival times are intrinsically discrete. The second model we consider is 
the logistic model, which “was primarily developed for this second case but may also be 
applied to the first” (Jenkins 2005). 
Equations (3.4) and (3.5) show the logistic and complementary log-log (“cloglog”) 
discrete time hazard functions, respectively: 
 
p(t) = [1 + exp(–z(t))]–1                                                   (3.4) 
 
p(t) = 1 – exp[–exp( z(t) )]                                                 (3.5) 
 
where z(t) = c(t) + β′X for a representative individual in year t, c(t) is the baseline 
hazard function, and β′X includes an intercept term. 
Finally, we also estimate the above-mentioned complementary log-log model 
including unobserved heterogeneity, for which it assumes normal distributed errors. In 
this way, we obtain our results net of individual unobserved heterogeneity. This is what 
we call an “xtcloglog” model in our estimates. 
Using this methodology, we achieve the goal of checking the robustness of our 
estimates. We present these results in Table 3.11 in which Column (1) shows our 
baseline results using Random Effects to facilitate the results comparison.45 Columns 
(2), (3) and (4) display results of using the cloglog, logistic, and xtcloglog models, 
respectively.  
The first thing that stands out is that the results obtained with this new methodology 
are very similar to previous results, both in terms of the sign of the effect and in terms 
of being statistically significant. Focusing on our variable of interest, we observe that, 
regardless of the model used, the effect of this variable on the risk of marital disruption 
is negative and statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45 We show Random Effects estimates rather than Fixed Effects to facilitate the comparison of those factors that do 
not vary over the time.  
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Table 3.11 - Children Conceived During First Marriage and Risk of Marital Dissolution: 
Survival Analysis 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
All Children Conceived -0.015*** -0.229*** -0.236*** -0.288*** 
 (0.002) (0.031) (0.032) (0.035) 
Gender -0.013** -0.085* -0.087* -0.111** 
 (0.005) (0.046) (0.048) (0.056) 
Age 0.030*** 0.066* 0.069** 0.196*** 
 (0.002) (0.034) (0.035) (0.049) 
Age Squared -0.0003*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.002*** 
 (0.00002) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.001) 
Wife Five Years Older 0.037** 0.229** 0.237** 0.287** 
 (0.015) (0.107) (0.112) (0.132) 
Husband Five Years Older 0.018*** 0.206*** 0.216*** 0.248*** 
 (0.007) (0.055) (0.056) (0.067) 
Highest Education: Lowest Level 0.044*** 0.582*** 0.594*** 0.680*** 
 (0.011) (0.101) (0.104) (0.121) 
Highest Education: High School Level 0.036*** 0.516*** 0.526*** 0.609*** 
 (0.006) (0.074) (0.076) (0.089) 
Highest Education: College Level 0.032*** 0.422*** 0.430*** 0.508*** 
 (0.005) (0.075) (0.076) (0.088) 
Highest Education Spouse: Lowest Level 0.018* 0.384*** 0.397*** 0.468*** 
 (0.010) (0.097) (0.100) (0.112) 
Highest Education Spouse: High School Level 0.010* 0.256*** 0.262*** 0.296*** 
 (0.006) (0.074) (0.075) (0.085) 
Highest Education Spouse: College Level 0.010* 0.239*** 0.244*** 0.271*** 
 (0.005) (0.076) (0.077) (0.085) 
Father in Household in 1979 -0.027*** -0.276*** -0.285*** -0.324*** 
 (0.006) (0.049) (0.051) (0.061) 
Without Father Figure in 1979 -0.010 -0.237 -0.241 -0.238 
 (0.029) (0.181) (0.189) (0.226) 
Charged Illegal by 1980 0.046*** 0.341*** 0.353*** 0.414*** 
 (0.011) (0.072) (0.075) (0.092) 
Age First Marriage -0.008*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.048*** 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) 
Child Before Marriage 0.046*** 0.233*** 0.245*** 0.316*** 
 (0.009) (0.062) (0.064) (0.076) 
Race: Hispanic -0.004 -0.027 -0.028 -0.045 
 (0.008) (0.069) (0.071) (0.081) 
Race: Black 0.049*** 0.343*** 0.355*** 0.436*** 
 (0.008) (0.062) (0.064) (0.076) 
Constant -0.258*** -4.133*** -4.140*** -5.849*** 
 (0.030) (0.553) (0.571) (0.744) 
Region FE YES YES YES YES 
Cohort FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 45,632 45,632 45,632 45,632 
Number of Caseid 5,622   5,622 
Notes: Children conceived during first marriage include only those children who were born during or after the ninth month of 
marriage. The sample consists of men and women who were at least 21 years old when they first married. They appear in our 
database since the year of their first marriage until the previous year of their divorce –since we want to find the impact of personal 
and familiar characteristics in year t-1 on divorce decisions in year t- or until they no longer appear in the survey, whichever comes 
first. All columns include controls for the sex, the age and the age gap, the education of respondent and his/her spouse, family 
structure when young, risk activities when young, age at first marriage, whether there exists a child who was conceived before first 
marriage, the race, the region of current residence and the cohort of respondent. Column (1) presents our baseline estimates using 
the Random Effects technique (Table 3.3, Column (3)). Columns (2), (3) and (4) display results from using the cloglog, logistic and 
xtcloglog models, respectively. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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With respect to the other covariates, we find no important differences from the 
results obtained in our baseline estimates. Only the variables related to age at first 
marriage are less statistically significant, although the sign of their impact does not 
change. The remaining covariates maintain and even increase their impact on the risk of 
divorce. Thus, we again observe the U-shaped inverse relationship between age and the 
risk of marital disruption, and the positive effect of an existing age gap between 
spouses. Again, lower levels of education imply higher probabilities of marital 
dissolution, as do having been charged with illegal activity in youth, having had a child 
before marriage, and being black, while the presence of the father in the household 
during the youth of the respondent reduces the risk of marital disruption.  
 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, we analyze the impact that children conceived during first marriage have 
on the marital stability of the couple. We develop Fixed Effects and Random Effects 
models to exploit the panel structure of the data. Then, we take into account the 
potential endogeneity between the number of children conceived during first marriage 
and the risk of marital disruption by developing an instrumental variable approach. We 
create two different sets of instruments, a range of dummies indicating the number of 
siblings of the respondent, and a dummy showing whether the respondent experienced a 
multiple birth during first marriage. In all cases, we find a significant deterrent effect of 
children conceived during first marriage on the risk of marital disruption. 
Our findings are robust to a range of sample selections, to the inclusion of certain 
variables that may have an impact on the risk of divorce but that are excluded from our 
baseline estimates due to endogeneity concerns, and to different definitions of our 
variable of interest. We also show that the younger the children, the greater their 
deterrent effect on the risk of marital disruption. Moreover, we present empirical 
evidence that those children conceived before the first marriage do not have a deterrent 
effect; on the contrary, they are a destabilizing factor for the couple. Our results are 
robust even to the use of a survival analysis technique. 
We further explore whether all the children conceived during first marriage have 
the same deterrent effect on the probability of marital disruption. We conclude that the 
higher the level of education of the parents, the greater the negative effect of their 
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children on marital instability, suggesting that parental education increases the child 
marriage-specific investment, in line with the theoretical predictions of Becker. In 
particular, fertility has no significant effect on the marriage stability of individuals with 
less than intermediate education. 
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3.A Appendix A:Instrumental variables, first step 
 
Table 3.12 - Instrumental Variables, First Step of Results Shown in Table 3.4 
(Dependent Variable: Number of Children Conceived During First Marriage) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
One Sibling 0.013  0.014 
 (0.049)  (0.036) 
Two Siblings 0.055  0.064* 
 (0.048)  (0.035) 
Three Siblings 0.074  0.081** 
 (0.048)  (0.036) 
Four or More Siblings 0.132***  0.145*** 
 (0.047)  (0.035) 
Twins  0.582*** 0.570*** 
  (0.035) (0.037) 
Gender 0.020 0.025** 0.026** 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) 
Age 0.433*** 0.423*** 0.425*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age Squared -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00006) 
Wife Five Years Older -0.308*** -0.306*** -0.301*** 
 (0.038) (0.028) (0.029) 
Husband Five Years Older -0.025 -0.017 -0.020 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) 
Highest Education: Lowest Level 0.123*** 0.065*** 0.054** 
 (0.029) (0.023) (0.024) 
Highest Education: High School Level 0.041** 0.018 0.010 
 (0.019) (0.015) (0.016) 
Highest Education: College Level -0.021 -0.011 -0.018 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) 
Highest Education Spouse: Lowest Level 0.011 0.002 -0.006 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) 
Highest Education Spouse: High School Level -0.056*** -0.069*** -0.071*** 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) 
Highest Education Spouse: College Level -0.061*** -0.067*** -0.069*** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
Father in Household in 1979 0.031* 0.029** 0.030** 
 (0.017) (0.012) (0.013) 
Without Father Figure in 1979 -0.067 -0.077 -0.075 
 (0.069) (0.050) (0.052) 
Charged Illegal by 1980 -0.048 -0.035* -0.037 
 (0.028) (0.020) (0.021) 
Age First Marriage -0.121*** -0.124*** -0.123*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Child Before Marriage -0.203*** -0.196*** -0.206*** 
 (0.023) (0.016) (0.017) 
Race: Hispanic 0.102*** 0.127*** 0.107*** 
 (0.023) (0.016) (0.017) 
Race: Black -0.057** -0.049*** -0.070*** 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.017) 
Constant -4.697*** -4.358*** -4.478 
 (0.095) (0.079) (0.086) 
Region FE YES YES YES 
Cohort FE YES YES YES 
Observations 45,632 45,632 45,632 
Number of Caseid 5,622 5,622 5,622 
Notes: Children conceived during first marriage include only those children who were born during or after the ninth month of marriage. The 
sample consists of men and women who were at least 21 years old when they first married. They appear in our database since the year of 
their first marriage until the previous year of their divorce –since we want to find the impact of personal and familiar characteristics in year t-
1 on divorce decisions in year t- or until they no longer appear in the survey, whichever comes first. Column (1) shows results using 
dummies for the number of siblings of respondent as covariates. Column (2) includes as covariate a dummy indicating whether the 
respondent has experienced a multiple birth. Column (3) presents results after using both sets of variables simultaneously as covariates. *** 
Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
      
3.B Appendix B: Data sources and definition of variables 
 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent Variable   
Divorce This variable takes value 0 while the interviewee is married, and value 1 the year before the divorce occurs NLSY79 
Variables of Interest   
Children Conceived During Marriage Number of children conceived during first marriage NLSY79 
Children Conceived During Marriage Under 6 Number of children conceived during first marriage who are six years old or younger NLSY79 
Children Conceived During Marriage Under 10 Number of children conceived during first marriage who are ten years old or younger NLSY79 
All Children Conceived Number of children conceived before and during first marriage NLSY79 
Children Conceived Before Marriage Number of children conceived before first marriage starts NLSY79 
Control Variables   
Gender This variable takes value 0 for women and value 1 for men  NLSY79 
Age Variable indicating the age of interviewee NLSY79 
Age Squared Variable indicating the square of the age of interviewee NLSY79 
Wife Five Years Older This variable takes value 1 if the wife is, at least, five years older than her husband and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Husband Five Years Older This variable takes value 1 if the husband is, at least, five years older than his wife and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Same Age This variable takes value 1 if there is an age gap between spouses of less than five years and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Highest Education: Lowest Level This variable takes value 1 if the highest level of education of the interviewee is lower than 12th grade and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Highest Education: High School Level This variable takes value 1 if the highest level of education of the interviewee is the 12th grade (completed high school) and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Highest Education: College Level This variable takes value 1 if the highest level of education of the interviewee is between the first and the third year of college and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Highest Education: More Than College Level This variable takes value 1 if the highest level of education of the interviewee is the fourth year of college or more and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Highest Education Spouse: Lowest Level This variable takes value 1 if the highest level of education of the interviewee´s spouse is lower than 12th grade and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Highest Education Spouse: High School Level This variable takes value 1 if the highest level of education of the interviewee´s spouse is the 12th grade (completed high school) and 0 
otherwise 
NLSY79 
Highest Education Spouse: College Level This variable takes value 1 if the highest level of education of the interviewee´s spouse is between the first and the third year of college and 0 
otherwise 
NLSY79 
Highest Education Spouse: More Than College Level This variable takes value 1 if the highest level of education of the interviewee´s spouse is the fourth year of college or more and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Father in Household in 1979 This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s father or stepfather is in household on 1979 and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Father Out Household in 1979 This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s father or stepfather is not in household on 1979 and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Without Father Figure in 1979 This variable takes value 1 if respondent has not got a father figure in 1979 and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Charged Illegal by 1980 This variable takes value 1 if respondent has ever been charged with illegal activity, excluding minor traffic offenses, by 1980 and 0 otherwise NLSY79  
Age at First Marriage Variable indicating the age of respondent when first marriage began NLSY79 
Child Before Marriage This variable takes value 1 if first children were conceived before first marriage and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Race: Hispanic This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s race is hispanic and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
  
Race: Black This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s race is black and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Race: Other This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s race is different to black and hispanic and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Region FE Dummy variables for the region of residence (North East (omitted), North Central, South, and West) NLSY79 
Cohort FE Dummy variables for the cohort of respondent (from 1957 to 1964) NLSY79 
Family Income Indicator Variable that relates the total net family income and the number and age of household members NLSY79 
Family Income Indicator Squared This variable is the squared of the previous indicator NLSY79 
Religion Raised Dummy variables for the religion under which respondent was raised (protestant, roman catholic, jewish, other religion and no religion 
(omitted)) 
NLSY79 
Living Urban This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s current residence is urban and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Employed This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s employment status is employed and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Spouse Employed This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s spouse’s employment status is employed and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Same Education This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s education is the same than his/her spouse and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Respondent More Educated Than Spouse This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s education is higher than his/her spouse and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Respondent Less Educated Than Spouse This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s education is lower than his/her spouse and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Instrumental Variables   
No Siblings This variable takes value 1 if respondent has no brothers or sisters and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
One Sibling This variable takes value 1 if respondent has one brother or sister and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Two Siblings This variable takes value 1 if respondent has two brothers and sisters and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Three Siblings This variable takes value 1 if respondent has three brothers and sisters and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Four or More Siblings This variable takes value 1 if respondent has four or more brothers and sisters and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
Twins This variable takes value 1 if respondent has experienced a multiple birth during first marriage and 0 otherwise NLSY79 
First Sex Before 16 Years Old This variable takes value 1 if respondent had his/her first sexual intercourse before 16 years old NLSY79 
First Sex Between 16 and 18 Years Old This variable takes value 1 if respondent had his/her first sexual intercourse between 16 and 18 years old NLSY79 
First Sex After 16 Years Old This variable takes value 1 if respondent had his/her first sexual intercourse after 18 years old NLSY79 
No Sex by the Period 1983-1985 This variable takes value 1 if respondent had not had sex by the period 1983-1985 NLSY79 
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Conclusiones 
 
La familia es la institución social más antigua e importante de nuestra sociedad. Las 
Naciones Unidas, en el artículo 16 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos la 
definen como “el elemento natural y fundamental de la sociedad, y tiene derecho a la 
protección de la sociedad y del Estado”. Aunque esta institución ha sufrido numerosos 
cambios a lo largo de los años, y especialmente en los tiempos más recientes 
(proliferación de familias monoparentales, aprobación del matrimonio homosexual en 
numerosos países, incremento de las tasas de divorcio…), se mantiene como un pilar 
fundamental de nuestra sociedad.  
Desde un punto de visto académico, los economistas han mostrado interés por su 
estudio ya desde el S. XVIII, con los trabajos desarrollados por Cantillon (1730), 
Malthus (1798) o Smith (1776), en los que se cuestionaban por la relación existente 
entre determinadas variables económicas y el tamaño de la población. Sin embargo, la 
disciplina de la Economía de la Familia tal y como la conocemos hoy en día surge como 
consecuencia de los trabajos desarrollados por el profesor Gary Becker, y se ocupa del 
estudio del comportamiento y las estructuras familiares desde un punto de vista 
económico, es decir, describiendo a la familia como una unidad económica. Este campo 
de investigación incluye no sólo factores relativos a ingresos y salarios, sino también 
otros como la fertilidad, la mortalidad, el capital humano, la negociación dentro del 
hogar, el matrimonio o el divorcio, entre otros.  
Esta tesis se centra en el estudio de la fertilidad, un campo importante dentro de la 
Economía de la Familia. De hecho, los hijos son considerados como el “producto” más 
importante que se puede generar en el seno de la familia. Es allí donde el hijo va a 
adquirir los primeros valores y donde va a establecer las primeras relaciones que 
formarán su personalidad. Además, hay una amplia gama de decisiones que la pareja 
debe tomar en relación a los hijos, como si tenerlos o no tenerlos, cuántos tener, cuándo 
tenerlos, cuánto tiempo se les debe dedicar… sobre las que influyen un gran número de 
factores y que pueden tener importantes consecuencias. A lo largo de esta tesis, 
pretendemos arrojar luz sobre el proceso de toma de decisiones relacionado con la 
fertilidad, siguiendo tres líneas de investigación.  
En el primer capítulo de esta tesis analizamos el papel jugado por la liberalización 
de las leyes de divorcio que tuvo lugar en Europa desde la segunda mitad del S. XX  en 
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la caída de las tasas de fecundidad que se han venido produciendo desde ese momento. 
El impacto de las reformas en las leyes de divorcio sobre la fertilidad se produce a 
través del efecto sobre el valor asignado al matrimonio. Tanto la reducción de los costes 
del divorcio que hace que las opciones fuera del matrimonio sean más atractivas, como 
el debilitamiento del matrimonio como “seguro” para ambas partes, o la reducción de 
los beneficios asociados al matrimonio que se produce con las reformas legales, 
suponen una caída del valor asignado al matrimonio no sólo para aquellos que ya están 
casados, sino también para quienes contemplan la posibilidad de casarse.  
Para desarrollar este análisis, nuestra estrategia empírica utiliza las variaciones en el 
momento de implementar las reformas en las leyes de divorcio en cada país europeo 
incluido en el análisis, lo que nos permite obtener el efecto de dichas reformas sobre las 
tasas de fecundidad. Estas reformas incluyen cualquier modificación de las leyes de 
divorcio que suponga la liberalización de las mismas, ya sea por la ampliación de los 
motivos de divorcio o por la introducción implícita o explícita del divorcio unilateral. 
Se trata de una estrategia que ha sido previamente utilizada en la literatura económica 
para estudiar las consecuencias de cambios en las leyes de divorcio (véase, por ejemplo, 
Friedberg 1998; González y Viitanen 2009; Wolfers 2006). 
Los resultados obtenidos, que son robustos a la introducción de variables que 
controlan otros aspectos que también pudieron contribuir a la caída de las tasas de 
fecundidad, muestran cómo los cambios en las leyes de divorcio tuvieron un impacto 
negativo y permanente sobre las tasas de fecundidad. Estos resultados están en la misma 
línea que los obtenidos por estudios previos que utilizan datos de los Estados Unidos, y 
que señalan que reformas en las leyes de divorcio tuvieron un efecto negativo sobre la 
fecundidad (Alesina y Giuliano 2007; Drewianka 2008). También analizamos en este 
capítulo el mecanismo a través del cual se produce este efecto. Nuestros resultados 
muestran cómo este proceso liberalizador tuvo un impacto negativo tanto sobre las tasas 
de fecundidad marital como sobre la fecundidad fuera del matrimonio, si bien es cierto 
que el primero de estos efectos no parece ser permanente. Finalmente, estudiamos el 
efecto de las reformas en las leyes de divorcio sobre la fecundidad dentro del 
matrimonio en función del número de años que la pareja haya estado casada. Los 
resultados obtenidos muestran que el impacto varía en función de si la pareja contrajo 
matrimonio antes o después de que se llevaran a cabo las reformas.  
Esta caída de las tasas de fecundidad en Europa, sobre la que hemos visto que 
representó un papel importante el proceso liberalizador de las leyes de divorcio, tiene 
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importantes implicaciones económicas. Por una parte, y a pesar de que queda fuera del 
ámbito de estudio de este capítulo, investigaciones previas han mostrado cómo caídas 
de la tasa de fecundidad se relacionan con incrementos de la participación de las 
mujeres en el mercado de trabajo. También se pueden observar implicaciones para el 
nivel educativo de las mujeres, ya que las caídas en las tasas de fecundidad pueden 
alentar a las mujeres a invertir en su propia educación como consecuencia del aumento 
de los réditos que percibirán debido a su mayor participación en el mercado laboral. Por 
último, el envejecimiento de la población que se produce a raíz de la caída de las tasas 
de fecundidad puede llegar a poner en peligro la viabilidad del sistema de bienestar 
implantado en los países europeos. Dicho sistema, y en concreto el sistema de 
pensiones, se sostiene sobre la base de que las nuevas generaciones de trabajadores 
aportan el capital necesario a través de sus impuestos para pagar a los jubilados. Sin 
embargo, si la tasa de fecundidad cae, a largo plazo este sistema se convierte en 
insostenible para cualquier país. Así, se pone de manifiesto la necesidad de que los 
gobiernos valoren todas las implicaciones que se pueden derivar de cada una de las 
decisiones que adopten.  
En el segundo capítulo de esta tesis analizamos otro problema vinculado con la 
fecundidad, los embarazos de mujeres adolescentes. En concreto, estudiamos el impacto 
que la cultura tiene sobre la probabilidad de que las mujeres sufran uno de ellos. Estos 
embarazos, a pesar de representar un porcentaje importante de la tasa total de 
fecundidad, sobre todo en determinados países, suponen una preocupación para los 
mismos debido a las consecuencias negativas que se derivan de ellos. Investigaciones 
previas han establecido que experimentar un embarazo adolescente se asocia con peores 
condiciones socioeconómicas tanto para las madres (Chevalier y Viitanen 2003) como 
para sus hijos (Francesconi 2008). Además, estas madres adolescentes tienen más 
probabilidades de realizar una menor inversión en su propia educación (Hofferth et al. 
2001; Klepinger et al. 1999), lo que influye en su capital humano, y hace que perciban 
menores salarios en el futuro (Chevalier y Viitanen 2003; Hoffman et al. 1993; 
Klepinger et al. 1999).  
Para desarrollar este análisis consideramos únicamente a aquellas mujeres 
inmigrantes de segunda y superior generación que han nacido y han vivido en los 
Estados Unidos, de manera que todas ellas hayan estado expuestas a las mismas leyes e 
instituciones, y hacemos uso de las variaciones en las tasas de fecundidad de las 
adolescentes en función del país de procedencia de sus antecesores. De este modo, si 
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existen diferencias en la probabilidad de concebir un hijo siendo adolescente en función 
del país de origen, éstas pueden ser consideradas como evidencia del impacto de la 
cultura. 
Los resultados muestran que la cultura tiene un impacto cuantitativamente 
significativo en la probabilidad de experimentar un embarazo adolescente, lo que 
implica una serie de consecuencias negativas tanto para la madre como para sus hijos. 
Aquellas mujeres originarias de países con actitudes más favorables hacia los 
embarazos adolescentes tienen mayores probabilidades de quedarse embarazadas 
durante la adolescencia. Estos resultados son robustos a cambios en la muestra 
seleccionada y a la inclusión de controles para determinadas características del país de 
origen. También se incluyen variables de control midiendo características individuales 
de las mujeres adolescentes, sin que los resultados sufran cambios significativos.   
Estos resultados tienen importantes implicaciones políticas y económicas que los 
gobiernos deberían tener en cuenta si pretenden reducir las tasas de fecundidad 
adolescente debido a sus consecuencias negativas. En la medida en la que se demuestra 
que la cultura representa un papel importante sobre la probabilidad de experimentar un 
embarazo adolescente, se pone en tela de juicio la efectividad, y por lo tanto la 
rentabilidad, de las políticas tradicionales destinadas a reducir estos embarazos. Estas 
políticas, entre las que se encuentran la difusión de información relativa a métodos 
anticonceptivos o la mejora de la educación sexual de los adolescentes, no tienen en 
cuenta las diferencias culturales de aquellos a quienes se dirigen. Basándonos en los 
resultados obtenidos, consideramos que es esencial que los gobiernos desarrollen 
nuevas medidas destinadas a reducir estos embarazos que sí tengan en cuenta la cultura 
de los adolescentes, como contratar a especialistas en planificación familiar o a 
trabajadores sociales de diversos orígenes o razas, de manera que puedan comprender y 
empatizar mejor con las circunstancias específicas de cada mujer en función de su 
cultura. 
En el tercer capítulo de esta tesis estudiamos el impacto que los hijos concebidos 
durante el primer matrimonio tienen sobre el riesgo de ruptura matrimonial. Becker 
(1981) expone que los hijos pueden ser considerados como inversiones específicas que 
la pareja realiza en su propio matrimonio, lo que hace subir el valor del mismo, 
reforzando su estabilidad. Sin embargo, existe cierta controversia a nivel empírico con 
respecto a este asunto. Andersson (1997), Cherlin (1977) o Steele et al. (2005) 
encuentran en sus investigaciones que los hijos efectivamente reducen la probabilidad 
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de que se produzca una ruptura matrimonial, especialmente cuando son jóvenes. Koo y 
Janowitz (1983), sin embargo, no hallan ningún efecto de los hijos sobre la estabilidad 
matrimonial. Otros trabajos encuentran resultados mixtos, como Waite y Lillard (1993), 
quienes obtienen que el primer hijo de la pareja sí tiene un efecto estabilizador, mientras 
que el resto tienen el efecto contrario, o Chan y Halpin (2002), cuyos resultados apuntan 
a que durante la década de los años ochenta se produjo un cambio en el impacto de los 
hijos sobre la probabilidad de ruptura matrimonial, pasando de ser negativo a positivo. 
Finalmente, Svarer y Verner (2008) y Vuri (2001) hallan resultados contradictorios en 
función de la metodología utilizada. En un principio encuentran evidencia empírica del 
efecto disuasorio de los hijos sobre la probabilidad de ruptura matrimonial, pero una vez 
que consideran la endogeneidad entre ambas variables, el resultado que obtienen es el 
contrario. 
Teniendo en cuenta estas investigaciones anteriores, desarrollamos nuestro análisis 
para arrojar luz sobre el verdadero efecto que los hijos tienen sobre la estabilidad 
marital. Los resultados de nuestro estudio confirman el efecto disuasorio de los hijos 
sobre la posibilidad de que se produzca una ruptura de la pareja. Posteriormente, 
continuamos con nuestro análisis teniendo en cuenta la potencial endogeneidad 
existente entre los hijos y la estabilidad marital. Por una parte, y siguiendo la teoría 
expuesta por Becker, los hijos pueden ser considerados como una inversión de la pareja 
en su propio matrimonio, lo que debería aumentar su valor y reforzarlo, pero por otro 
lado, aquellas parejas con más problemas maritales son menos propensas a procrear 
(Myers 1997). Para superar estos problemas de endogeneidad, desarrollamos un 
enfoque de variables instrumentales que confirma el impacto negativo de los hijos sobre 
el riesgo de ruptura matrimonial. Finalmente, en este capítulo también estudiamos si 
todos los hijos tienen la misma capacidad disuasoria sobre la probabilidad de que se 
produzca una ruptura matrimonial, para lo que estudiamos su impacto en la estabilidad 
marital en función del nivel educativo de sus padres. Nuestros resultados nos muestran 
que cuanto mayor es el nivel educativo de los padres, mayor es el efecto disuasorio de 
sus hijos sobre la probabilidad de ruptura de la pareja. De hecho, no encontramos 
evidencia empírica que demuestre este efecto disuasorio en el caso de los hijos 
concebidos durante el primer matrimonio cuyos padres tienen el nivel educativo más 
bajo. 
Nuestros resultados confirman la hipótesis propuesta por Becker, según la cual los 
hijos pueden ser considerados como una inversión que la pareja realiza en su 
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matrimonio, aumentando su valor y haciéndolo más resistente a las tensiones y por lo 
tanto más difícil de romper. Reforzando esta teoría, y de acuerdo con nuestros 
resultados, la inversión en el matrimonio que se realiza cuando se tiene un hijo depende 
del capital humano de los miembros que forman la pareja. De este modo, las parejas con 
un mayor capital humano, medido a través del nivel educativo, realizan una mayor 
inversión en su hijo que las parejas con un capital humano menor, lo que refuerza y 
protege más su matrimonio ante la posibilidad de que se produzca una ruptura. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusiones 
 
- 130 - 
 
Referencias 
 
Alesina, A. and Giuliano, P. (2007) Divorce, Fertility and the Shot Gun Marriage, IZA 
DP No. 2157. 
 
Andersson, G. (1997) The Impact of Children on Divorce Risks of Swedish Women, 
European Journal of Population, 13, 109–145. 
 
Becker, G. (1981) A Treatise on the Family, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
 
Cantillon, R. (1730) Essai sur la Nature du Commerce in Général (Essay on the Nature 
of Trade in General), (edited and translated by Henry Higgs, London: Frank Cass and 
Co.). 
 
Cherlin, A. (1977) The Effect of Children on Marital Dissolution, Demography, 14, 
265-272. 
 
Chan, T. and Halpin, B. (2002) Children and Marital Instability in the UK, Manuscript, 
Department of Sociology, University of Oxford. 
 
Chevalier, A. and Viitanen, T. (2003) The Long-run Labour Market Consequences of 
Teenage Motherhood in Britain, Journal of Population Economics, 16, 323-343. 
 
Drewianka, S. (2008) Divorce Law and Family Formation, Journal of Population 
Economics, 21, 485-503. 
 
Francesconi, M. (2008) Adult Outcomes for Children of Teenage Mothers, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 110, 93–117. 
 
Friedberg, L. (1998) Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel 
Data, American Economic Review, 88, 608–627. 
 
González, L. and Viitanen, T. (2009) The Effect of Divorce Laws on Divorce Rates in 
Europe, European Economic Review, 53, 127-138. 
 
Hofferth, S., Reid, L. and Mott, F. (2001) The Effects of Early Childbearing on 
Schooling Over Time, Family Planning Perspectives, 33, 259-267.  
 
Hoffman, S., Foster, E. and Furstenberg, F. (1993) Re-evaluating the Costs of Teenage 
Childbearing, Demography, 30, 1-13. 
 
Klepinger, D., Lundberg, S. and Plotnick, R. (1999) How Does Adolescent Fertility 
Affect the Human Capital and Wages of Young Women, Journal of Human Resources, 
34, 421-448. 
 
Koo, H. and Janowitz, B. (1983) Interrelationships between Fertility and Marital 
Dissolution: Results of a Simultaneous Logit Model, Demography, 20, 129-145. 
 
Conclusiones 
 
- 131 - 
 
Malthus, T. (1798) An Essay on the Principle of Population, (edited by Donald Winch, 
Cambridge: Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, 1992). 
 
Myers, S. (1997) Marital Uncertainty and Childbearing, Social Forces, 75, 1271-1289. 
 
Smith, A. (1776) The Wealth of Nations, (edited by Edwin Cannan, New York: The 
Modern Library, 1937). 
 
Steele, F., Kallis, C., Goldstein, H. and Joshi, H. (2005) The Relationship between 
Childbearing and Transitions from Marriage and Cohabitation in Britain, Demography, 
42, 647-673. 
 
Svarer, M. and Verner, M. (2008) Do Children Stabilize Relationships in Denmark?, 
Journal of Population Economics, 21, 395–417. 
 
Vuri, D. (2001) Fertility and Divorce, European University Institute, Working Paper 
ECO 2001/5. 
 
Waite, L. and Lillard, L. (1993) A Joint Model of Marital Childbearing and Marital 
Disruption, Demography, 30, 653-681. 
 
Wolfers, J. (2006) Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation 
and New Results, American Economic Review, 96, 1802-1820. 
 
  
 
 
